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Abstract  
 
The propriety of awarding constitutional damages as appropriate relief in South Africa can be 
inferred from the discretionary ss 38 and 172(1) of the Constitution which empower the 
courts to ‘grant appropriate relief’ and to make ‘just and equitable orders’, respectively. These 
damages are claimable against the State for Bill of Rights infringements as opposed to private 
individuals or juristic entities. In spite of the remedy’s promise, the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court (‘CC’) has not been particularly encouraging, with clear guidance on the 
granting of the remedy still at large. There is a challenge of acceptance of the remedy as part 
of South African law, and the problem of approach and process. Unsurprisingly, the courts 
have sought refuge in treading with extreme circumspection, and have approached the 
remedy in a circumstantial and ad hoc manner. A hybrid and functional approach which is 
tailor-made and purpose-oriented would help do away with a formalistic approach that has 
stunted the growth of constitutional damages as a remedy in South African law. This would 
eliminate elevating form over substance, subordinating constitutional vindication to common 
law or statutory remedies, and subjecting constitutional rights violations to indirect as 
opposed to direct constitutional remedy. What must be looked at is the breach that has 
occurred, the ‘mischief’ that needs to be corrected, and the impact that such correction is 
intended to have. This would mean that there are instances where constitutional damages 
would remain appropriate despite the existence of a remedy in common law. This will 
inevitably involve departing from the archaic approach to remedies, to think in terms of a 
closed category of ‘tried-and-tested’ remedies. In determining quantum, the comparable 
common law measure of damages will often be a useful guide, but only to that extent. It is for 
the courts to make an award which reflects what a court considers to be fair and just under 
the circumstances. These are the hallmarks of a functional and pragmatic approach that South 
African courts and those of comparative democracies ought to adopt.  
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CHAPTER 1 
AWARDING CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN SOUTH 
AFRICA - AN INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
More than anything else, South Africa’s hope of developing a modern democratic state 
premised on good governance lies in the promise of the ‘country’s most hopeful feature – its 
big-spirited, visionary Constitution’.1 From this stems the imperative of preserving 
constitutional supremacy and the rule of law. Judicial remedies have a central role to play in 
this endeavour and are yet another transformative element in the constitutional project, a 
project Corder described as ‘the miraculous transformation of the formal instruments and 
processes of governance in South Africa’.2 
Among the judicial remedies to enforce compliance with the Constitution and the rule of law 
are constitutional damages. Constitutional damages comprise a monetary award granted by 
a court to a victim of constitutional violation of rights by the State,3 giving them the character 
of a public remedy.4 Their essence is vindication of constitutional rights and the enforcement 
of constitutional duties,5 as opposed to restitution. Regrettably, in spite of being well-
meaning, constitutional damages have found little application by South African courts. The 
granting of the remedy remains sketchy at best, and to date there is no clear framework 
guiding the awarding of this relief. This thesis makes proposals for a functional approach to 
the remedy, vis, a substantive approach illuminated by the function it seeks to serve that is 
not constricted by common law or statutory remedies, and that does not approach 
constitutional damages as a remedy of last resort, thus subjecting constitutional rights 
violations to indirect as opposed to direct constitutional redress. Much of this thesis thus 
addresses and dismantles traditional arguments that have been used to justify subordinating 
constitutional damages to delictual and statutory remedies, and that have been used to 
position constitutional damages as a remedy of last resort. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Edwin Cameron Justice: A Personal Account (2014) Tafelberg, Cape Town 1.  
2 Hugh Corder ‘Reviewing review: much achieved, much more to do’ in Hugh Corder and Linda Van de Vijver 
(eds) Realising Administrative Justice (2002) Siberink, Cape Town 1.  
3 The word ‘State’ is used here in its broadest sense, to encompass all arms of government at all levels (national, 
provincial and municipal), including government agencies and institutions.  
4 The intersections of public and private remedies, as the question why constitutional damages are only available 
against the state as opposed to individual violators of constitutional rights, are explored in detail in subsequent 
Chapters.  
5 Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2nd ed) (2012) Juta, Cape Town 568 and Iain Currie and Johan 
de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th ed) (2013) Juta, Cape Town 200. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Several cases have come before the courts with litigants seeking constitutional damages.6 The 
courts have been amenable and have obliged in some instances.7 Notwithstanding, there 
exists an uncertainty as to when constitutional damages are appropriate, and how the relief 
is to be approached. The few cases that have reached the courts seeking the relief have made 
this apparent. The problem is two-fold: there is a challenge of acceptance of the remedy as 
part of South African law; then there is a problem of approach and process. As regards the 
challenge of acceptance, courts themselves are not ad idem as to what purpose constitutional 
damages serve, and how the remedy relates to established damages at common law.8 
Resistance against acceptance of this remedy by the courts and legal scholars alike, 
conditional or unconditional, is still apparent. The question arises: what difference is there 
between common law and constitutional damages? For the courts that accept the remedy as 
part of South African law, the second challenge kicks in: under what circumstances are 
constitutional damages appropriate?9 The latter faces the additional question of process and 
quantification, whose answers have thus far appeared elusive. 
 
Owing to the uncertainty surrounding constitutional damages, the courts have sought refuge 
in treading with extreme circumspection. Discordance has been an inevitable result, and the 
minimal development of the remedy under those circumstances is hardly surprising. This is 
notwithstanding the time lapse from the date of promulgation of the interim Constitution, 
the date the first case on constitutional damages was heard, and the present day. In spite of 
a number of cases pronouncing on constitutional damages to date, most judges are no more 
enlightened on how to approach the remedy – as apparent from the discordant judgments. 
For the litigant, the status quo is effectively that seeking constitutional damages is akin to 
venturing into unchartered territory as the outcome is for all intents and practical purposes 
unpredictable.  
 
6 Some of these cases include Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC); MEC, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA); Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 (2) SA 611 
(SCA); Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA); Ngomana v CEO of the SA Social Security Agency 2010 
ZAWCHC 172 39 and most recently Minister of Police v Mboweni and Another 2014 (6) SA 256 (SCA). 
7 For example, Modderklip (note 6); Kate (note 6); Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another 
2002 (1) SA 342 (SE) and Mbanga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and another 2002(1) SA 359 (SE). 
8 Constitutional damages have traditionally been understood to be premised on the vindication of constitutional 
rights. They are not a private law remedy synonymous to delictual damages. The misunderstanding, including 
by the courts, is perhaps best illustrated by Ackermann J’s approach in Fose (note 6) where, having found that a 
case for constitutional damages had not be proven, he went on to argue against granting constitutional damages 
on the basis that punitive damages have no deterrent effect. (See para 71). One gets the impression that in the 
Judge’s view, constitutional damages were primarily – if not solely - predicated on punishment and deterrence, 
and nothing on vindication of rights was mentioned.  
9 Put differently, according to O’Regan, the challenge ‘is the extent to which damages are appropriate relief for 
the vindication of constitutional rights’. See Kate O’Regan ‘Fashioning Constitutional remedies in South Africa’ 
(April 2011) Advocate 43.  
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Against this background, a two-part question forms the basis of this research: Should 
constitutional damages be granted by South African courts, and if so, under what 
circumstances and process should the remedy be granted? Key sub-questions have been 
identified as follows:  
1  What are constitutional damages? What is their significance and how are they 
different from common law damages?10 
2 What is the place of constitutional damages among judicial remedies broadly and 
constitutional remedies in particular? 
3  How have the courts handled constitutional damages thus far, and how have other 
countries dealt with the remedy?  
4 Can constitutional damages co-exist with other common law remedies? If so, how is 
‘double-compensation’ prevented? Does the availability of alternative remedies 
negate a claim for constitutional damages?  
5 How are constitutional damages quantified? 
6 How much discretion do the courts have in dealing with the remedy? 
 
1.3 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
The primary aim of this research is to explore the desirability, possibility and practicality of 
the full acceptance of constitutional damages as part of South Africa’s arsenal of 
constitutional remedies. More pertinent and complex, the research engages with the next 
step of attempting to establish a guiding framework for the granting of monetary damages 
for unconstitutional behaviour by the State and its officials, identifying possible options for 
consideration. Attempts at a framework and possible options focus on three parts, namely: 
identification of appropriate circumstances for constitutional damages, the process in dealing 
with a constitutional damages case, and the quantification of an award.    
At a much broader level, the results of this research are envisaged to add to the understanding 
of constitutional remedies in general, including innovations in the area of judicial remedies. 
It is hoped that this will make a meaningful contribution to a much more effective, proactive 
and responsive understanding of constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the courts’ role in 
exacting accountability on duty bearers. 
In both endeavours, this research seeks to reap the benefits of both the theoretical and 
practical understanding of the remedy under investigation, and supporting concepts such as 
the rule of law and constitutionalism. 
 
 
 
10 It will be noted that by far the most significant argument used to stunt the growth of constitutional remedies 
is the availability of common law damages. 
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1.3.1 Academic/theoretical value 
Before a practical and effective framework is developed, there is the need for a developed 
understanding of the theoretical, philosophical and academic underpinnings of the 
constitutional damages remedy - its foundation, value, and utility. It is for this reason that a 
detailed investigation will be conducted on the rule of law and the role of courts in advancing 
constitutionalism through judicial remedies, with a view of locating constitutional damages 
within that scheme. The origins of constitutional damages are traced, and the value and 
necessity of developing a framework for the granting of the remedy outlined. Significantly, 
there is an existing gap in academic research in South Africa in the area of judicial remedies 
in general and constitutional damages in particular. This research will therefore contribute to 
closing this lacuna.   
1.3.2 Practical value 
This research deals with an important area of law that has a strong bearing on the role and 
authority of the courts in upholding the rule of law and executing their constitutional 
mandate. The remedies and orders that courts grant are indispensable to cementing that role 
and authority, hence the importance of investigating judicial remedies. Currently there is no 
framework for the granting of constitutional damages in South Africa and it remains an issue 
open to surmise and conjecture for litigants, with the courts approaching the remedy on a 
case by case basis, albeit with no uniform understanding of precisely what considerations and 
process ought to be followed for the relief to be granted. The development of a framework 
for the granting of the remedy therefore furthers ongoing legal reform. 
 
1.4 LOCATING CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES  
 
1.4.1 The rule of law, limited government and judicial remedies in general 
 
A constitution is a necessary foundation and ingredient for constitutionalism. Without more, 
however, it does not in itself translate to constitutionalism.11 Constitutionalism is defined by 
its fundamental elements. The first is the concept of limited government, the limitation of 
state power under a supreme constitution and the protection of individual rights through a 
Bill of Rights.12 The separation of powers is another, such that there is no arm of government 
 
11 The terms ‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalism’ refer to two different things. Thomas Paine in Rights of Man: 
Part II (1972) New York: AMS Press 93 defines a ‘constitution’ in these classical fascinating but accurate terms: 
‘A constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people constituting a government, and a government 
without a constitution is power without right ... A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government; and a 
government is only the creature of a constitution.’ ‘Constitutionalism’ on the other hand would mean principles 
which govern the legitimacy of government action by describing and prescribing both the source and the limits 
of governmental power. Such principles include, among others, accountability, responsiveness, separation of 
powers, rule of law and supremacy of the Constitution. 
12 In South African this is achieved through Chapter 2 of the Constitution.  
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with unfettered powers to run government as it deems fit.13 Then there is the rule of law, 
which means governance under rules and not arbitrary discretion, whereby there is 
compliance with the constitution and the laws made under it.14  
Underlining all this is accountable governance. With this concept, an independent judiciary 
becomes central as a key arm in the trias politica whose role is to ensure that the constitution 
is upheld and enforced, and that the rule of law is maintained. In order to effectively carry 
out this role the judiciary must be clothed with the necessary powers and enforcement 
mechanisms to hold those under its jurisdiction to account for their actions or omissions and 
to be a check on the overreaches of the executive and the legislature.15 A matrix of injunctions 
and sanctions helps the courts to exercise this role. It is the coercive and binding nature of 
the sanctions that give the courts their effective authority and integrity. Without that power 
of effective remedies legal and constitutional excesses occur unmuted and with impunity and 
the essence of limited government is lost. People are left at the mercy of those who wield 
power.  
It is against this background that constitutional remedies are formulated for the protection of 
the constitution by judicial means. In the South African context, they are designed to ensure 
accountability pursuant to ss 1(d) and 195 of the Constitution.16 In Olitzki Property Holdings v 
State Tender Board & another,17 the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) explained the importance 
of accountability by stating that ‘there can be no doubt that the accord of civil remedies 
securing its observance will often play a central part in realising our constitutional vision of 
open, uncorrupted and responsive government’.18 
 
Four broad categories of constitutional remedies exist: declarations of invalidity (with 
severance, reading-in and reading down as ‘sub-remedies’ in the category); prohibitory 
interdicts; mandatory interdicts (mandamuses and structural interdicts); and awards of 
damages.19 Of these, constitutional damages are a nascent addition. The purpose of 
constitutional remedies is two-fold. Firstly, the individual wronged must find an adequate 
remedy. Secondly, there is a higher calling to constitutional remedies, which is the 
maintenance of the rule of law, the enforcement of the principles of limited government, and 
the maintenance of constitutionalism and a just society. This second purpose is the collective 
 
13 See Tlouamma and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 (1) SA 534 (WCC) para 59-63 
and the sources quoted therein, for a succinct description of the separation of powers doctrine.  
14 The concept of the rule of law and what it means receives detailed attention in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
15 Section 165 (1) of the Constitution states that: ‘The judicial authority of the Republic in vested in the courts’. 
Section 165 (5) states that: ‘An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state 
to which it applies’. 
16 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
17 2001 (3) 1247 (SCA). 
18 Ibid para 31. 
19 Currie and De Waal (note 5) 183-203 and also Jonathan Klaaren ‘Judicial Remedies’ (1999) in Chaskalson et al 
Constitutional Law of South Africa [Revision Service 5, 1999] 9-5. 
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or societal dimension of constitutional remedies. Constitutional remedies must meet these 
two objectives at all times, directly or indirectly. 
 
But constitutional remedies are neither uncontroversial nor necessarily clear-cut. Part of the 
problem stems from the fact that there are now generally accepted formulations of the 
remedies that seem to have solidified into ‘principles’. One such ‘principle’ is that 
constitutional remedies must be forward-looking, community-oriented and structural as 
opposed to backward-looking, individualistic and corrective or retributive.20 Another even 
more controversial formulation is that constitutional remedies are remedies of last resort.21 
Again, this is an area in which the courts are at variance. But from where does this formulation 
emerge? Is it a matter of convenience or there is fundamental justification rooted in law and 
with a bearing on the substance of the law itself or its practice? Proponents of this formulation 
rely on the so-called subsidiarity principle, which is often described interchangeably as the 
principle of avoidance.22 What has largely emerged from scholars and judges who oppose 
constitutional damages is that this remedy does violence to these ‘established rules’ or 
‘principles’ of law. Whether this violation of ‘established principles’ is perceived or real is an 
issue that very few have been able to confront head-on. This thesis proposes to consider these 
criticisms to their logical conclusions. 
As well-intentioned and seemingly justified these formulations may be, they have an often 
downplayed effect of limiting the scope and reach of constitutional remedies, in the process 
losing the magnanimity of the Bill of Rights and individual justice. While constitutional 
remedies have a goal of upholding a constitutional system and the rule of law, this does not 
mean the individual should be relegated to the periphery and must be sacrificed in the pursuit 
of community-oriented justice. It remains a principle of law that justice must be 
individualised.23 The individual’s victimhood should be recognised.  
This thesis will seek to address the double standards imbued in these ‘principles’, 
deconstructing them in making a case for the full acceptance of constitutional damages as a 
constitutional remedy that does no violence to established notions of remedies. This is done 
 
20 Ian Currie and Johan de Waal (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1, Constitutional 
law (1st ed) (2001) Juta, Cape Town 288. 
21 In Kate v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape [2005] 1 All SA 745 
(SE) at para 20, the court took to task this notion of using constitutional remedies as a last resort and criticised 
the remarks made in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 (2) SA 611 (SCA) that constitutional damages 
may only be awarded where no statutory or common-law remedies exist. This was conformed on appeal in Kate 
(note 6) before the SCA at para 27 where Nugent JA said: ‘But the relief that is permitted by s 38 of the 
Constitution is not a remedy of last resort, to be looked to only when there is no alternative – and indirect – 
means of asserting and vindicating constitutional rights.’ 
22 See Currie and De Waal (note 5) 24-25 where the principle and how it operates is discussed.  
23 In addition, there exists circumstances where backward-looking constitutional remedies are apposite. In 
Mahambehlala (note 7) at 355-356, the court stated that ‘[i]n essaying the determination of appropriate relief, 
it is important to bear in mind that, although constitutional remedies will often be forward-looking to ensure 
that the future exercise of public power is in accordance with the principle of legality […] they may also be 
backward-looking.’ 
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fully conscious of the fact that constitutional remedies in their formulation are not supposed 
to be overly constrained with technicalities attendant to statutory and common law remedies, 
making them a unique species of remedies.24  
1.4.2 The notion of effective remedies  
 
A court will not give an order that it cannot enforce and that is brutum fulmen. This is known 
as the ‘principle of effectiveness’.25 This principle means that the remedy chosen by a court 
must be one that strikes effectively at the source of the constitutional infringement.26 Partly 
for this reason, the superior courts27 have the discretion to fashion new remedies where the 
existing are inadequate.28 This is to allow the courts to grant ‘appropriate relief’ pursuant to 
s 38 of the Constitution and the need for the courts to make orders that are ‘just and 
equitable’ in terms of s 172(1) of the Constitution. Save for declaratory orders, an effective 
remedy in the form of an enforceable verdict must follow each case. In Fose v Minister of 
Safety and Security29 the CC noted that: 
‘Particularly in a country where so few have the means to enforce their rights through the courts, it is 
essential on those occasions when the legal process does establish that an infringement of an 
entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated … The courts have a particular responsibility 
in this regard and are obliged to “forge new tools” and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to 
achieve this goal […] [A]n appropriate remedy must be an effective remedy, for without effective 
remedies for breach, the values underlying and the right entrenched in the Constitution cannot 
properly be upheld or enhanced.’30 
 
The premise is that there must be an effective remedy for each right, as rights and remedies 
are complementary.31 This is, in the words of Marshall CJ in the defining case of Marbury v 
Madison,32 ‘[t]he very essence of civil liberty’. In determining appropriate relief, the CC has 
stated that ‘we must carefully analyse the nature of [the] constitutional infringement, and 
strike effectively at its source’.33 This speaks to the approach that must be taken in 
formulating, developing and granting constitutional remedies in South Africa. This theme will 
feature throughout the analysis in this research. There are several instances where 
constitutional damages will stand as the most effective relief available in the circumstances, 
and the relief will be examined within this context.  
 
24 This is against the backdrop of the Constitution being supreme, and the Bill of Rights being ‘a cornerstone of 
democracy in South Africa’ in terms of s 7(1) of the Constitution.  
25 Currie and De Waal (note 5) 179 put it this way: ‘Courts are more likely to be more hesitant to find a violation 
of a right in situations where there is no appropriate remedy for the violation.’ 
26 Per the Constitutional Court in Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 45.  
27 The Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 defines ‘superior court’ in s 1 as the Constitutional Court, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, the High Court and any court of a status similar to the High Court. 
28 Section 38 of the Constitution, 1996. 
29 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
30 Ibid para 69. 
31 The concept is discussed by Centlivres CJ in Minister of the Interior and Another v Harris and Others 1952 (4) 
SA 769 (A) at 780H-781B. Several subsequent cases also articulate this position.  
32 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
33 Hoffman (note 26) para 45. 
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1.4.3 Necessity and utility of the remedy 
 
Constitutional damages as a part of constitutional remedies serve a specific purpose, just as 
with every constitutional remedy. It is this purpose that makes a case for the acceptance of 
constitutional damages in a clear, precise and ascertainable manner. Constitutional damages 
are about recognising the value of individual rights and are an expression of aversion towards 
violations of constitutional rights and duties. But this remedy is beyond individual interests. 
At the core of constitutional damages is the vindication of rights.34 While this is done by 
means of monetary compensation, this is not compensation in the delictual sense.35 Neither 
is it necessarily about punishing an offender. While these elements are an inevitable part of 
it, the essence of the relief is in affirming the wider public interest in upholding the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.36 
 
A new legal culture emerged in South Africa post-1994, and in the process of democratic 
consolidation there are serious challenges putting the constitutional project at risk. For 
instance, police torture is a prevalent problem. Fose,37 the first case to bring constitutional 
damages before the CC was on this subject. Denial of socio-economic rights, despite their 
justiciability, is a live issue. An even more disturbing problem is the widespread non-
compliance with court orders (or dragging of feet in doing so) by government and its 
departments.38 De Beer and Vettori expose how non-implementation of legislative provisions 
in social assistance cases as well as non-compliance with court orders is rife in the Eastern 
Cape,39 attributed by some to ‘sheer laziness and incompetence on the part of the officials of 
the Department of Social Development’.40 Corder suggests that the seemingly endless series 
 
34 Hoexter (note 5) 568 and Currie and De Waal (note 5) 200. 
35 The Cape High Court in Ngomana v CEO of the SA Social Security Agency 2010 ZAWCHC 172 para 39, said the 
following in this regard: ‘The purpose of constitutional damages is not primarily to compensate for financial 
prejudice or patrimonial loss; it is rather a means by which the courts may seek by surrogate relief to give 
expression to the fulfilment or realisation of a claimant’s abrogated constitutional rights by way of an award in 
monetary compensation …’ 
36 Nigel Lowe and Brenda Sfrin Lowe Borrie & Lowe The Law of Contempt (3rd ed) (1996) LexisNexis Butterworths 
1. 
37 Fose (note 6).  
38 There is a growing body of cases in South Africa that records instances of wilful disregard of court orders by 
the executive and administrative branch of government. For a listing and discussion of some of these cases see 
Rolien Roos ‘Executive disregard of court orders: enforcing judgments against the state’ (2006) 123 (4) SALJ 744 
who cites Clive Plasket ‘Administrative justice and social assistance’ (2003) 120 SALJ 494, 518 and Vumazonke v 
MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape and three similar cases 2005 (6) SA 229 (SE) paras 1–2. See also De 
Bruin ‘Ofﬁcial ignores court order’ (http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News) 28 October 2003; 
and Gibson ‘Manto facing jail threat’ (http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Politics) 22 October 
2003; Magidimisi NO v Premier of the Eastern Cape Magidimisi NO v Premier of the Eastern Cape 2005 (6) SA 
267 (TkD) para 1; and  Rassie Malherbe and Michele Van Eck ‘State Non-Compliance with Legal Duties: The 
Constitutional Court Finally Cracks the Whip Nyathi v MEC for the Department of Health, Gauteng 2008 9 BCLR 
865 (CC)’ (2009) 1 TSAR 191.  
39  De Beer, RJ and Vettori, S ‘Enforcing Socio-economic Rights’ (2007) 1 PELJ 27 at 26, citing the comments of 
Plasket J in Vumazonke v MEC 2005 (6) SA 229 (SE) 233 paras 3-8 where a number of judges who have had to 
deal with such cases are quoted. 
40 Ibid.  
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of decisions about contempt of court when rights are violated emanating from mainly the 
Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth High Courts suggest ‘a very poor, even callous, approach in 
that province to the administration of social welfare grants’.41 This phenomenon has 
unfortunately reached unacceptable proportions prompting references to it as ‘an imminent 
constitutional crisis’.42 So serious is the situation that Froneman J in the High Court in Kate43 
remarked that the courts have become ‘the primary mechanism for ensuring accountability 
in the public administration of social grants’.44 This is a tendency that strikes at the very heart 
of South Africa’s democracy,45 thus justifying the intervention of the judiciary.46 
 
To what extent are the rights of individuals, and the constitutional duties of state officials 
enforceable by law? To this Levine et al assert that: ‘Unless a duty can be enforced, it is not 
really a duty; it is only a voluntary obligation that a person can fulfil or not at his whim. In such 
circumstances, the holder of the correlative ‘right’ can only hope that the act or forbearance 
will occur’.47 Constitutional damages can play a major role in addressing this.  
1.4.4 Legal provisions and jurisprudence in South Africa 
The lawful availability of constitutional damages as a remedy is no longer moot by virtue of s 
38 of the Constitution which empowers the courts to ‘grant appropriate relief’.48 The 
Constitution does not define what is meant by ‘appropriate relief’, and the only relief 
expressly mentioned is a declaration of rights. Another guide comes from s 172(1) which 
requires that courts should make ‘just and equitable orders’.49 This clause makes another 
express mention of other constitutional remedies: declarations of invalidity; orders limiting 
the retrospective effect of such declarations; as well as orders suspending the declarations of 
invalidity for any period and on any conditions to allow the competent authority to correct 
 
41 Hugh Corder ‘Securing the rule of law’ in Carnelly and Hoctor (eds) Law, Order and Liberty: Essays in Honour 
of Tony Mathews (2011) University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg 28. 
42 Roos (note 38) (2006) 745, also citing article ‘SA could face constitutional crisis’ Mail & Guardian Online, 28 
August 2006 and ‘Judge warns of constitutional crisis’ LegalBrief Today Issue Number 1652, 29 August 2006. 
43 Note 21 above.  
44 Ibid para 4.  
45 Malherbe and Van Eck (note 38) 191. 
46 De Beer and Vettori (note 39) 26. 
47 David I Levine, David J Jung and Tracy A Thomas Remedies: Public and Private (2009) West 10-11. 
48 Section 38 provides as follows: 
‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights 
has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. 
…’ 
49 ‘172 Powers of courts in constitutional matters 
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court- 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent 
of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including- 
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow the 
competent authority to correct the defect. 
…’ 
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the defect.50 What this implies is that there is a permissive and flexible regime of 
constitutional remedies, and that the courts are given a wide discretion to define them, the 
guide being that such remedies must be ‘appropriate’ in the circumstances.  
 
Nothing in the Constitution prevents a court from awarding damages as a remedy for the 
violation of fundamental rights.51 As Hoexter argues, the wide and permissive regime makes 
room for constitutional damages where the aim is to regally promote respect for human rights 
and deter future violations of rights.52 Several statutes enacted to give effect to constitutional 
rights have also made express provision for damages. For instance, the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)53 in s 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) allows a court in review proceedings to 
direct an administrator or any party to the proceedings to pay compensation in exceptional 
cases, and this is in addition to setting aside a decision.54  
 
What further emerges from a constitutional and legislative analysis is that there is nothing 
preventing the breach of the Constitution by the State from being vindicated directly,55 and 
constitutional damages are no less legitimate as an exercise of judicial authority.56 They can 
be awarded as long they are justifiable. This should be viewed as a component of the frantic 
attempt to narrowing the disjuncture between the Constitution and its implementation. It is 
not overstretching it to say that the controversial formulation that constitutional damages 
are a remedy of last resort is the key factor responsible for the stunted growth of the remedy 
in South African law.  
From the courts’ vantage point, quite a significant number of cases have been argued before 
them, with litigants seeking the relief. The jurisprudence of the CC has not been particularly 
encouraging.57 This is because the CC has not provided clear guidance on the granting of the 
remedy. Of importance however, in the country’s leading judicial authority on constitutional 
damages, Fose,58 the existence of constitutional damages was not denied by the CC. The claim 
in that case failed because the plaintiff failed to make out a case on the merits. The positive 
aspect of this is that the court did not dismiss constitutional damages as being unsound at 
law. What simply emerged from the claimant’s failure to make a case was that the suitability 
of constitutional damages as relief ultimately turns on facts. The court further denied the use 
 
50 Ibid.  
51 Currie and De Waal (note 5) 200; Currie and De Waal (note 20) 297. Hoexter (note 5) 568 states that by 
empowering a court to grant ‘appropriate relief’ for the infringement of fundamental rights, s 38 gives scope for 
the award of various sorts of damages. 
52 Hoexter (note 5) 568. 
53 Act 3 of 2000.  
54 In Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) para 101 Sachs J in his separate 
concurring judgment noted that ‘[j]ust compensation today can be achieved where necessary by means of PAJA’. 
Arguments on whether PAJA damages are constitutional damages are addressed in Chapter 4.   
55 Kate (note 6). 
56 Gene R Nichol ‘Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims’ (1989) 75(6) Virginia LR 1154. 
57 Currie and De Waal (note 5) 200. 
58 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
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of the remedy for punitive purposes. Disturbingly, however, the court gave weight and 
credence to the ‘remedy of last resort’ narrative. Subsequently, the High Court in Jayiya v 
MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape59 also propagated the notion that ‘constitutional damages’ 
may only be awarded where no statutory or common-law remedies exist. 
 
On the other hand, however, some progressive jurisprudence has emerged. In President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd,60 constitutional 
damages were awarded for the violation of property rights, and in Kate v MEC: Department 
of Welfare, Eastern Cape61 damages were awarded for the breach of the right to social 
assistance. Instructive guidance emerged from both the ratio and obiter of these cases, and 
the court in Kate62 especially was not constrained in taking issue with the notion that 
constitutional remedies, and in this case constitutional damages, are remedies of last resort.63 
The award of damages for the breach of social assistance rights came in the backdrop of other 
similar cases in previous years, reported as Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, 
and Another64 and Mbanga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and another65. 
From these leading cases, and others that have addressed this relief, the conflict is apparent. 
The circumspection and the confusion are pronounced. Without a framework, the courts have 
approached the remedy in a circumstantial and ad hoc manner.66 This very approach is 
responsible for the misunderstanding, over-cautiousness and disappointing growth of the 
remedy in South African jurisprudence. The existing jurisprudence can be summed up as 
having an overall ambiguous stance. Regardless, none of the cases has expressly dismissed 
constitutional damages as untenable at law.  
 
1.5 OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION 
 
Admittedly, constitutional damages do not represent a clear-cut area. The question is not 
simply whether to accept or reject the remedy in South African law. It is a highly complex 
question that has a bearing on several established legal principles and areas of law. There are 
additional questions relating to the circumstances under which the remedy should be 
granted, the procedure the courts ought to follow to reach such a decision, and the 
quantification of the damages. The conflicting arguments on constitutional damages present 
 
59 2004 (2) SA 611 (SCA). 
60 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
61 Kate (note 21) and Kate (note 6). 
62 Supra.  
63 This is discussed in detail in the Chapters to follow.  
64 2002 (1) SA 342 (SE). 
65 2002(1) SA 359 (SE). 
66 Generally, the courts have dealt with each case as it comes. In Modderklip (note 6) the SCA, referring to cases 
such as Fose and Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) stated at para 43 that: ‘[C]onstitutional remedies will differ by circumstance. The only appropriate relief 
that, in the particular circumstances of the case, would appear to be justified is that of “constitutional” damages, 
i.e. damages due to the breach of a constitutionally entrenched right. No other remedy is apparent. …’ 
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the researcher and theorist with several options on how a constitutional damages remedy 
may be applied in South Africa. This thesis will present and weigh these options, with a view 
to identifying and advocating a more workable approach, tailor-made for South African 
purposes and circumstances. Of the options considered in this thesis, there are three major 
ones.  
 
The first is a ‘purpose-oriented approach’. Such an approach would look at the goal to be 
achieved by a remedy, and then consider the most appropriate remedy to address the 
problem. To constitutional damages, this approach would mean that the existence of a 
delictual or other alternative remedy to a claimant would not necessarily mean that a 
constitutional damages claim will be met with failure. Instead, the onus would rest on the 
plaintiff who is claiming constitutional damages to establish why they are the most 
appropriate relief, while the state’s role would be to show how there are other more 
appropriate remedies, or any special reason why constitutional damages should not be 
granted. This approach seems to find support in Canadian jurisprudence, where the courts 
have allowed for monetary damages for the breach of rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.67 Canada follows the same approach in awarding non-pecuniary damages in 
personal injury cases.68 With this approach, what must be looked at is the breach that has 
occurred, the ‘mischief’ that needs to be corrected, and the impact that such correction is 
intended to have. This would mean there are instances where even though there is a remedy 
in common law, constitutional damages will be appropriate.  
A second option is the use of constitutional damages only where no common law or statutory 
remedies are applicable. This is a narrow and constrained approach to the relief. The main 
advantage of such an approach is that it does away with potential overlaps when one has 
other remedies at common law, statute or the Constitution. There are no blurred lines. The 
downside, however, is that this approach subtracts from the essence and purpose of 
constitutional damages, relegating constitutional damages to a ‘residual remedy’ that applies 
when none else applies. This would be an anti-thesis in that vindication of the Bill of Rights is 
of central importance given that this is the cornerstone of the country’s democracy and rule 
of law.69 It is submitted in this thesis that constitutional remedies were never meant to be 
inferior to common law and statutory remedies.70 Regrettably, this approach more than the 
others appears to reflect the cautious and conservative approach the judiciary in South Africa 
 
67 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982. In Canada the Supreme Court allowed the claim for breach of a 
fundamental right by the City Police Department in Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28. 
Constitutional damages, commonly referred to as ‘Charter damages’, were granted for unreasonable search and 
seizure in terms of section 24(1) of the Charter. 
68 Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229. 
69 Section 7(1) of the Constitution, 1996. 
70 This submission is based on the following: the supremacy of the Constitution (s 2 of the Constitution); the 
centrality of the Bill of Rights and the need for the rights contained therein to be protected (s 7(1)); the presence 
of remedies clauses in the Constitution (in particular, ss 38 and 172(1)); and the questionable use of subsidiarity 
as the basis to elevate common law over constitutional remedies.  
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has seemingly taken. The key question with this option is whether the existence of other 
remedies in common law and in statute in and of itself extinguishes a potential constitutional 
damages claim. More fundamentally, it introduces the debate of mutual exclusivity between 
common law and constitutional remedies. 
Closely tied to the second option, the third option is of using constitutional damages where 
the existing common law and statutory remedies are inadequate and fall short of addressing 
the issue at hand. This is where there are gaps, despite there being common law and statutory 
remedies available. In such a case, there may be an impetus to then use constitutional 
damages as a ‘gap-filler’ remedy. The question becomes whether this is the correct or the 
intended utility of constitutional damages. But there is another more poignant issue: when 
the existing common law remedies fall short or are inadequate, the court has the 
constitutional duty to develop the common law.71 Would the use of constitutional damages 
then amount to an option for the court between developing the inadequate common law or 
using constitutional remedies to fill the gap? As with the second option, constitutional 
damages here would occupy an inferior and peripheral position. 
In considering these options, sight is not lost of the fact that the co-existence or mutual 
exclusivity of constitutional damages and common law remedies is not a question confined 
to constitutional damages alone. It is a question with wider fundamental implications for the 
dichotomy of constitutional remedies and common law remedies, and of private law 
remedies and public law remedies.72 As Moseneke DCJ signaled in Steenkamp NO,73 this is a 
complex debate. At best, a determination of a viable framework for constitutional damages 
would consider tenets in all these options, and craft a tailor-made framework that addresses 
the practical and real problems at home. 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THESIS  
 
This thesis is divided into eight Chapters that each focus on key questions as outlined by the 
research questions above. Each Chapter gives a detailed exposé of specific questions, building 
 
71 Section 8(3) of the Constitution, 1996, provides as follows:  
‘When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), 
a court- 
in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the 
extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance 
with section 36(1).’ 
Section 39(2) provides that: 
‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ 
72 This issue was briefly dealt with by the CC in Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 
(2) SA 359 (CC) para 106, with the court asserting that ‘private law damages claims are not always the most 
appropriate method to enforce constitutional rights’. 
73 (Note 54) para 1. 
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into the main question of what framework constitutional damages should follow. The 
Chapters are structured as follows: 
 
CHAPTER 1: AWARDING CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
BEHAVIOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA – AN INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter provides a synopsis of constitutional damages in South Africa and identifies the 
research questions. It places the research in context and provides the necessary background 
information and problem areas, and in so doing provides justification for the research. The 
Chapter gives some insight into the course the thesis follows, and the propositions made.  
 
CHAPTER 2: THE PLACE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES IN A CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY - 
THEORETICAL ASPECTS 
 
This Chapter presents a theoretical discussion of the role of judicial remedies in general and 
constitutional remedies in particular. The aspects of limited government, separation of 
powers, rule of law, and the role of the judiciary are discussed. The enforceability of 
constitutional rights and duties is given particular focus, and constitutional damages are 
located within that context. In particular, the Chapter argues that the emergence of 
constitutional law as a legal culture is the foundation for constitutional damages. It argues for 
judicial activism to aid the growth of constitutional remedies in general and damages in 
particular. In the discussion, a literature survey is conducted on these aspects.  
 
CHAPTER 3: MONETARY DAMAGES AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY 
With Chapter 2 having located constitutional damages within the constitutional remedies 
framework, Chapter 3 deals with the fundamentals of constitutional damages, starting with 
the definition. Differences with common law damages are drawn, and the utility of 
constitutional damages as a remedy is established. A literature survey on constitutional 
damages will be conducted in this Chapter. 
 
CHAPTER 4: A CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW ON CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES - THE GOOD AND THE BAD 
 
This Chapter carries out a detailed analysis of the current South African approach to 
constitutional damages. It starts with a look at the remedies provisions of the Constitution 
and literature around them, and then statutory provisions that allow for monetary damages 
to be paid for violations of constitutional rights. Thereafter follows a look at the seminal 
jurisprudence informing the constitutional damages remedy. An analysis of this jurisprudence 
is conducted and a clear problem statement emerges from this, informing the areas of 
intervention needed in crafting a framework for the remedy. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES 
 
This Chapter weighs the South African experimentation with the remedy against the 
approaches of jurisdictions where the remedy is in advanced use. The first comparator is 
Canada, where the remedy has been developed under the banner of ‘Charter damages’ 
pursuant to s 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The United States of 
America is considered next, where a jurisprudence referred to as ‘constitutional torts’ has 
been developed. Trinidad and Tobago, New Zealand, India and Sri Lanka are also considered 
for their developed approach to constitutional damages and the clarity with which the courts 
handle the relief. Closer to home, Botswana and Zimbabwe are considered. France is then 
considered as a leading civil law country where damages have been awarded for violation of 
fundamental human rights, and afterwards a brief look at the awarding of damages for 
violation of human rights at international law. Finally, a wholesome analysis of the different 
approaches is then conducted with a view to identify lessons. 
 
CHAPTER 6: SUBSIDIARITY, THE CO-EXISTENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON-LAW 
DAMAGES, AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
 
This Chapter addresses the most common and forceful criticisms against constitutional 
damages, being the use of common law remedies to solve constitutional violations and the 
use of constitutional remedies as remedies of last resort. The principle of subsidiarity and how 
it affects direct application of the Constitution and vindication of constitutional rights is 
addressed, in particular, how subsidiarity should not be used to relegate constitutional 
damages and constitutional remedies in general to the status of ‘residual remedies’. The 
Chapter closes with a discussion on how much discretion the courts must exercise in awarding 
constitutional damages. 
 
CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS OF A MONETARY REMEDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – 
SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS AND ADDITIONAL CRITICISMS 
 
This Chapter addresses the key substantive aspects of constitutional damages and their 
implications. Most such aspects are also the basis for criticisms of the remedy, and these 
criticisms are addressed, in addition to the ones identified in Chapter 6. Among these are the 
financial costs of damages to the state; the separation of powers doctrine; the non-
restitutionary rationale of the damages; the deterrence effect of the relief; and the 
unintended consequences of the relief.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION - STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 
 
In this final Chapter, procedural aspects relating to the awarding of constitutional damages 
are addressed, specifically, the nature of the defendant, the elements of a claim, the rights 
for which constitutional damages are claimable and the quantification of the damages. 
Conclusions from the preceding analysis are drawn and the various alternative options for a 
framework on constitutional damages weighed. This is done against the backdrop of lessons 
emerging from the comparative analysis in Chapter 5, and a viable option for South Africa is 
singled out as a functional approach that borrows from other options. 
 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
Conceptually, this research is largely based on the normative constitutional theory, and stems 
from the premise of the supremacy of constitutional rights and the imperative to vindicate 
them where possible with specially-designed constitutional remedies. Normative theory, as 
opposed to empirical propositions, seeks to understand the law as it should operate as 
opposed to how it currently operates. In other words, it is a discipline of re-imagining different 
approaches to the law, with a view to offer propositions of both substantive and procedural 
law, on how best one thinks certain objectives of the law may be achieved. ‘Normative 
constitutional law’ is simply a constitutional law adaptation of ‘normative theory’, which is a 
decision-making matrix of rationality to help people maximise expected utility of outcomes. 
It is concerned with what should and ought to be, as opposed to what is. Desk research is 
used, and this is justified by the nature of the research questions, which can all be answered 
precisely by desk research and data analysis. However, given the need for practicality in both 
the analysis and recommendations, albeit without losing sight of the importance of theory in 
legal reform, the research seeks as much as possible to merge theory and practice. It will also 
attempt to steer clear of romanticised propositions, that is, it will avoid addressing the subject 
in an idealised and unrealistic fashion over practical considerations. The research begins on a 
conceptual and theoretical level, examining the theories underlying constitutional remedies 
in general and constitutional damages in particular. It then proceeds to a practical 
investigation into the viability, feasibility and process of the remedy. 
A diversified approach to sources is taken. This is in order to get a comprehensive assessment 
and a multiplicity of views before proffering suggestions of a framework. The following 
sources are used: 
The Constitution and statutes - The constitutional and statutory provisions which open the 
doors for constitutional damages are examined in detail. Scholarly commentary and 
jurisprudence around the provisions is evaluated.  
Jurisprudence - Court judgments shape the interpretation and application of the law, and give 
in-depth legal analyses of legal concepts and principles and all their nuances. They take the 
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leading role in steering legal reform. The courts’ attitude towards the remedy, and how the 
treatment of the remedy has been changing over a progressive period of time is examined. 
Cases from the High Courts all the way to the Constitutional Court are examined, and the 
academic commentary surrounding such cases is considered.   
Academic literature - There is little local academic writing on the topic of constitutional 
damages. This is because this topic is relatively nascent and has not been explored to its 
logical conclusions. However, significant arguments and propositions exist in the little writing 
there is, and the current academic thinking as captured in journal articles, books, reports, 
conference papers and presentations, and any similar work, is explored. The literature review 
is done thematically in the preliminary Chapters.  
International Law - As with any other area of law, South Africa operates as a member of the 
family of nations and seeks to align its constitutional remedial practice with international 
jurisprudence and best practice. Thus the authoritative and often cutting-edge voice of 
international law is sought.  
Comparative law - Finally, a core component of this thesis is a comparative analysis of 
constitutional damages in theory and practice in other jurisdictions. Mostly common-law 
jurisdictions will be examined, with the benefit of a different perspective from a leading 
European civil law jurisdiction. Comparators are chosen on the basis of similarities of 
Constitutions and constitutional remedial provisions with South Africa, and the wealth of 
constitutional damages jurisprudence from their courts. There is immeasurable value in 
learning from other jurisdictions, and this benefit is harnessed in this research, especially 
given that constitutional damages are a growing phenomenon in many jurisdictions.  
 
 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
 
It is not always that when government officials violate constitutional rights or when they fail 
to carry out their constitutional mandates, it is out of malice, repugnance, incompetence or 
recalcitrance. At times pressing and justifiable political, policy or economic considerations 
may inform the course of action that the government takes and such reasons must be given 
due consideration before the government is castigated or action is taken against it. This is not, 
of course, to imply immunity, impunity or indifference. Rather it is an acknowledgement that 
the administrator or the executive official entrusted with a task is better suited to carry out a 
task and is the one coming face to face with the realities of discharging their constitutional 
and legal duties. One must not be drawn therefore into making observer commentary that is 
devoid of pragmatism and out of touch with realities. To this end both the theorist and the 
courts should not be oblivious to such challenges, and this thesis will be alive to this danger 
in its assertions and postulations.   
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However, where constitutional violations and dereliction of duty occur without legally 
permissible justification, the judiciary is called upon to exercise its constitutional mandate of 
holding perpetrators to account. This calls for a wider pool of constitutional remedies from 
which the courts can draw, and constitutional damages fit squarely within this framework. 
The effectiveness of constitutional remedies flows from properly defined and detailed 
frameworks within which the courts should operate. Constitutional damages are largely 
lacking in this aspect, but cannot remain so perpetually. Establishing a framework for the 
remedy is therefore an apt endeavour to reap the benefits of the remedy. Before a framework 
and its nuances is proposed, however, it is crucial to illustrate how we arrive at the need for 
constitutional damages and for a framework. This is the subject of the next Chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE PLACE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES IN A CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY - THEORETICAL 
ASPECTS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter seeks to lay down the theoretical framework for constitutional damages. The 
primary sub-question addressed is: What is the place of constitutional damages among 
judicial remedies broadly and constitutional remedies in particular? I thus proceed from the 
general to the specific: why do we need constitutional remedies in a constitutional society 
and how do constitutional damages fit in that cluster of remedies? Answers to these 
questions are to be found in legal principles that include the rule of law, separation of powers, 
and the role of the courts, and these are discussed first. I then look at the emergence of a 
new constitutional culture in South Africa that places a premium on the protection of rights 
as giving relevance to constitutional damages. The primary point is that the post-1993 
constitutional culture dictates a robust protection of the Constitution, and requires the 
development and evolution of constitutional remedies that work to achieve that goal. I then 
consider judicial activism as a tool that has often been used in both the common law and civil 
law traditions alike to develop the law, including remedies. I argue that judicial activism will 
lend to a strong and meaningful application of constitutional damages.  
 
2.2 LIMITED GOVERNMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
2.2.1 Significance of the rule of law 
 
In South Africa’s constitutional society, the Constitution must now be understood as the 
beacon of the rule of law and the ultimate source of legal authority.1 All laws and conduct 
must satisfy the demands of the Constitution. To fully understand the import of this 
statement, we must look more closely at the concept of rule of law. Although the phrase ‘rule 
of law’ was popularised by Dicey in his seminal work Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution as early as 1885, Bingham2 cites authors who in turn cite a number of antique 
sources where the idea itself appeared. Among these is Aristotle who in a literal English 
translation is captured in the following words: ‘It is better for the law to rule than one of the 
citizens so even the guardians of the laws are obeying the laws.’3 Another seminal scholar, 
Fuller, put it in the following terms in 1733: ‘Be you never so high, the Law is above you.’4 
 
1 Tlouamma and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 (1) SA 534 (WCC) para 135. 
2 Tom Bingham ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66 Cambridge LJ 67. 
3 John Warrington (ed. and trans.) Aristotle’s Politics and Athenian Constitution (1959) JM Dent, Book III, s.1287, 
97.  
4 Thomas Fuller Gnomologia: Adages and Proverbs (1733) 943. This was quoted by Lord Denning in Gouriet v 
Union of Post Office Workers [1977] QB 729, 762. 
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Indeed the 10th edition of Dicey’s work records that ‘[l]et no one suppose that Dicey invented 
the rule of law. He did of course put his own interpretations upon the meaning of that rule’.5 
It is an idea that, in Devenish’s words, has an ancient lineage.6  
 
The rule of law speaks of a society where the law is respected and is the ultimate authority. 
This, of course, presupposes that there has been a democratic law-making process and all 
who are subject to the law consent to its authority even if they are not necessarily in 
agreement with all that the law says. Put differently, the law must command the moral 
respect of the people.7 Under rule of law, no one given power by the law for a certain purpose 
may act beyond the confines of such powers, or usurp the power conferred on another – a 
principle known as ultra vires.   
 
According to Humphreys,8 ‘[t]he notion that “the rule of law” captures a particular quality of 
law or a legal system, a quality that must be more or less present or absent in a given legal 
system and that thus provides a basis for evaluating such a system, imbues most accounts of 
the rule of law.’9 It is a concept having a universal validity,10 encompassing inherent principles 
like uniformity, certainty, impartiality and equity.11 Also added to this is the principle of 
legality, which Devenish calls ‘the core or seminal meaning of the rule of law’.12 Zimbabwe’s 
former Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay said the following: 
 
‘…[I]t is an undeniable fact that whatever system of law is applicable, whether it is the English common 
law, the Napoleonic Code, my own, or that of other countries, the rule of law forms an essential 
foundation in any democratic system of governance. It is a concept of universal validity and application. 
It embraces those institutions and principles of justice which are considered minimal to the assurance 
of human rights, and the dignity of man. … [I]t is generally accepted that a society in which the rule of 
law prevails is one in which a climate of legality, observance of the law and an effective judiciary, are 
evident. … [I]t is the antithesis of the existence of wide, arbitrary and discretionary powers in the hands 
of the executive. …’13 
From this emerges an understanding that the rule of law can be understood both as having a 
moral foundation and significant political foundations, though essentially of a jurisprudential 
 
5 Albert V Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed) (1960) Macmillan & Co Ltd, 
London xcvi-xcvii. 
6 George Devenish Constitutional Change and Reform in South Africa, unpublished doctoral thesis, Unisa (1986), 
381, cited in George Devenish ‘The rule of law revisited with special reference to South Africa and Zimbabwe’ 
(2004) 4 TSAR 677. 
7 In a representative and parliamentary democracy, the citizens empower their representative institutions to 
make binding laws which the executive must put into effect. Disagreements must be resolved through the courts 
rather than self-serving disobedience. See Tom Bingham The Rule of Law (2010) Allen Lane, London 60. 
8 Stephen Humphreys Theatre of the Rule of Law: Transitional Legal Intervention in Theory and Practice (2010) 
Cambridge University Press. 
9 Ibid 6. 
10 George Devenish ‘The rule of law revisited with special reference to South Africa and Zimbabwe’ (2004) 4 TSAR 
677, 675. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid 678. 
13 Anthony R Gubbay ‘The Progressive Erosion of the Rule of Law in Independent Zimbabwe’ (2009) Third 
International Rule of Law Lecture: Bar of England and Wales, 9 December 2009.  
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nature.14 In modern society, this quality cannot be divorced from the protection of rights. 
Bingham argues that ‘[t]he rule of law must, surely, require legal protection of such human 
rights as, within that society, are seen as fundamental.’15 This is true for South Africa where 
the Bill of Rights occupies pride of place within the constitutional framework. This is reflected 
by Oakeshott who submits that the rule of law is not merely a procedural attribute, but that 
it also says something about the content of law, and that law should be restricted to the task 
of ensuring that justice prevails.16  
 
While one may be tempted to view it as such, the ‘rule of law’ is not a broad, vague and 
abstract phrase simply to be used as ‘a shorthand description of the positive aspects of any 
given political system’ as Raz warns.17 It refers to something more concrete. Devenish18 
suggests that the German concept of the Regstaat or constitutional state is a more 
comprehensive one than that of the rule of law, encapsulating ‘everything that is good in 
statecraft and public law'.19 The concept, he proceeds, includes inter alia the separation of 
powers, enforceable guarantees in respect of individual rights, the supremacy of the 
constitution, the principle of legality, legal certainty, access to independent courts and multi-
party democracy.20 This is largely correct and true. However, save for the aspect of multi-
party democracy, it is not easily discernible how the rule of law is exclusive of all the other 
aspects identified by Devenish, and how lines can be drawn between these two concepts in 
the modern legal society. Hence we have cases such as National Party v Jamie,21 where the 
court referred to the rule of law as ‘that supreme principle of a civilized constitutionality’. The 
rule of law must not be understood in overly restrictive terms. Price captures the dynamism 
and content-laden nature of the rule of law principle describing it as ‘[t]he continuing 
evolution of South Africa’s conception of the rule of law as a justiciable constitutional master-
principle’.22 The rule of law is therefore also value-laden and at Devenish’s own admission, 
‘the pursuance of social justice and economic improvement is therefore compatible with the 
rule of law’.23 Bingham is of the view that the core of the existing principle is that ‘all persons 
and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled 
to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly 
administered in the courts.’24 The rule of law itself is not dependent only upon positive law, 
 
14 Devenish acknowledges this two-sided face of the rule of law in his work (note 10) wherein he cites scholars 
who criticised Dicey’s conception of the rule of law.  
15 Bingham (note 2) 77. 
16 Michael Oakeshott On History and Other Essays (1999) Liberty Fund, Indianapolis. 
17 Joseph Raz ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ in Joseph Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 
(1979) Oxford University Press 270. 
18 Devenish (note 10) 681. 
19 He relies on IM Rautenbach and EFJ Malherbe Constitutional Law (1999) 11 as authority.  
20 For this he relies on DH Van Wyk ‘Suid-Afrika en die regstaat idee' (1980) TSAR 153. 
21 1994 (3) SA 483 (EWC) 492F. See also ANC (Border Branch) v Chairman, Council of State of the Republic of 
Ciskei 1992 (4) 434 (Ck). 
22 Alistair Price ‘The Evolution of the Rule of Law’ (2013) 130 SALJ 658 
23 Devenish (note 10) 682. 
24 Bingham (note 7) 8. 
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and while it may be couched in positive law terms, it essentially consists of values and not 
institutions.25 What is equally true, however, is that even in a country like Zimbabwe where 
there is a written constitution and a justiciable bill of rights the rule of law can be abrogated,26 
the point being that having a constitution does not necessarily imply rule of law. 
 
In a constitutional democracy such as South Africa, the constitution is the supreme law of the 
land, and the rule of the law in this case requires that all laws and all conduct, including by 
the judiciary, comply with the constitution. To remove doubt, the rule of law was captured as 
a foundational value of the South African society in s 1(c) of the Constitution.27 In the context 
of the adjudication of disputes and constitutional enforcement, the rule of law ‘appears as a 
sort of social glue, a connective tissue holding society together.’28 It means adequate 
protection of fundamental human rights. Ultimately, the promotion of the rule of law ‘is 
explicitly bound up with the primary currents of international political and economic 
development, and today provides a leading language for the articulation and justification of 
overarching public policy orientations.’29 It is also explicitly bound up with socio-political and 
economic development at national level. The aspirations of a nation that are seen to be 
encapsulated by a constitution are themselves dependent on the rule of law, that is, on the 
primacy of that constitution. Preoccupation with the rule of law can therefore not be easily 
dismissed or disassociated from the progress of the nation as a whole, politically, socially and 
economically. This is not to deny the role of other currents to such progress, such as social 
cohesion, economic development, culture, tradition and religion. 
 
2.2.2 Separation of powers and the role of the courts 
 
One of the fundamental tenets of the rule of law is the separation of powers.30 This is so 
because separation of powers, the trias politica doctrine, allows for checks and balances that 
ensure that no one is acting ultra vires. Following the monumental threats to the Zimbabwean 
judiciary during the land reform period, Judge Hefer stated that ‘unfailing loyalty to the 
concepts of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary is required. Without 
it there can be no rule of law'.31 Under the trias politica, state power is separated between 
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.32 Specific functions, duties and responsibilities 
 
25 Arthur L Goodhart ‘The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty’ (1958) 106 Penn LR 943-963 cited in Dicey (note 
5) cx.  
26 Ibid 690. 
27 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
28 Humphreys (note 8) 29.  
29 Ibid 7. 
30 See also Tlouamma (note 1) para 59. 
31 ‘Rule by fear’ Cape Times, 5 March 2001. 
32 In Tlouamma (note 1) at para 60 the court traces the origins of the separation of powers principle in South 
Africa to Constitutional Principle VI of the Interim Constitution of 1993 which provided that 'There shall be a 
separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to 
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.' The final Constitution adopted in 1996 had to give effect 
to this principle, albeit without expressly stating that principle anywhere in the Constitution. The principle is 
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are allocated to the distinctive institutions with defined areas of competence. Seedorf and 
Sibanda33 aptly describe this as separation of public institutions and of public functions. That 
translates to the making of law, application and execution of the law, and dispute resolution.34 
The Western Cape High Court had this to say:  
 
‘The separation of powers is premised on the principle that each branch of government is independent, 
has a separate function and unique powers that the others cannot infringe upon. The doctrine therefore 
recognizes the functional independence of the three branches of government, namely, the legislature, 
the executive and the judiciary. […] The three branches are not hermetically sealed from each other 
and exhibit a degree of overlap.’35  
The above echoes how the principle was understood by the CC in the First Certification 
judgment,36 where it was held that there is ‘no universal model of separation of powers and, 
in democratic systems of government in which checks and balances result in the imposition 
of restraints by one branch of government upon another, there is no separation that is 
absolute [...] The principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, recognises the functional 
independence of branches of government.’37 This proposition was repeated in De Lange v 
Smuts NO and Others.38  
The separation of powers doctrine is thus dynamic.39 In early accounts such as Montesquieu’s 
The Spirit of the Laws40 separation of powers was shown to have been intended to guard 
against tyranny and preserve liberty. Montesquieu in his celebrated work L’Espirit de Lois 
 
imbued in the nature and structure of the Constitution itself, and the powers allocated to each arm of state. For 
authority for this proposition see: Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 (1) SA 
287 (CC) paras 29-30; International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 (4) SA 
618 (CC) para 91; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 
(4) SA 490 (CC); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); and Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature, 
and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC). In Doctors for Life 
International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) para 37 the court held that:  
‘The constitutional principle of separation of powers requires that other branches of government 
refrain from interfering in parliamentary proceedings. This principle is not simply an abstract notion; it 
is reflected in the very structure of our government. The structure of the provisions entrusting and 
separating powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches reflects the concept of 
separation of powers. The principle has important consequences for the way in which and the 
institutions by which power can be exercised.’  
33 Sebastian Seedorf and Sanele Sibanda ‘Separation of Powers’ in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (2014) 1 Revision Service 6, 12-1. 
34 Ibid 12-2. 
35 Tlouamma (note 1) para 60, citing Kate O’Regan ‘Checks and Balances: Reflections on the Development of the 
doctrine of separation of powers under the South African Constitution’ (2005) 8 PELJ 1, 125. 
36 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras 108-109. 
37 Ibid paras 108-109. 
38 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 60.  See also South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others 
2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) para 24, where the court held that ‘[t]he practical application of the doctrine of separation 
of powers is influenced by the history, conventions and circumstances of the different countries in which it is 
applied.’ 
39 Glenister (note 32) para 22. 
40 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws (1748). 
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‘methodically expanded the ideas and doctrine of the trias politica’, holding that the 
separation of the three branches of government was a necessary precondition for liberty and 
to curtail centralised authority.41 Similarly in contemporary times, Chief Justice Pius Langa 
identified the objective of separation of powers as that of ‘secur[ing] the freedom of every 
citizen by seeking to avoid an excessive concentration of power, which can lead to abuse, in 
one person or body’.42 This is an accurate observation given that the essence of the 
constitutional state is the fundamental notion of limited power and accountability. Absence 
thereof attracts abuse or maladministration.43 
 
Where disputes arise and where there is abuse of power or failure to meet constitutional 
obligations, the courts become central. In a society based on the rule of law, people should 
be able, in the last resort, to have their rights and disputes settled by the courts.44 In South 
Africa’s democracy all public power is subject to constitutional control.45 Section 165 of the 
Constitution vests judicial authority in the courts and renders them ‘independent and subject 
only to the Constitution and the law’. Section 172 grants the judiciary the power to scrutinize 
the conduct of the other two branches of government and declare any law or conduct 
inconsistent with the Constitution invalid. This power of judicial review is essential for the 
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers among the three branches of 
government and the rule of law. As Moseneke DCJ notes in International Trade Administration 
Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd,46 in the end courts must determine whether 
unauthorised trespassing by one arm of the state into the terrain of another has occurred.47 
In that narrow sense, the courts are the ultimate guardians of the Constitution and the rule 
of law.48 They are auditors of legality,49 and not only do they have the right to intervene in 
order to prevent the violation of the Constitution, but also the duty.50  
It is in the performance of judicial review that courts are more likely to confront the question 
of whether to venture into the domain of other branches of government and the extent of 
such intervention.51 In circumstances requiring such judicial intervention courts must observe 
 
41 George E Devenish ‘The doctrine of separation of powers with special reference to events in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe’ (2003) 66(1) TSAR 84, 85, quoted in Pieter Labuschagne ‘Trias politica as guiding constitutional 
principle in the modern state: Obsolete relic or constitutional necessity’ (2006) 25 (1) Politeia 18, 20. 
42 Pius Langa ‘The separation of powers in the South African Constitution’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 2, 4. 
43 Devenish (note 41) 85. 
44 Bingham (note 7) 85. 
45 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (note 32) paras 19-20; Doctors for Life (note 32) para 38. 
46 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC). 
47 Ibid para 92.  
48 Doctors for Life (note 32) para 38 and also Glenister (note 32) para 33. 
49 Bingham (note 7) 61. 
50 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (note 38) para 25; Doctors for Life (note 32) paras 68-69. 
For instance, while the Interim Constitution might not have been explicit, the Final Constitution, 1996 expressly 
grants upon the Constitutional Court the power in terms of section 167(4)(e) to decide whether a provincial or 
even the national legislature has failed in its obligation to enact legislation. See SCAW South Africa (note 32) 
para 93. Also Glenister (note 32) para 19. 
51 Glenister (note 32) para 33. 
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the limits of their own power.52 This is the approach that the CC followed in Doctors for Life.53 
Ngcobo J speaking for the majority held that: 
‘Courts have traditionally resisted intrusions into the internal procedures of other branches of 
government. They have done this out of comity and, in particular, out of respect for the principle of 
separation of powers. But at the same time they have claimed the right as well as the duty to intervene 
in order to prevent the violation of the Constitution. […]’54  
 
Having courts that can pronounce on the constitutional compliance of the executive and the 
legislature is of essence to the rule of law, and an independent, impartial and empowered 
judiciary is essential for this task.  
 
2.2.3 Judicial remedies as sanctioning powers of the courts 
 
Having established the meaning and import of the rule of law, and having placed the courts’ 
role under the separation of powers in perspective, it is crucial that we examine the practical 
powers of courts. The coercive power that guarantees the efficacy of the law is found in the 
courts. This is the power to issue binding orders to affected parties. If that is the case, then 
the nature of such orders or judicial remedies is fundamentally important.  
 
It is a foundational tenet of the law that the law must be intelligible, clear and precise. In 
expressing this principle, the European Court of Human Rights said as follows:  
 
‘[T]he law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate 
in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case […] a norm cannot be regarded as a 
“law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he 
must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.’55 
 
This is true of judicial remedies. It is in the interest of the rule of law that judicial remedies as 
a part of the law are clear and that there be some degree of predictability. It is a requirement 
of the rule of law that decisions should be based on stated criteria. Constitutional remedies 
and damages in particular, are not excluded from this. In the following section I proceed to 
explore constitutional remedies and their enforcement. I start by laying the ground on how 
we arrive at having constitutional remedies and why they occupy a unique position in the 
judicial remedies matrix. The answer to these questions is to be found in the emergence of a 
new legal culture in South Arica.  
 
 
 
52 Ibid. See also Bato Star Fishing (note 32) para 47 where the following dicta of the House of Lords in R (on the 
application of Prolife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] 2 All ER 977 (HL) at para 76 was quoted 
with approval: ‘This means that the courts themselves often have to decide the limits of their own decision-
making power.' 
53 Note 32 above.  
54 Doctors for Life (note 32) at paras 68-69. 
55 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, 271 para 49. 
26 
 
2.3 JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
 
2.3.1 The emergence of constitutionalism as a legal culture  
 
Every legal system is premised on a legal culture particular to that system. Cover puts it this 
way: ‘The creation of legal meaning takes place always through an essentially cultural 
medium.’56 Law is one of those cultural domains.57 Every legal system has its own distinct 
history and origins and this significantly informs the system’s legal culture. Rosen thus 
postulates that we can approach a variety of legal systems by looking for the ways in which, 
as part of their larger cultures, each finds itself having to address certain common problems.58 
In short, if culture is by definition constitutive, then the law must be formative and not simply 
formed.59 Thus for instance, delict as a system of law originates and is anchored in Roman law 
and amplified in the Roman Dutch common law. It has a certain value system that places a 
premium on specific aspects of life and society. So when delict protects the right to dignity, 
for example, certain values are attached to it, values and the extent of which may vary with 
other legal traditions and systems. For instance, the common law rests upon an individualistic 
conception of society and lacks the means of enforcing public rights as such.60 This is the 
reason why the fundamental rights mainly protected in delict are personality (individual) 
rights such as dignity, privacy, reputation and bodily integrity. This is but one example of 
differences in value systems between different legal cultures.  
At the centre of South Africa’s legal cultural transformation is the new Constitution. This new 
Constitution brought in a new constitutionalism to South Africa – what Klare described as 
‘transformative constitutionalism’.61 According to Landau constitutions in developing 
countries, South Africa included, are thoroughly transformative documents by necessity as no 
 
56 Robert Cover, cited in Lawrence Rosen Law as Culture: An Invitation (2006) Princeton University Press, 
Princeton and Oxford 1. 
57 Ibid 4-5. 
58 Ibid 8. 
59 Ibid 11. 
60 Dicey (note 5) ciii.  
61 Karl Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146, 150. Klare’s thesis has 
been developed and expanded upon by several eminent jurists and authors, among them Dikgang Moseneke 
‘The Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture: transformative adjudication’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 309; Catherine 
Albertyn and Beth Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenges of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an 
indigenous jurisprudence of equality’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 248; Henk Botha, André van der Walt and Johan van der 
Walt (eds) Rights and democracy in a transformative constitution (2003); Mtendeweka Mhango ‘Transformation 
and the Judiciary’ in Cora Hoexter and Morné Olivier The Judiciary in South Africa (2014) Juta 68; Pius Langa 
‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 3 Stell LR 351; Marius Pieterse ‘What do we mean when we talk about 
transformative constitutionalism?’ (2005) 20 SAPL 155; Cora Hoexter ‘Judicial Policy revisited: Transformative 
adjudication in administrative law’ (2008) 24 SAJHR 281; T Roux ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Best 
Interpretation of the South African Constitution: Distinction without a Difference?’ (2009) 20 Stell LR 258; AJ van 
der Walt ‘Tentative Urgency: Sensitivity for the Paradoxes of Stability and Change in Social Transformation 
Decisions of the Constitutional Court’ (2001) 16 SAPL 1; K van Marle ‘Transformative Constitutionalism as/and 
Critique’ (2009) 20 Stell LR 286.  
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developing country wants to stay as it is.62 That the South African Constitution is centred on 
the need to transform South Africa into a society based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights is now settled.63 In Soobramoney v Minister of Health, 
KwaZulu-Natal,64 Chief Justice Chaskalson wrote that a commitment to transform the South 
African society lies at the heart of the new constitutional order.65 Transformation will thus 
continue to play a key role in interpreting the Constitution.66   
When South Africa adopted the Interim Constitution in 1993 and subsequently the Final 
Constitution in 1996, a new constitutional culture began to emerge. It was premised on the 
Constitution as the supreme reference point of the law, and the supreme source of legal 
legitimacy.  According to Price, the enactment of the South African Constitution amounted to 
a ‘constitutional revolution’ that altered the legal system’s ultimate rules of recognition.67 
Pieterse speaks of a ‘complete overhaul of South African legal culture.’68 A new constitutional 
and legal order emerged, affecting the treatment of both rights and remedies.69  
Traditionally, as with pre-1993 South Africa, constitutional law was primarily structural and 
was concerned with defining government power and limiting its reach over citizens, and in 
that process protected individual rights. The introduction of a democratic Constitution with a 
Bill of Rights as a cornerstone of the evolved society, however, made individual rights much 
more powerful and directly enforceable through the Constitution itself. This made the 
transformation to be one beyond mere change of legal system, formal institutions and 
structures of government.70 It is clear that the functionality of constitutional law in 
transitional South African society has changed.71 As per Chief Justice Ngcobo, the new 
Constitution now demands a change in the legal norms and values of the society.72 What this 
means is that whilst there was no evolution of the grundnorm, the way fundamental rights 
were perceived changed as there was now a new legal ethos designed to safeguard rights and 
 
62 David Landau ‘Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2010) 51 Harv Int LJ 
319. 
63 Mhango (note 61) 78. 
64 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
65 Ibid para 8. 
66 Langa (note 61) 351. 
67 Alistair Price ‘The Influence of Human Rights on Private Common Law’ (2012) 129 SALJ  330, 359, citing Lourens 
Ackermann ‘The legal nature of the South African constitutional revolution’ (2004) NZLR 633. Chief justice Pius 
Langa has also described the transformation project in similar terms as ‘a social and economic revolution’. See 
Langa (note 61) 352. 
68 Pieterse (note 61) 155. 
69 The basis of such a proposition can be found in what Chief Justice Pius Langa traced back to the Interim 
Constitution Epilogue which stated that that Constitution was ‘a historic bridge between the past of a deeply 
divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South 
Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex’. This, the Chief Justice goes on, is a magnificent goal for 
a Constitution: to heal the wounds of the past and guide us to a better future. See Langa (note 61) 352. 
70 Mhango (note 61) 78. 
71 John Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide (2nd ed) (2004) 
Juta, Lansdowne 1. 
72 Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) para 56. 
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promote social justice against a backdrop of political oppression, abuse of power and socio-
economic inequality.73 A violation of a fundamental right now assumes a different, more 
reprehensible character than it did prior to the introduction of the Bill of Rights. For this 
reason, when the Constitution itself provides a framework for the remedying of breach of 
constitutional rights, that framework must find application. 
Two competing concerns are at play when a legal system goes through a period of 
transformation after the adoption of a new Constitution. According to both Roux and 
Pieterse, there is simultaneously the need for legal continuity as well as the imperative that 
old order rules change to give effect to the new Constitution.74 According to Mubangizi, a 
characteristic of a transitional society is that it is invariably engaged in the process of dealing 
with change after the move to democracy.75 The society is primarily concerned with issues of 
justice in response to human rights violations perpetrated during the reign of a former 
regime.76 What is envisaged is a sort of legal and social revolution in accordance with 
institutional values and prescripts, and such transformation is not pursued simply for the sake 
of it, but is intended to bring social change of a fundamental and dramatic kind.77 South 
African constitutionalism attempts to transform society from one deeply divided by the legacy 
of a racist and unequal past into one based on democracy, social justice, equality, dignity and 
freedom.78 This requires an explicit engagement with social vulnerability in all legislative, 
executive and judicial action and the empowerment of poor and historically marginalised 
sectors of society through both pro-active and context-sensitive measures affirming human 
dignity.79  
 
Such an interpretation and application of the Constitution is neither misplaced nor amusing. 
It is proper use of the law to bring positive social change. According to Dror, ‘[o]ne of the 
 
73 François Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9th ed) (2007) Juta, Cape Town 38. See also the 
following on the transformational ambition and potential of post-apartheid constitutional law: Hugh Corder 
‘From Prisoner to Patriarch: Transforming the Law in South Africa, 1985-2000’ (2001) SALJ 118 772-793; Klug 
Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction (2000) Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge; Chaskalson (note 61) 193; and Moseneke (note 61) 309-319. 
74 Theunis Roux ‘Continuity and Change in Transforming Legal Order: The Impact of Section 26(3) of the 
Constitution on South African Law’ (2004) SALJ 466 and Pieterse (note 61) 155. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid.  
77 Mhango (note 61) 78 
78 See Dennis Davis Democracy and deliberation: Transformation and the South African legal order (1999) Juta, 
Kenwyn 44; Pierre De Vos ‘A bridge too far? History as context in the interpretation of the South African 
Constitution' (2001) 17 SAJHR 9-10; Dennis Davis ‘Elegy to transformative constitutionalism’ (2003) in Henk 
Botha, André van der Walt and Johan van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution 
(Stellenbosch University Press, Stellenbosch 57; Klare (note 61) 153; Moseneke (note 61) 315. 
79 Pieterse (note 61) 159, citing Moseneke (note 61) 318-319; Pierre De Vos ‘Grootboom, the right of access to 
housing and substantive equality as contextual fairness’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 258, 267; Sandra Liebenberg ‘South 
Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: An effective tool in challenging poverty?’ (2002) 6 Law, 
Democracy and Development 159, 160-162; and Marius Pieterse ‘Beyond the welfare state: Globalisation of neo-
liberal culture and the constitutional protection of social and economic rights in South Africa’ (2003) 14 Stell LR 
3, 18. 
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more important devices used to initiate and control directed social change is law, a device the 
use of which is prima facie (and, in most cases, perhaps mistakenly) believed to be cheaper 
and quicker than education, economic development and other instruments and ways of 
directed social change’.80 In South Africa’s ongoing constitutional reform and transformation 
process, an essential part of the process is having solid and meaningful constitutional 
remedies in response to constitutional violations that the country is seeking to move away 
from, especially for those groups that were previously disenfranchised and continue to be 
vulnerable. This is an issue of transformation in the sense that most of those who find 
themselves needing the might of these constitutional remedies, including constitutional 
damages, are the previously oppressed and marginalised, those who are at the receiving end 
of societal prejudice and neglect. These are the people who seek social assistance that they 
will need to enforce; they are the people who need their right to housing to be protected; 
they are the ones who will seek to enforce the right to basic education to have their children 
educated; and they are the ones who will seek protection and vindication of their rights 
against police brutality when they face force during demonstrations against poor living 
conditions.  
 
South Africa’s kind of constitutional evolution is not novel. The Unites States experienced the 
same evolution, including through important amendments introducing rights to the 
Constitution. In this regard, Park remarks that ‘[i]nitially, constitutional law was concerned 
with defining the powers of the federal government in relation to the states and the branches 
of the federal government in relation to each other.’81 He adds: ‘That is not to say that the 
Constitution was irrelevant to the relationship between government and society; it indirectly 
protected the rights of private citizens by limiting the reach of government power.’82 
Constitutionalism in the present day United States now also focuses on protection of 
fundamental rights.  
It is prudent to recognise here that before the coming into effect of the Interim Constitution 
in South Africa there were some rights that were litigated upon and protected at common 
law, such as privacy and dignity,83 albeit under sustained assault by the apartheid regime. In 
the Interim Constitution and eventually in the Final Constitution there was a deliberate and 
conscious decision to include those rights in the Bill of Rights as fundamental rights.84 This 
was not devoid of consequence or effect. It meant that these rights assumed a new character 
and importance as fundamental rights upon which the society is founded - a different 
characterisation from the one they had at common law.  
 
80 Yehezkel Dror ‘Law and Social Change’ (1958-1959) 33 Tulane LR 787, 802.  
81 James J Park ‘Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy’ (2003) 38 Harv Civil Rights-Civil Liberties LR 393, 
408. 
82 Ibid 409. 
83 Johann Neethling and Johan M Potgieter Law of Delict (2010) Lexis Nexis, Durban 17. 
84 Du Bois et al (note 73) 37. 
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The judiciary occupies a pinnacle position in advancing the new constitutional culture. In 
Mhango’s words, the judiciary is necessarily implicated in achieving the goal of transforming 
South African society and its various institutions.85 Not only is the judiciary itself required to 
be transformed; it has an important role to play in realising the transformation of the legal 
system and of society more broadly.86 The CC in particular, was created for the very purpose 
of enforcing a constitutional culture when the Interim Constitution was adopted,87 and is 
today at the apex of the transformation agenda in relation to the country’s evolving 
constitutional jurisprudence.88 While there is much progressive jurisprudence that has 
emanated from the judicial institution in the country, more still needs to be done by the 
judiciary in order to fully advance the transformative purpose of the Constitution.89 
 
2.3.2 Criticisms of the legitimacy of the South African constitutional project 
 
In as much as this thesis seeks to push the boundaries of protection of constitutional rights 
as guaranteed in the Constitution of the land, and I advance aspects such as judicial activism 
and an expanded remedial regime in both approach and interpretation of what the law 
provides, I do so within the context of the current existing Constitution and constitutional 
framework. I neither advocate for constitutional reform, nor for the amendment of anything 
within the current constitutional framework.  
I accept the individualised nature of the remedy of damages, but at the same time, I accept 
and advance the damages remedy for its deterrent attribute, and also its ability to redress 
systemic violations that occur. In this nature, it has a two-pronged objective of both 
remedying the breach to the wronged individual(s), and also to solve systemic violations by 
being deterrent. This is essentially the same even with delictual damages. The systemic 
nature of constitutional violations within the context of South Africa is acknowledged and 
accepted throughout the thesis, such as the challenge of social grants administration in the 
Eastern Cape, and the prevalent police torture and unlawful arrests that I refer to in Chapter 
 
85 Mhango (note 61) 69. 
86 Ibid.  
87 See the website of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/text/court/main.html, (accessed 03 June 2016), which gives the history 
of the court and why it was created: ‘It was agreed that a new court, more representative of South Africa's 
diverse population, should be established to protect the Constitution and the fundamental human rights it 
entrances. … A question that arose in the negotiating process concerned the sort of institution needed to protect 
a constitution and the rights enshrined in it. Should South Africa create a specialist Constitutional Court, use the 
existing court structure to act as the guardian, or opt for a hybrid? It was felt that that the new Constitution 
needed as its protector a new court - one untainted by the past. In this sense, the decision to create a 
Constitutional Court was a political one.’ See also Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
‘Discussion Document on the Transformation of the Judicial System and the Role of the Judiciary in the 
Developmental South African State’ (2012) para 5.1.2: The constitutional court was created ‘with a view to 
championing the reform of the South African law and jurisprudence, which was influenced by the unjust laws of 
the erstwhile apartheid regime.’ 
88 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (note 87) para 5.1.2.  
89 Ibid para 3.3.4. 
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1. Therefore, the thesis advances constitutional damages both as individual relief, and as far-
reaching relief for systemic violations.  
In academic theory, very little is ever settled, if anything at all. All find itself within the context 
of contestation, and the legitimacy of the constitutional project is no different. It has to be 
acknowledged that South Africa’s constitutional project does not perch itself uncontested. 
Quite the contrary. The liberal democratic nature of the Constitution as well as the rights that 
the Constitution protects are contested within the theoretical and philosophical realm. Thus, 
scholars such as Ramose,90 have taken on this contestation, quite adventurously so and in a 
remarkable way, questioning and challenging the confinement of our democratic 
appreciation only within the four corners of the Constitution and its underpinning 
framework, in the process questioning the very legitimacy of the very constitutional project. 
This school of thought reimagines the nature of rights protected under the Constitution, and 
the conceptualisation of rights and remedies. Part of what fortifies such contestation is the 
manner in which the Constitution was developed – a process led by a Constitutional Assembly 
and certified by the Constitutional Court, with no direct involvement of the people beyond 
public consultations. Even then, many have argued that the public consultations were 
themselves largely cosmetic, to give the process a resemblance of popular legitimacy. 
Whatever merit there is to this argument, realities of the day are that the resultant 
Constitution of 1996 is the present law of the land, and underpins democracy as it is now 
known and practiced in South Africa today. Further, the South African blend of 
representative, constitutional, direct and popular democracy dictate that none is above the 
other, but that these run and operate concurrently. Thus, while popular democracy may have 
lacked in some degree, representative and constitutional democracy was still at play in the 
manner and process in which the Constitution was enacted. The process of drafting and 
adopting the Constitution involved political consensus on constitutional principles, checks 
and balances through a Constitutional Assembly, and then certification by the Constitutional 
Court. Together, these processes gave legitimacy and credibility to the process. Unless that 
Constitution is repealed, or certain parts of it are amended, it remains law. It is within the 
context of that existing law that I interrogate the question of constitutional damages in this 
thesis.  
However, this thesis does not to dwell on academic contestations, but rather it is a pragmatic 
work rooted in that which currently obtains and applies as the country’s Constitution and 
constitutional framework, as opposed to whether and why that whole Constitution, 
constitutional framework and the rights protected may be wrong or inadequate. As such, I do 
not see it necessary to elaborately address any legitimacy contestations of the very 
constitutional order that applies under the current Constitution.  
 
90 Mogobe B Ramose ‘Towards a post-conquest South Africa: beyond the constitution of 1996’ (2018) SAJHR 
326.  
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The fit and appropriateness of constitutional remedies, is a discussion that can be fully had 
without resorting to critiques or contestations about the legitimacy of the whole 
constitutional project. Whatever the merits of the contestation of the legitimacy of the 
Constitution, the Constitution is currently the valid law of the land – both based on the 
realities and the principle of the presumption of validity of law. Unless that Constitution is 
legally changed, courts cannot shy away from awarding certain remedies that are allowable 
under the Constitution for constitutionally protected rights. 
 
2.3.3 Constitutional remedies  
 
The emergence of a new constitutional culture could not have been without consequence to 
the kind of injunctions and remedies pronounced by the courts. Okpaluba notes that: 
 
‘[W]ith the coming into effect on that date of an autochthonous Constitution entrenching an elaborate 
Bill of Rights incorporating strongly worded enforcement provisions empowering the courts to grant 
‘appropriate relief’ and to make ‘just and equitable’ orders for the enforcement of the guaranteed 
rights, the South African perspective on public law remedies in general and recovery of damages for 
governmental wrongs in particular, was destined to change.’91  
 
Constitutional remedies in contemporary South Africa must be understood through these 
lenses. They bear a particularly important utility in the country’s democracy, and for this 
reason cannot be relegated to a peripheral role, nor can they be viewed in the same way as 
ordinary common law remedies. This is so for at least two reasons. Firstly, constitutional 
remedies are there to atone for constitutional rights violations, rights of which occupy pride 
of place as ‘a cornerstone of democracy’92 in South Africa. Remedies to redress violation of 
these rights must naturally occupy a pinnacle position. Secondly, constitutional damages 
achieve ‘group justice’ as opposed to just individual justice by vindicating the Bill of Rights as 
opposed to merely an individual’s interests. A constitutional culture drives the greater good, 
and has a public dimension to it, even public welfare. Currie and De Waal put it this way: 
 
‘The harm caused by violating constitutional rights is not merely a harm to an individual applicant, but 
a harm to a society as a whole: the violation impedes the realisation of the constitutional project of 
creating a just and democratic society. Therefore the object in awarding a remedy is not only to grant 
relief to the litigant before the court but also to vindicate the Constitution and deter future 
infringements. Vindication is necessary because harm to constitutional rights, if not addressed, will 
diminish the public’s faith in the Constitution. …’93 (Footnote omitted)  
 
Similarly, Didcott J in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security94 mentioned that ‘[s]ociety has an 
interest in the defence that is required here. Violations of constitutionally protected rights 
harm not only their particular victims, but it harms society as a whole too. That is so because, 
 
91 Chuks Okpaluba ‘The Law of Bureaucratic Negligence in South Africa: A Comparative Commonwealth 
Perspective’ (2006) Acta Juridica 118. 
92 Section 7(1) of the Constitution, 1996.  
93 Currie and De Waal (note 5) 181. 
94 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
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unless they are adequately remedied, they will impair public confidence and diminish public 
faith in the efficacy of the protection, and for a good reason too since one invasion discounted 
may well lead to another.’95 To then take a right founded in constitutional culture and deny it 
a remedy modelled, developed and founded in the constitutional framework itself, preferring 
instead to extract or even create a remedy in delictual culture, does disservice to the country’s 
constitutional culture. For this reason, the use of the Constitution as a protector of last resort 
is inappropriate insofar as it relegates constitutional supremacy to the legal periphery, and 
devalues the Constitution. The South African Bill of Rights is not only highly progressive in 
substance but it is also entirely justiciable, hence any affected person may approach a 
competent court alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed and the court 
must remedy such violation.96  
The Constitution, unlike the inherited and subsequently adapted law of delict, is 
autochthonous, having ‘sprung not only from the native African soil, but indeed from the soul 
of the land’.97 This alone changes the legal value system, and where the law places higher 
currency. Thus for instance, though there is an undeniable social justice dimension to delictual 
remedies, delict is not primarily known for protecting socio-economic or political rights, nor 
for being social justice-oriented. This is the prerogative and premium of a constitutional 
culture, whose remedies are generally forward-looking, community-oriented and structural, 
rather than backward-looking, individualistic and corrective or retributive.98 The CC in 
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape99 expressed a similar sentiment that 
the purpose of a public law remedy is to pre-empt, correct or reverse improper actions.100 
Additionally, a public law remedy is meant to advance efficient and effective public 
administration compelled by constitutional precepts and, at a broader level, entrench the rule 
of law.101  
 
As to the nature of the remedies themselves, Klaaren102 postulates that the South African 
Constitution has what he terms ‘primary remedies’ and ‘secondary remedies’. He identifies 
 
95 Ibid para 82.  
96 There are numerous publications dealing specifically with the South African Bill of Rights.  A non-exhaustive 
list includes Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2013); Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African 
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002); Govindjee, Vrancken and Holness Introduction to Human Rights 
Law (2009) Lexis Nexis; and Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical 
Guide (2004).  
97 George Devenish The South African Constitution (2005) LexisNexis Butterworths 39. This is a document crafted 
by South African people, informed by the nation’s experiences and aspirations, embodying the values and 
aspirations of the nation, and designed to usher the nation into its next phase of social, political and economic 
development. 
98 Currie and De Waal (note 96) 181. 
99 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) para 29. 
100 See also Currie and De Waal (note 96) 181. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Jonathan Klaaren ‘Chapter 9 - Judicial Remedies’ (1999) in Matthew Chaskalson, Janet Kentridge, Jonathan 
Klaaren, Gilbert Marcus, Derek Spitz, and Stu Woolman (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (1st ed) Revision 
Service 5, 9-i. 
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what he terms two primary remedies in the Final Constitution: the supremacy clause (s 2) and 
the fundamental rights remedy clause (s 38) – though without clarifying on why he describes 
the supremacy clause as a remedy. Perhaps he implies the power of the supremacy clause to 
render any law or conduct contrary to the Constitution to be void and of no effect. Then there 
is s 172 which deals expressly with powers of the courts in constitutional matters, mentioning 
remedies which Klareen identifies as the secondary remedies. Klaaren also identifies what he 
terms ‘non-judicial’ remedies in the form of s 7(2), which requires the state to ‘respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bills of Rights’. Much analysis can be done on why 
there are two separate clauses specifying certain remedies including the interpretation to be 
employed in dealing with these clauses, but that is beyond the scope of this section. What is 
of interest to this research are three points: identifying the unique remedies that exist under 
the banner of ‘constitutional remedies’, highlighting the place which these remedies occupy 
among judicial remedies in general, and demonstrating the broad and permissive scheme of 
these clauses that allow for constitutional damages to be awarded.  
 
Sections 38 and 172(1) each make express mention of a number of constitutional remedies. 
Section 38 mentions ‘a declaration of rights’, while s 172(1) mentions a declaration of 
invalidity, including an order limiting the retrospective application of the invalidity 
declaration, and an order suspending the declaration for any period and on any conditions 
pending remedial action by the concerned authority. Additionally, s 172(2)(b) allows a court 
which makes an order of constitutional invalidity the discretion to grant a temporary interdict 
or other temporary relief to a party, or to adjourn the proceedings pending a decision of the 
CC on the validity of that act or conduct. While these remedies are specifically listed in the 
Constitution, s 38 introduces a flexible constitutional remedies regime. The section allows 
courts to grant ‘appropriate relief’. This means there is an open-ended list of the remedies 
that can be applied for constitutional breaches and on other constitutional questions. In 
essence, it leaves the judiciary with the creative discretion to formulate remedies that best 
address the matters before them, as long as such remedies fit the description of ‘appropriate 
relief’.103 The judiciary is allowed to continue engaging in a case-by-case inquiry into the relief 
appropriate in the circumstances,104 and the end sought in all this is adequate justice. 
This is confirmed in s 172(1)(b) of the Constitution which allows the court to make ‘any order 
that is just and equitable’ when deciding a constitutional matter within its power. In addition 
to declarations of rights and declarations of invalidity, other commonly known and accepted 
constitutional remedies take the form of reading-down,105 reading-in, severance and 
 
103 See Chapter 1 which briefly discusses the notion of ‘appropriate relief’ and sources cited therein.  
104 Klaaren (note 102) 9-16A. 
105 While reading down is an interpretive tool, it is as much a judicial remedy in the sense that it can be employed 
as the solution (remedy) to a problem of a law deemed to be infringing the Constitution by way of its excessive 
reach. Judicial remedies on infringing provisions of the law are not only textual (in the sense that they delete or 
insert text – that is severance or reading-in), but also conceptual, in the sense that the text is not altered, but 
the reach of the text is placed within boundaries. As a remedy, reading down ‘involves shrinking the reach of a 
statute to remove its unconstitutional applications or effects without regard to the explicit statutory language 
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interdicts. These all qualify as remedies in the broad sense of them being interventions that 
a court can make to undo or prevent a constitutional infringement. Interdicts turn take the 
form of mandatory interdicts, prohibitory interdicts, interim interdicts, final interdicts and 
structural interdicts. Of these, structural interdicts have generated the most debate because 
of their close intersection with separation of powers and judicial deference. Added to this are 
constitutional damages, a relatively novel and contested addition in many jurisdictions. The 
courts are not limited to choosing only one of these remedies per case or issue. Rather, the 
broad discretion conferred by s 172(1)(b) allows for any combination of remedies that will 
lead to an ‘order that is just and equitable’.106  
Currie and De Waal identify certain factors which guide judges in awarding constitutional 
remedies, in addition to what has already been said above. These factors are as follows: there 
is need for effective remedies; a court’s order must not only afford effective relief to a 
successful litigant, but also to all similarly situated people; the need for good government; 
and the principle of separation of powers that requires the court to show the deference it 
owes to the legislatures when devising a constitutional remedy.107 Then there is also the need 
to consider the identity of the violator; the nature of the violation; the consequences or 
impact of the violation on the victim; fault and causation; victim responsibility; and the 
prospects of successful implementation of the court’s order when considering the 
appropriateness of the remedy.108  
The Constitution was not enacted devoid of remedial mechanisms. The clauses and remedies 
enumerated above are directly derived from the Constitution. This means that they are 
specially formulated to deal with constitutional problems, although some of these, such as 
 
that would be required to achieve that result’ (see for example R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223; Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Federation of Law Societies, 2015 SCC 7; R. v. Appulonappa, 2015 SCC 59 at para 85). The South 
African Constitutional Court in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at 
para 23 rendered this rule thus: ‘Judicial officers must prefer interpretations of legislation that fall within 
constitutional bounds over those that do not, provided that such an interpretation can be reasonably ascribed 
to the section.’ When such choice is made, reading down becomes a remedy. I am mindful that some scholars 
such as Michael Bishop think of it not as a ‘true remedy’. Bishops says the following: 
 
‘Described in this sense, reading down does not appear as a remedy but as a mandatory rule of 
interpretation. Unlike “true” remedies, reading down does not follow a finding of invalidity, but avoids 
such a finding by choosing an interpretation that does not violate the Final Constitution. Is it still 
accurate to talk about reading down as a “remedy”’?  
 
[Michael Bishop ‘Constitutional Remedies’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
2ed (Original Service 06-08) 9-1 to 9-99 at 9-88.] 
 
It is an interesting fact of recognition nonetheless that this discussion is had in a Chapter titled “Constitutional 
Remedies”, and under a subsection on categorisation of remedies.  
106 Ibid. At 9-26 Klaaren cites the case of the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home 
Affairs 1999 (3) SA 173 (C), per Davis J, as having done this through invoking this general remedial discretion to 
solve a problem relating to a challenge to the constitutionality of s 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991. 
107 Currie and De Waal (note 96) 183. 
108 Ibid.  
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declarations of rights, are also found in the common law and the courts remain entitled to 
apply them.109  
2.3.4 Judicial activism in applying constitutional remedies 
The preceding discussion has traced the origins of, and reasons for, the existence of 
constitutional remedies. What has emerged is that constitutional remedies are significant in 
directly enforcing the Constitution. The courts find themselves occupying a critical position in 
this regard: standing firmly between the individual citizen and those wielding power, and 
being the ultimate arbiter on constitutional rights.110 The important position that 
constitutional remedies occupy, and the transformation agenda require the bench to have a 
transformative mind-set in its approach to constitutional remedies. It is to this approach that 
this section now turns.  
 
When applying constitutional remedies there is need for the courts to ‘undo the formalistic 
and authoritarian legal tradition that was inherited from the apartheid era’,111 as well as to 
adopt a judicial policy that overcomes legal formalism.112 This is because the South African 
transformation project presupposes a unique approach to constitutional adjudication that is 
aimed at achieving the transformative objects and values of the Constitution.113 The judiciary 
must embrace and actively engage in transformative adjudication.114 This is one 
manifestation of judicial activism.  
 
Judicial activism is an inscriptive term, meaning different things to different people and 
escaping precise definition.115 Generally however it can be defined as entailing dispensing 
justice through making decisions that are in line with the temper and tempo of the 
Constitution, most often arising from inactivity by the executive and the legislature. It stands 
on the opposite side of judicial restraint and is the use of judicial power to articulate and 
enforce what is beneficial for the society in general and people at large.116 This implies pro-
activeness in dealing with particularly problematic issues plaguing the polity, and must 
necessarily mean ‘the active process of implementation of the rule of law, essential for the 
 
109 Chapter 6 in particular addresses the co-existence of remedies and the principle of subsidiarity.  
110 EK Quansah and CM Fombad ‘Judicial Activism in Africa: Possible Defence Against Authoritarian Resurgence?’ 
http://www.ancl-radc.org.za/sites/default/files/Judicial%20Activism%20in%20Africa.pdf23. (Accessed 05 June 
2016) 3. 
111 Cora Hoexter ‘Judicial Policy revisited: Transformative adjudication in administrative law’ (2008) 24 SAJHR 81, 
287 cited in Mhango (note 61) 79. 
112 Hoexter Ibid 285-7. 
113 Mhango (note 61) 79. 
114 Moseneke (note 61) 316-18.  
115 See generally Christopher Wolfe Judicial Activism: Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Security? (1997) Lanham, 
Rowman & Littlefield 1-33 and Quansah and Fombad (note 110) 8. 
116 Lipika Sharma ‘Judicial Activism in India: Meaning and Implications’ 
http://www.academia.edu/2148025/JUDICIAL_ACTIVISM_IN_INDIA_MEANING_AND_IMPLICATIONS (Accessed 
03 June 2016). 
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preservation of a functional democracy’.117 An activist court would feature judges who are 
outspoken supporters of the political, social, and economic rights of oppressed peoples, a 
court committed to the agenda of social justice.118 While the concept of judicial activism is 
quite controversial, it has an important role to play in entrenching the rule of law and 
constitutional governance.119 At the core of the concept is the notion that in deciding a case 
judges, especially those in higher courts, must reform the law if the existing rules or principles 
appear defective.120  
 
Judicial activism is philosophically and theoretically legitimate. Particularly in a society 
wherein executive malfeasance and legislative shortcomings are common, the courts are seen 
as the main bearers of the public’s vision of constitutional transformation, the best 
embodiment of the transformative project of the Constitution.121 Essentially, courts are the 
last line of defence. This is especially true when many people still live in circumstances below 
the threshold of constitutional promise. The challenge of the day becomes to make legal 
justice closer to social justice, and judicial activism can aid the judiciary in its role as a 
stakeholder in collaborative governance with the other two arms of government.   
 
Judicial activism usually manifests itself in progressive interpretation and application of the 
Constitution. Oftentimes it is seen as ‘damage control’ to correct executive or legislative 
excesses, thus it is only temporary or ad hoc. Notwithstanding, judicial activism has a long and 
fruitful history of protecting fundamental rights, particularly when dealing with rights of 
society’s most vulnerable and powerless.122 This, Swart captures in the following terms: ‘[I]f 
one believes in judges as vindicators of a socially progressive Constitution, one would expect 
judges to be activist and creative in the formulation of constitutional remedies,’ especially 
when assisting society’s most vulnerable.123 This is an area of protracted debate in 
constitutional interpretation theory, but it cannot be denied that globally, human rights and 
constitutionalism owe much to activist judiciaries. An activist court is far more effective than 
 
117 Manika ‘Judicial Activism: A means for Attaining Good Governance’ (2006) VII (3) Nyaya Deep NALSA 117, 120. 
118 Carl Baar ‘Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limits of the World’s Most Active Judiciary’ in 
Donald W Jackson and C Neal Tate (eds) Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (1992) who discusses 
public interest litigation in India.  
119 Quansah and Fombad (note 110) 3. 
120 Ibid 3-4. 
121 Vicky Jackson and Mark Tushnet Comparative Constitutional Law (3rd ed) (2014) Foundation Press 780 and 
David Landau ‘Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2010) 51 Harv Int LJ 31. 
122 According to Sharma (note 116), the following are some of the well accepted reasons which compel a court 
or a judge to be activist: i) near collapse of responsible government; ii) pressure on judiciary to step in aid; iii) 
judicial enthusiasm to participate in social reform and change; iv) legislative vacuum left open; v) the 
constitutional scheme; vi) authority to make final declaration as to validity of a law; vii) role of judiciary as 
guardian of fundamental rights; and viii) public confidence in the judiciary. In the South African context, we are 
dealing primarily with the role of the judiciary as a guardian of fundamental rights, the rule of law and the 
maintenance of responsible government.  
123 Mia Swart ‘Left out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the Poorest of the Poor’ (2005) SAJHR 
215.   
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a positivist conservative court in protecting the society against legislative adventurism and 
executive tyranny.124  
Judicial activism has at its core the notion that judges should not hesitate to go beyond their 
traditional role as interpreters of the Constitution and laws given to them by others in order 
to assume a role as independent policy makers or independent ‘trustees’ on behalf of 
society.125 As Nwabueze notes, ‘when the courts seek to confine their own function unduly 
by a narrow, positivist interpretation of the law, constitutionalism may be endangered.’126 
Judicial activism is of particular relevance to South Africa in that the transformative 
constitutional culture requires an approach to adjudication that is an antithesis to a mere 
formalistic or technical approach to law. Klare criticised a formalistic approach as ‘highly 
structured, technicist, literal and rule-bound’ as opposed to the ‘policy-oriented and 
consequentialist’ approach that should be favoured.127 He argues that: 
  
‘The new South Africa has a Constitution with massively egalitarian commitments superimposed on a 
formalistic legal culture without a strong tradition of substantive political discussion and contestation 
through the medium of legal discourses. An opening to transformation requires South African lawyers 
to harmonize judicial method and legal interpretation with the Constitution's substantively progressive 
aspirations.’128  
 
In support of this, Hoexter identifies a formalistic approach as a pre-democratic era-inherited 
‘handicap’ to the judiciary.129 A shift from conservative, formalistic and technical adjudication 
must now be encouraged as a value-laden constitutional dispensation cannot be upheld and 
advanced by an empty, plain and technical approach to legal adjudication of the past purely 
positive law tradition.130  
 
124 Om Dutt ‘The role of judiciary in the democratic system of India (judicial activism under the Supreme Court 
of India) (2012) 2(3) Golden Research Thoughts 1.  
125 Quansah and Fombad (note 113) citing Lino A Graglia ‘It’s not Constitutionalism, It’s Judicial Activism’ (1996) 
19 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 293, 296 where he defines the concept as: ‘By judicial activism I 
mean, quite simply and specifically, the practice by judges of disallowing policy choices by other governmental 
officials or institutions that the Constitution does not clearly prohibit.’ See also G Jones ‘Proper Judicial Activism’ 
(2002) 14 Regent Univ LR 141, 143 where the term is defined as ‘At its broadest level, judicial activism is any 
occasion where a court intervenes and strike down a piece of duly enacted legislation.’ 
126 See Benjamin Obi Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa: The Role of the Courts in Government 
(1977) St Martin's Press, New York 286. 
127 (1998) 14 SAJHR 146, 168. 
128 Klare (note 61) 188.  
129 Hoexter ‘Judicial Policy revisited: Transformative adjudication in administrative law’ (2008) 281. 
130 Chief Justice Pius Langa (Note 61) 357 argues that a conservative or formalist approach to law is inconsistent 
with a transformative Constitution. 
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In the Constitutional Court, judicial activism began to slowly manifest in the early years of its 
existence.131 One can point to seminal cases such as S v Makwanyane and Another;132 Minister 
of Home Affairs v Fourie;133 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom;134 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Group (TAC) (No.2);135 and Doctors for Life International 
v Speaker of the National Assembly136 among several others, as apt examples. When dealing 
with rights such as housing, security of the person, social welfare, right to health, and others 
of a similar nature, the courts find themselves being the pronouncer of dignity and its 
opposite, security and vulnerability, and life and death. It is in these kind of cases that judicial 
activism in the hands of the courts may be very useful and of assistance to redeem and protect 
vulnerable individuals.  
 
Perhaps one of the best illustrations of judicial activism is to be found in the case of Minister 
of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) (‘TAC case’).137 Writing 
as ‘The Court’,138 the strongest way a court can express itself,139 the government was ordered 
to supply the drug nevirapine, a fast-acting and potent antiretroviral drug for use against 
intrapartum mother-to-child transmission of HIV and not to confine the drug provisions to a 
few select pilot centres. The court found that the policy of confining nevirapine to research 
and training sites failed to address the needs of mothers and their new-born children who did 
not have access to these sites, and was unreasonable under the circumstances. In a 
comprehensive analysis, the court also found the government approach to be unreasonable 
on the basis that it violated children’s rights in terms of section 28 of the Constitution.140 The 
court recognised that while HIV/AIDS was but one of many illnesses that required attention 
under an overstretched health sector budget, it was the greatest threat to public health in 
the country,141 and the pandemic was beyond a mere health issue thus requiring the court to 
intervene.142 The government contested the order sought, arguing that owing to the 
separation of powers, the courts should show deference to decisions taken by the executive 
 
131 This is especially true of public interest litigation cases which were invariably human rights cases. Much of 
the country’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence grew in this manner. For a discussion of public interest 
litigation jurisprudence in South Africa, see Musa Kika ‘Justice for the Poor and Many: Public Litigation in South 
Africa Through the Cases – 20 Years of Impact Litigation’ (2013-2014) 2 UKZN Student LR 45. A similar position 
obtains in India, and for this see: KL Bhatia Judicial Review and Judicial Activism - A comparative study of India 
and Germany from an Indian perspective (1997) New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications 116. 
132 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
133 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC).   
134 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), although the judicial deference displayed by the court in its order was the subject of 
criticism by Dannie Brand in ‘Judicial deference and democracy in socio-economic rights cases in South Africa’ 
(2011) 3 Stell LR 614. 
135 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
136 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC).   
137 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
138 The judgment was written by Chaskalson CJ, Langa DCJ, Ackermann J, Du Plessis AJ, Goldstone J, Kriegler J, 
Madala J, Ngcobo J, O’Regan J, Sachs J and Skweyiya AJ. 
139 Edwin Cameron Justice: A Personal Account (2014) Tafelberg, Cape Town 192.  
140 Para 78.  
141 Para 93.  
142 Para 94.  
40 
 
concerning the formulation of its policies,143 and that making policy is the prerogative of the 
executive and not the courts.144  
 
The court did acknowledge that ‘[c]ourts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court 
orders could have multiple social and economic consequences for the community’ and that 
‘[t]he Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, namely, 
to require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to subject the 
reasonableness of these measures to evaluation’.145 That consideration however did not 
cause the court to back off. It is important to reproduce the following lengthy quote from the 
judgment: 
 
‘This Court has made it clear on more than one occasion that although there are no bright lines that 
separate the roles of the legislature, the executive and the courts from one another, there are certain 
matters that are pre-eminently within the domain of one or other of the arms of government and not 
the others. All arms of government should be sensitive to and respect this separation. This does not 
mean, however, that courts cannot or should not make orders that have an impact on policy. … The 
primary duty of courts is to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and without 
fear, favour or prejudice. The Constitution requires the state to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights. Where state policy is challenged as inconsistent with the Constitution, courts 
have to consider whether in formulating and implementing such policy the state has given effect to its 
constitutional obligations. If it should hold in any given case that the state has failed to do so, it is 
obliged by the Constitution to say so.  In so far as that constitutes an intrusion into the domain of the 
executive, that is an intrusion mandated by the Constitution itself. There is also no merit in the argument 
advanced on behalf of government that a distinction should be drawn between declaratory and 
mandatory orders against government. Even simple declaratory orders against government or organs 
of state can affect their policy and may well have budgetary implications. ...’146 (My emphasis). 
The court went further: 
‘A dispute concerning socio-economic rights is thus likely to require a court to evaluate state policy and 
to give judgment on whether or not it is consistent with the Constitution. If it finds that policy is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, it is obliged in terms of section 172(1) (a) to make a declaration to 
that effect.  But that is not all. Section 38 of the Constitution contemplates that where it is established 
that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed a court will grant appropriate relief. It has wide 
powers to do so and in addition to the declaration that it is obliged to make in terms of section 172(1) 
(a) a court may also make any order that is just and equitable’.147 
This confirmed what the court had found earlier in Grootboom148, that an otherwise 
reasonable programme that is not implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance 
with the State’s obligations.149 For this reason, the courts should be prepared to be creative, 
active and forceful in fashioning and granting ‘appropriate relief’ that is required to protect 
 
143 Para 22.  
144 Paras 96-97.  
145 Para 38.  
146 Paras 98-99. The court cited examples where this has been done by the Constitutional Court before as 
Premier, Mpumalanga, and Another v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, Eastern 
Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC) and August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC), 
both decisions that altered policy, planning and regulations and had manifest cost implications. 
147 TAC (note 137) para 101.  
148 Note 134.  
149 Ibid para 42.  
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and enforce the Constitution. In emphatic terms, the court rejected the separation of powers 
argument.150 The court emphasised that what must be made clear is that when it is 
appropriate to do so, courts may - and if need be, must - use their wide powers to make orders 
that affect policy as well as legislation.151 By way of comparison the court cited other 
jurisdictions where courts have granted injunctive remedies, such as in the United States in 
the cases of Brown et al v Board of Education of Topeka et al (Brown I)152 and Brown et al v 
Board of Education of Topeka et al (Brown II)153 and in India, the UK, Canada and Germany.154  
Following the TAC case, the government was forced to draft a policy responding to the 
concerns of the Treatment Action Campaign Committee. It is a fact that had the court not 
intervened, thousands if not millions of people would have died of AIDS in South Africa. 
According to Justice Edwin Cameron this case was seminal for two reasons.155 Firstly, it saved 
the lives of millions of people, effectively bringing an end to an era of government’s denial of 
the AIDS pandemic and its catastrophic effects.156 Today, about 2, 5 million South Africans are 
on antiretroviral treatment,157 and these policy outcomes are directly attributable to the TAC 
case. Secondly, the decision by President Thabo Mbeki and the government to abide by the 
order of the court endorsed the rule of law in South Africa and was a seal of political will to 
abide by the Constitution and the rule of law.   
Such is the power of appropriately employed judicial activism. Regrettably, the activism 
displayed in the earlier CC cases such as TAC has not permeated the development of 
constitutional damages. While it is clear that the courts are clothed with wide powers, they 
 
150 TAC (note 135) para 106. At para 105 the court referred to a case that addressed the same subject, Mohamed 
and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC), in which it was said 
that:   
‘Nor would it necessarily be out of place for there to be an appropriate order on the relevant organs of 
State in South Africa to do whatever may be within their power to remedy the wrong here done to 
Mohamed by their actions, or to ameliorate at best the consequential prejudice caused to him. To 
stigmatise such an order as a breach of the separation of State power as between the Executive and 
the Judiciary is to negate a foundational value of the Republic of South Africa, namely supremacy of the 
Constitution and the rule of law. The Bill of Rights, which we find to have been infringed, is binding on 
all organs of State and it is our constitutional duty to ensure that appropriate relief is afforded to those 
who have suffered infringement of their constitutional rights. …’ 
151 TAC (note 137) para 113.   
152 347 US 483 (1954). 
153 349 US 294 (1955) para 107.  
154 After discussing the jurisprudence in foreign jurisdictions on the permissible scope of court orders the court 
said in para 112: ‘… The various courts adopt different attitudes to when such remedies should be granted, but 
all accept that within the separation of powers they have the power to make use of such remedies – particularly 
when the State’s obligations are not performed diligently and without delay.’ 
155 Address at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Law School, 2014. For a detailed account on AIDS 
denialism in South Africa and the impact of the TAC decision, see Edwin Cameron Witness to Aids (2005) IB 
Tauris. 
156 According to the Human Sciences Research Council, 6.4 million people are living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa 
(I van der Linde ‘HIV/AIDS in South Africa: At last the glass is half full’, 20 June 2013. 
http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/media-briefs/hiv-aids-stis-and-tb/plenary-session-3-20-june-2013-hiv-aids-in-south-
africa-at-last-the-glass-is-half-full (Accessed 31 July 2014)). 
157 See Laura Gonzalez ‘How South Africa’s fight against HIV stacks up’, 3 September 2013. http://www.health-
e.org.za/2013/09/23/south-africas-fight-hiv-stacks/ (Accessed 31 July 2014). 
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require creativity and courage to impose remedies that may seemingly be offensive and not 
palatable to the government of the day, yet for the greater good of society. The Chief Justice 
of Tanzania remarked as follows in describing the crucial responsibility played by judges: 
 
‘Through judicial activism and the delivery of equitable justice, judges fulfil the expectations of the poor, 
the ignorant and the illiterate. We judges cannot escape from addressing the question that confronts 
the people in their quest for justice and freedom. They are demanding freedom from want, 
independence from poverty and destitution, from ignorance and illiteracy. The judges, in interpreting 
fundamental rights, cannot forget these quests for freedom, the demands of the people for social and 
economic advancement, which in reality constitutes “social justice”’.158 
 
Comparatively, the leading activist courts worldwide can be found in the Colombian 
Constitutional Court and the Indian Supreme Court, with the former being necessitated by 
dysfunctional constitutional and political systems and institutions. It has been said that the 
greatest contribution of judicial activism in India has been that of providing a safety valve in 
a democracy and a hope that justice is not beyond reach.159 The point to be made is how 
important judicial activism can be used to create robust and vigilant judiciaries that can step-
in to cover the gaps in legislative and executive failures to protect constitutions guarantees.  
 
With judicial activism, the note of caution to be sounded is the danger of ‘unrestrained 
activism’, when a judge injects their personal views into judgments or expresses political 
preferences which may lead to far-reaching political consequences that could undermine the 
body politic.160 Justice Rao of the Indian High Court said the following in this regard: 
 
‘Judicial activism should not result in rewriting of the Constitution or any legislative enactments. 
Reconciliation of the permanent values embodied in the Constitution with the transitional and changing 
requirements of the society must not result in undermining the integrity of the Constitution. Any 
attempt leading to such a consequence would destroy the very structure of the constitutional 
institutions. Conscious of the primordial fact that the Constitution is the supreme document, the 
mechanism under which laws must be made and governance of the country carried on, the judiciary 
must play its activist role. No constitutional value propounded by the judiciary should run counter to 
any explicitly stated constitutional obligations or rights. In the name of doing justice and taking shelter 
under institutional self-righteousness, the judiciary cannot act in a manner disturbing the delicate 
balance between the three wings of the State.’161 
Chief Justice Langa correctly put the need for this balancing as follows: ‘Overly activist judges 
can be as dangerous for the fulfilment of the constitutional dream as unduly passive judges. 
Both disturb the finely-balanced ordering of society and endanger the ideals of 
 
158 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Discussion Document on the Transformation of the 
Judicial System and the Role of the Judiciary in the Developmental South African State’ (2012) citing ‘The 
Judiciary in Africa’ 198–19. 
159 SP Sathe ‘Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience’ (2001) 6 Washington Univ Journal of Law & Policy 2. In 
addition, see the following for insights on judicial activism in India: Madhav Khosla ‘Addressing Judicial Activism 
in the Indian Supreme Court: Towards an Evolved Debate’ (2009) 32 Hastings International and Comparative LR 
55 and Upendra Baxi ‘The Avatars of Judicial Activism: Explorations in the Geography of (In) Justice’ (2001) in 
Verma and Kusum (eds) Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of India: Its Grasp and Reach (2000) Oxford University 
Press and Indian Law Institute, Delhi 156-209. 
160 Sathe (note 159) 20. 
161 See MN Rao ‘Judicial Activism’ to be found at www.geocities.com/bororissa/jud.html?20088. 
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transformation.’162 Justice Albie Sachs in his judgment in Prince v President of the Law Society 
of the Cape of Good Hope163 reflected that ‘[u]ndue judicial adventurism can be as damaging 
as excessive judicial timidity.’ There can be no denying that judicial activism must function 
within the limits of the judicial process.164 That is not necessarily restrictive. The reality is that 
the trias politica scheme anticipates the necessary or unavoidable intrusion of one branch on 
the terrain of another.165 The CC in the First Certification judgment166 held that no 
constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of powers: the scheme is always one 
of partial separation.167 In any case, there was no intention that the judiciary is to be the 
passive of the three arms of government, but must ‘rise to the challenge of the nation’s 
Constitution, whereby the judicial arm as guardian of the Constitution must shed any form of 
inferiority complex and take its proper place as a co-ordinate arm of government with the 
mandate of checking the exercise of both the executive and legislative arms of 
government.’168 Thus while the courts cannot prescribe how the executive or the legislature 
should carry out their functions where policy and political choices are concerned, the courts 
have a constitutional mandate to prescribe how these branches should operate where such 
prescriptions are an enforcement of what the Constitution requires. As Humphreys notes, 
‘[e]ven if the courts are not necessarily the best arbiters of social welfare policy, they remain 
the privileged centre of legitimacy under orthodox rule of law conditions, as the final arbiters 
of legal interpretation.’169  
 
Remarkably, judicial activism was endorsed in the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development’s ‘Discussion Document on the Transformation of the Judicial System and the 
Role of the Judiciary in the Developmental South African State’ released in February 2012. 
This document pits judicial activism as ‘a yardstick for change’ and expressly acknowledges 
that ‘judges are perceived as organs of change through their judicial activism’,170 and that this 
‘requires a judiciary that is progressive in its philosophy and inclination’.171 In that document 
it was expressed that ‘[i]n constitutional democracies, the Judiciary has the significant task of 
safeguarding and protecting the Constitution and its values. […] It is through exercising their 
judicial power that judges are perceived as agents of change through their judicial activism.’172 
This recognition by the government is crucial. A healthy measure of judicial activism is 
necessary and beneficial. Such a healthy dose would strike a balance between being activist 
 
162 Langa (note 61) 357-8. 
163 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) para 56.  
164 Dutt (note 124). 
165 Certification judgment (note 36) para 108-109. 
166 Ibid.  
167 Ibid. 
168 Nigerian Supreme Court Justice Obakayode Eso, quoted in Gbolahan Gbadamosi ‘Eso at 83: Judicial Activism 
revisited’ 27 September 2011, http://www.nigerianlawguru.com/articles/general/ESO-20at-2083-20judicial-
20activism-0revisited.pdf. (Accessed 23 October 2017).  
169 Humphreys Theatre of the Rule of Law: Transitional Legal Intervention in Theory and Practice (2010) 83. 
170 Para 3.3.3-4. 
171 Ibid.  
172 Para 3.3.2. 
44 
 
and avoiding conservatism. As Quansah and Fombad put it, it must now be recognised and 
accepted that the effectiveness of the Constitution depends very much on the ability of judges 
to breathe life and relevance into its provisions to ensure that they are not frozen in time.173 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
The emergence of a new constitutional culture in South Africa has brought a different, more 
progressive and value-laden understanding of the rule of law, and with it, a more critical role 
for the courts in the separation of powers arrangement. Constitutionalism that has a 
transformative agenda is at play and judicial remedies have become all the more important 
for the maintenance of the rule of law and the attainment of social justice. Consequently, 
there is a legitimate and fundamental need to develop effective constitutional remedies in 
order to enforce the Constitution, including constitutional damages. That task is in the hands 
of the judiciary, and a healthy dose of judicial activism will aid the completion of the task. The 
next Chapter introduces constitutional damages in detail, differentiating them from common 
law damages and outlining why they are an important remedy. This will lay the ground for an 
argument on why the remedy must be fully accepted in South African law, and how courts 
should go about granting the remedy.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
173 Quansah and Fombad (note 110) 21. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MONETARY DAMAGES AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY 
 ‘[P]rivate law damages claims are not always the most appropriate method to enforce constitutional rights’. 
Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC) para 106 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having laid down the theoretical foundations of constitutional remedies in general in the 
previous Chapter, and having located constitutional damages within that framework, this 
Chapter narrows the focus to constitutional damages. Specifically, this Chapter answers the 
questions: What are constitutional damages; what is their significance, and how are they 
different from common law damages? The Chapter begins by attempting a definition for 
constitutional damages, followed by a discussion of the South African literature on the 
subject. I then proceed to lay out the utility of constitutional damages, and the Chapter closes 
by looking closely at the differences between constitutional and common law damages.  
 
3.2 DEFINING CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES 
At an elementary level, constitutional damages are a ‘constitutional rights monetary 
remedy’.1 This is when a litigant sues government, its employees and officials for damages 
based on an infringement or denial of the litigant’s fundamental rights or freedoms.2 In South 
Africa these rights are primarily contained in the Bill of Rights, but also elsewhere in the 
Constitution, in statutes, in international conventions to which South Africa is party, and at 
common and customary law.3 These rights serve the primary purpose of protecting the 
individual’s constitutional rights against unacceptable infringement.   
Constitutional damages as a remedy are not predicated on restitutory compensation. The 
relief serves a greater purpose than that. It is part of the broader constitutional remedies 
scheme that focuses not only on the harm inflicted on the complainant, but also on the harm 
to the constitutional goal of creating a just and fair society.4 Rather than it being an exercise 
of attaching a monetary value to each right, constitutional damages make the Bill of Rights 
relevant, meaningful and tangible to individuals, particularly those frequently denied their 
rights. This is what the CC in Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal)5 alluded to 
 
1 Lisa Tortell Human Rights Law in Perspective: Monetary Remedies for Breach of Human Rights: A Comparative 
Study (2006) Hart Publishing, Oxford 46-55. 
2 See Kenneth Cooper-Stephenson Charter Damages Claims (1990) Calgary: Carswell v, and Sheldon Nahmod, 
Michael Wells and Thomas Eaton Constitutional Torts (1995) Anderson Publishing Company, Cincinnati 1. 
3 Section 39(3) of the Constitution provides that ‘The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other 
rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent 
that they are consistent with the Bill’. 
4 Pierre de Vos and Waren Freedman (eds) South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) Oxford University 
Press 393.  
5 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
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by saying that unless the material conditions in which people live are changed, legal rights are 
hollow.6 Not only do damages address the individual violation of the claimant(s); they address 
systemic violations of rights by deterring future violations, and by the very act of a court 
pronouncing on certain conduct as unconstitutional, and sanctioning the violation in 
monetary terms. Although damages by nature look back at the infringement that has 
happened in an attempt to redress the wrong, damages are also awarded to mitigate future 
loss suffered as a result of the wrongful conduct of an individual or the State.7 In this sense, 
they are forward-looking.8  
 
To the student and practitioner of constitutional law, dealing with this remedy entails 
combining knowledge of damages in general, constitutional law and civil procedure, all 
combined in a dynamic field of litigation.9 Just as with any other common law or constitutional 
remedy, constitutional damages have both substantive and structural dimensions.10 
Questions of substance deal with the content and utility of the relief, as well as its desirability 
and applicability. The structural questions on the other hand focus on the nature of the rights 
and the nature of the violations for which constitutional damages are claimable. From a 
structural perspective, there are two constituent parts: the elements of the prima facie case, 
encompassing the duty, basis for liability and causation on the one hand, and various 
immunities and defences that serve to counter claims for damages on the other.11 Together, 
the substantive and structural considerations form a framework in the granting of 
constitutional damages. 
 
3.3 SOUTH AFRICAN LITERATURE ON THE TOPIC 
 
The area of constitutional damages in South Africa is scarcely researched. This is not surprising 
given that judicial remedies in general receive little attention, more so constitutional 
remedies. Nonetheless there exists a small body of work on constitutional damages in South 
Africa, and it is this work that this section focuses on. A significant body of work exists on this 
topic in non-South African jurisdictions, but this section will focus on South African literature 
in order to understand local scholarly thought on the subject. Work from other jurisdictions 
is referred to throughout this thesis, and specifically in Chapter 5 where comparative 
jurisprudence is discussed. 
 
6 Ibid para 8.  
7 De Vos and Freedman (note 4) 409. 
8 One of the main arguments against constitutional damages in that they do not fit into the description of 
constitutional remedies as ‘forward-looking, community-oriented and structural’. This aspect is discussed in 
detail in a subsequent chapter, in which it is shown how constitutional damages are also forward-looking and 
community-oriented. In any case, seeking to confine constitutional damages to these descriptions is now 
outdated and inhibitive.  
9 See Nahmod et al (note 2) xv. 
10 Ibid 1. 
11 Ibid.  
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On the local front, a few constitutional scholars have written on constitutional damages, 
albeit with limited discussion. Conversely, a good number of prominent constitutional 
scholars such as George Devenish have not said a word on the subject. Currie and De Waal in 
The Bill of Rights Handbook12 address the substantive aspects of constitutional damages 
extensively, relative to other scholars. They acknowledge that constitutional damages are 
permissible under the broad and flexible remedies regime of the Constitution, and that 
nothing in the Constitution prevents a court from awarding damages as a remedy for the 
violation of fundamental rights.13 They identify at least two reasons why constitutional 
damages are necessary. Firstly, there are certain situations where a declaration of invalidity 
or an interdict makes little sense and the award of damages is the only form of relief that will 
‘vindicate the fundamental right and deter future infringements’.14 Secondly, the possibility 
of a substantial award of damages may encourage victims to come forward and litigate. This 
may serve to vindicate the Constitution and deter future infringements.15 The second reason  
is particularly interesting given that traditional constitutionalists who oppose constitutional 
damages would regard this type of relief as having the effect of ‘opening the floodgates of 
litigation’ as opposed to achieving deterrence.16  
Correctly so, Currie and De Waal recognise how constitutional damages seemingly depart 
from the conventional ‘principles’ guiding constitutional remedies. These ‘principles’ stipulate 
that constitutional remedies must be forward-looking, community oriented and structural.17 
Instead, a court faced with a constitutional damages claim is required to ‘look back to the past 
in order to determine how to compensate the victim or even to punish the violator’.18 Currie 
and De Waal then proceed to discuss ‘general principles’ attendant to the relief, primarily 
relying on the CC case of Fose v Minister of Safety and Security.19 They extract two ‘general 
principles’ from this case. First, in cases where the violation of constitutional rights entails the 
commission of a delict, an award of damages, in addition to those available under the 
common law, will seldom be available as it will amount to the awarding of punitive damages.20 
Indeed, a negative attitude towards ‘punitive damages’ permeates the majority judgment of 
the court.21 Second, even in circumstances where delictual damages are not available, 
constitutional damages will not necessarily be awarded for a violation of human rights.22  
 
12 Iain Currie and Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th ed) (2013) Juta, Cape Town 200-205. 
13 Ibid 200. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid 201. 
16 It will be noted later that while the court in the country’s leading judicial authority on constitutional damages, 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC), did not address the issue of opening the floodgates 
of litigation, it expressed pessimism as to the capacity of monetary damages to deter future violations.  
17 Currie and De Waal (note 12) 200. 
18 Ibid. 
19 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
20 Currie and De Waal (note 12) 202. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. 
48 
 
This is pessimism derived directly from Fose where the court ‘blows hot and cold’23 on the 
issue, approbating and reprobating at the same time. The court states that there is no reason 
why appropriate relief cannot include constitutional damages, then expresses doubt as to 
when exactly these damages would be appropriate. Following this line of the CC in Fose, 
Currie and De Waal’s inclinations are that one must rather seek common law remedies first, 
which the court would develop to cover constitutional breaches if needs be. Only when no 
common law remedies are applicable should one then resort to constitutional damages. Thus, 
they favour the indirect application approach to constitutional damages.24 The choice, they 
say, is essentially one between awarding constitutional damages to individual litigants, and 
structural relief aimed at addressing the systemic problem that caused the infringements.25 
The former, they argue, may appear to be an effective short-term remedy from a litigant’s 
perspective, but it does not sit well with the purpose of constitutional relief, which is forward-
looking and community-oriented.26 
Currie and De Waal acknowledge however that the jurisprudence of the CC has not been 
particularly encouraging.27 Despite the difficulties surrounding the relief, Currie and De Waal 
opine that there is room for the development of damages as a remedy ‘for certain violations 
of fundamental rights’.28 As to what these ‘certain violations’ are, the scholars are silent. This 
is a dilemma that even the courts themselves are faced with, a dilemma perpetuated by the 
courts’ failure to define the ‘certain violations’. This is a question for this thesis to address.  
De Vos and Freedman et al29 list constitutional damages as one of the constitutional remedies 
available in South Africa. As with Currie and De Waal, the scholars discuss constitutional 
damages through the lens of Fose. They identify two ‘principles’ from Fose similar to the ones 
identified by Currie and De Waal above. De Vos and Freedman go on to cite the case of 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd30 where 
constitutional damages were granted by the CC, but express the view that the Modderklip 
case is certainly not authority for the proposition that constitutional damages are always 
available.31 Their premise for this proposition is City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another32 where constitutional 
damages were not granted under what the scholars consider to be quite similar circumstances 
as in Modderklip. I would argue, however, that in as much as both these cases deal with 
eviction of unlawful occupiers from private land, the facts of the cases are too materially 
divorced from each other for any accurate comparison to be drawn in a discussion of 
 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 203. 
25 Ibid 205. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid 200. 
28 Ibid. 
29 De Vos and Freedman (note 4) 409-412. 
30 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
31 De Vos and Freedman (note 4) 412. 
32 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC). 
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appropriate remedies. For that reason, De Vos and Freedman’s argument is to be faulted. 
Finally, De Vos and Freedman refer with approval to Currie and De Waal’s suggested reasons 
as to why constitutional damages are necessary.33 
Hoexter enters the debate with her work Administrative Law in South Africa.34 She starts by 
identifying and examining s 38 of the Constitution as giving scope for the award of ‘various 
sorts of damages’ as ‘appropriate relief’.35 She singles out three types of damages that can be 
awarded under this section: delictual or compensatory damages, constitutional damages and 
punitive or exemplary damages.36 She ascribes to constitutional damages the purpose of 
generally promoting respect for human rights and deterring future violations, and to punitive 
damages the purpose of punishing public officials for their flagrant disregard of rights.37 In 
her view, the CC has adopted a cautious approach to damages that goes beyond 
compensation, and she refers specifically to Fose for this assertion.38 Hoexter also refers to 
the administrative justice case of Olitzki Property Holding v State Tender Board,39 a case that 
was heard before the coming into force of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
(PAJA).40 In this particular case, the SCA displayed caution when it was asked to award 
damages to the plaintiff arising out of the breach of administrative justice rights. The damages 
sought were in the form of profits the plaintiff would have accrued had it had been awarded 
the tender in question. Similar arguments against constitutional damages as were raised in 
Fose were raised by the SCA in this case. Hoexter proceeds to refer to another SCA case where 
damages were awarded: Transnet Ltd v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd.41 In that case damages 
were awarded for a fraudulent tender process. Similarly, Hoexter also mentions Modderklip 
as a case in which constitutional damages were awarded for want of an effective remedy.42  
Hoexter then turns to compensation under the PAJA. She identifies s 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) which 
states that ‘in exceptional cases’ the court may direct ‘the administrator or any other party to 
the proceeding to pay compensation’.43 Hoexter raises the concern that what makes a case 
‘exceptional’ is not explained, and it is not entirely clear whether harm or loss is a requirement 
and to what extent. She speculates that other features that may be thought to justify an 
award for compensation are inexcusable incompetence on the part of the administrator, and 
dishonesty.44 She discusses Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape,45 and particularly how 
the court rejected the request to grant constitutional damages for administrative justice 
 
33 De Vos and Freedman (note 4) 412. 
34 Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2nd ed) (2012) Juta, Cape Town 568-574. 
35 Ibid 568. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Hoexter (note 34) 568. 
39 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA). 
40 Act 3 of 2000.  
41 2005 (1) SA 299 (SCA). 
42 Hoexter (note 34) 569. 
43 Ibid 570. 
44 Ibid. 
45 2004 (2) SA 611 (SCA). 
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breaches. Hoexter ends with a discussion of MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate.46 The 
court in this instance was critical of the approach in Jayiya, and awarded constitutional 
damages. 
Klaaren, in his discussion of constitutional remedies,47 starts by identifying other jurisdictions 
where constitutional damages have been granted, and refers to India, Ireland, the United 
States, Trinidad and Tobago and Canada. At the time of writing, Klaaren noted that although 
the Canadian High Courts had granted constitutional damages, known as Charter damages, 
the Canadian Supreme Court was yet to do so. This has since changed as the Canadian 
Supreme Court has awarded Charter damages in Vancouver (City) v. Ward48 and subsequent 
cases. Klaaren proceeds to look at the nature of the remedy itself. He finds that while the 
form of the action is generally parallel, the standards appropriate for awards of damages 
under the common law may not be appropriate for constitutional damages claims, thus 
considerably shifting South African law on damages.49 
As with all other scholars, Klaaren traces the origins of the remedy in South African law to 
Fose.50 In highlighting the pessimism of the court towards punitive damages, Klaaren finds 
that while the action was unsuccessful in Fose, the court held that damages could be 
appropriate relief.51 Klaaren goes on to highlight concerns raised by the court. These are the 
need to prevent overcompensating a plaintiff, more so coming as an expense to the State;52 
the argument that deterrence would be ineffective; and the desire to leave the field of 
determining damages to Parliament.53 Following the judgment of Fose, Klaaren finds that 
there appears to be three routes to judicially granted constitutional damages. The first of 
these, he says, would be where the common law does not provide an adequate compensatory 
remedy.54 The tension here will be whether relief should be confined to remedies of general 
validity, such as invalidity or severance, or should include appropriate individual relief, such 
as damages.55 An instance where the common law would not provide adequate 
compensation is where the Constitution protects an interest that the common law does not 
recognise.56 With these claims, he proceeds, the choice will be between developing the 
common law and invoking the Constitution directly to award damages.57 He argues that the 
 
46 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA). 
47 Jonathan Klaaren ‘Judicial Remedies’ in Matthew Chaskalson, Janet Kentridge, Jonathan Klaaren, Gilbert 
Marcus, Derek Spitz, and Stu Woolman (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (1st ed) (1999) Revision Service 
5. 
48 2010 SCC 27. This and other cases from other jurisdictions are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
49 Klaaren (note 47) 9-9. 
50 Ibid 9-10. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 The latter is premised on the notion that as damages are an expense to the State, the legislature is best paced 
to decide on this remedy i.e. a separation of powers question. This was raised by Didcott J in his concurring 
judgment at para 85.  
54 Klaaren (note 47) 9-12. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid. 
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common law cannot be developed to fit every situation before the courts, stating that ‘[w]hile 
the Fose decision views the South African common law as flexible enough to be stretched to 
provide compensation in most cases, it cannot be bent and pulled out of all recognition.’58 He 
makes a strong case for the existence of constitutional damages in this submission.  
The second route to judicially granted constitutional damages, as identified by Klaaren, is the 
pursuit of an award for punitive damages. Taking a lead from the CC’s argument in Fose that 
punitive damages would serve no deterrent effect,59 Klaaren argues that instances where 
punitive damages would be awarded would be those circumstances where they would be 
likely to have deterrent effect.60 Notably, Klaaren further takes a cue from Kriegler J’s 
concurrence in the judgment where he emphasized that punitive damages were 
inappropriate in Fose because the problem (the allegation of a pattern of police torture) was 
widespread.61 Klaaren, in this regard, argues that by extension, cases where constitutional 
violations were identifiable and discrete and where the deterrent effect would be felt by the 
specific likely wrongdoers would be those matters in which an argument for punitive damages 
might be made.62 The third route he identifies is to seek nominal or per se damages. As with 
punitive damages, the presumption against this category of damages is a rebuttable one 
where no compensation has been awarded in the matter.63 Such awards would have little 
monetary value but would serve to vindicate the constitutional rights at issue, such as in 
political rights cases.  
 
Following his assessment of Fose, Klaaren concludes that a litigant seeking to remedy a 
practice of persistent torture is well advised to seek relief in the form of an interdict rather 
than an award of damages.64 Klaaren however ends his discussion by endorsing Didcott J’s 
views that Parliament should rather deal with the issue of constitutional damages as opposed 
to the courts. He argues that Parliament must pass legislation laying down general guidelines 
on the topic.65 Questions of institutional implementation and funding, he argues, are best 
addressed by a legislature. For this reason, he proceeds, courts should not be eager to allow 
constitutional damages claims although in appropriate cases a court may order damages 
without legislative authorisation.66 Klaaren does not spell out what those ‘appropriate cases’ 
would be.  
 
 
58 Ibid.  
59 Para 71 (Ackermann J); see also para 65, where Ackermann J provides a lengthy list of arguments against 
punitive damages. 
60 Klaaren (note 47) 9-12. 
61 Para 103 (Kriegler J concurring). 
62 Klaaren (note 47) 9-12. 
63 Para 68. 
64 Klaaren (note 47) 9-11. 
65 Ibid 9-13. 
66 Ibid. 
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Funnah and Sibanda, in their comment on Fose,67 explore punitive damages specifically, and 
consider how they have been dealt with by South African courts. They observe that the 
position at present seems to be that, in general, punitive damages as a distinct and 
independent category of damages may not be recovered.68 They then present Fose’s 
conclusion as follows: ‘After much consideration and survey on the issue, including the 
examination of pre-1994 era cases on the subject of punitive damages, Ackermann J held that 
there was no reason, in principle, to award punitive constitutional damages as “appropriate 
relief” for constitutional violations.’69 They quote Ackermann J’s reasoning in the following 
terms: ‘I can see no reason at all for perpetuating an historical anomaly which fails to observe 
the distinctive functions of the civil and the criminal law and which sanctions the imposition 
of a penalty without any of the safeguards afforded in a criminal prosecution’.70 In that sense, 
Funnah and Sibanda view Ackerman J as having taken a purist approach to the civil and 
criminal law divide. They argue that his rejection of punitive damages, based on the 
delineation between the civil and criminal laws derives from the old English position, pigeon-
holed as the function of punishment in close association with criminal law.71 I agree with this 
observation in view of the fact that public law litigation in general does not necessarily lend 
itself to clear categorisation under either criminal or civil law. Very often it is cross-cutting. So 
too are the remedies. Hence we have, for instance, committal for contempt of court as a 
punitive civil remedy.  
 
What Funnah and Sibanda seem to suggest however is that constitutional damages are 
merely punitive and nothing more, and their analysis is premised on the understanding that 
when we speak of constitutional damages, we are speaking of punitive damages. They take 
the erroneous view that constitutional damages are ‘punitive constitutional damages’. No 
doubt, they hold this view following Fose where the court also seemed to view constitutional 
damages solely as ‘punitive constitutional damages’ as opposed to a remedy that can serve 
other purposes unrelated to punishment. Interestingly, despite their narrow view of 
constitutional damages as punitive damages, the scholars see no merit in the CC’s restrictive 
approach:  
 
‘The South African Constitution enjoins the respect and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
In our view, when such rights are threatened and violated, punitive damages could make more sense 
in vindicating them. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court has branded punitive constitutional 
damages as not appropriate, and saw no reason to introduce such damages. Interestingly, the Court 
gave no convincing reason for its stance in this regard except for the inadequately and unconvincingly 
substantiated argument of due process and fair trial guarantees, double jeopardy and, the possible 
exploitation of limited state resources.’72 (Footnotes omitted) 
 
67 Abdul Karim Funnah and Omphemetse Sibanda ‘Towards a Selective Awarding of Punitive Damages Awards 
in South Africa? A Comment on Fose v The Minister of Safety and Security’ (2008) 48(2) Codicillus 36. 
68 Ibid 38. 
69 Funnah and Sibanda (note 67) 38 citing Fose (supra) para 70.  
70 See Fose (note 19) para 70.  
71 Funnah and Sibanda (note 67) 39. 
72 Ibid 40-41. 
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It is their view that punitive constitutional damages could also vindicate rights. Funnah and 
Sibanda then proceed to reject the other policy consideration used by the CC to deny 
damages, being the ripple effect damages awarded against the State can have on the 
country’s ‘economic and social reform’ agenda and on taxpayers’ money.73 They dismiss this 
argument as ‘ironic’ in light of the manner in which the government ineffectively uses its 
resources. ‘In any event’, they argue, ‘when did the government start giving a damn about 
taxpayers’ plight?’74  
 
Similarly, they go on to discuss the rejection of the remedy based on the deterrence 
argument.75 The CC expressed doubt as to the efficacy of punitive damages as a deterrent. 
Didcott J argued that such deterrence could in fact be achieved with private firms.76 Funnah 
and Sibanda pick on Didcott J’s view that punitive damages can easily be justified against big 
corporations and argue that this idea reflects some socio-economic bias of awarding damages 
against those who can pay like big private corporations.77 This, they argue, does not give 
credence to the court’s doubt of the efficacy of punitive damages.78 Although deterring 
individuals is fundamentally different from deterring firms, they argue, what is important is 
that punitive damages are most likely to discourage the behavior or the conduct in question.79 
 
Unlike other scholars above, Funnah and Sibanda attempt an approach to quantum. They 
suggest that that there must be case-specific amount ceilings.80 They argue that some 
standard should be introduced to determine the proper amount of punitive damages, and 
setting a limit on the amount of damages in certain cases. According to them, putting ceilings 
on the amounts to be awarded has become an important feature of punitive damages reforms 
in the United States. They find examples in the states of Alabama and Alaska.81 This is an 
interesting suggestion as to the calculation of quantum, a novel suggestion in South African 
jurisprudence. The merits of this submission are explored in Chapter 8 where quantum is 
discussed in detail. Suffice it to mention at this stage that this suggestion raises more 
problems than solutions.  
 
73 Fose (note 19) para 71. 
74 Ibid para 87. 
75 Funnah and Sibanda (note 67) 43. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid 48-49. 
81 Ibid. They state that in Alabama the limitation of the amount of damages depends on the nature of the harm 
- whether the harm is physical or non-physical, and on the type of the defendant and the defendant’s business’ 
net worth. Funnah and Sibanda in this regard refer to American Tort Reform Association ‘Punitive Damages 
Reform: SB 137’ (1999); Alaska Code § 6-11-21 and David Gold ‘Trial by Jury and Statutory Caps on Punitive 
Damages: Lessons for Alabama from Ohio’s Constitutional History’ (2001) 31(2) Cumberland LR 287, where the 
supposed limits are discussed. Similarly, they state that the State of Alaska limits the amount of damages to be 
awarded in terms of the nature of the wrong and of the defendant. For this one, the authors refer to American 
Tort Reform Association ‘Punitive Damages Reform: HB 58’ (1997) and several comparative cases from the State 
of Florida, Colorado and Iowa. 
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Former Constitutional Court Justice Kate O’Regan also enters the debate.82 According to her, 
one of the challenging aspects of the country’s constitutional jurisprudence is the extent to 
which damages are appropriate relief for the vindication of constitutional rights.83 As with 
other scholars she starts with the Fose judgment. Correctly so, she characterises Mr Fose’s 
claim as one of ‘constitutional damages which included punitive damages.’84 This is the 
correct position, as constitutional damages have been misconstrued as punitive damages 
many a times. Punitive damages are merely an element or a part of constitutional damages, 
but are themselves not defining of what constitutional damages are. O’Regan’s position is 
reflective of the broad thinking of the CC when it comes to constitutional damages. She holds 
the opinion that ‘[t]he South African law of delict provides suitable remedies for the breach 
of constitutional rights and requires relatively little adjustment to meet this purpose.’85 In 
most cases therefore, she argues, where a constitutional right has been infringed and loss or 
harm occasioned, a claim for damages will lie under one or other delictual action.86 
Unsurprisingly, she finds it difficult to determine when it is appropriate for damages sounding 
in money to be awarded for the breach of constitutional rights.87  
 
O’Regan discusses a number of cases where delictual damages have been claimed against the 
State for dereliction of duty and violation of rights. Quite contradictory, however, is her 
identification of the dictum in Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden88 where the 
SCA demonstrated how it is not always appropriate for delictual damages to be used to 
remedy constitutional rights breaches:  
 
‘Where the conduct of the state, as represented by the persons who perform functions on its behalf, is 
in conflict with its constitutional duty to protect rights in the Bill of Rights in my view the norm of 
accountability must necessarily assume an important role in determining whether a legal duty ought to 
be recognized in any particular case. The norm of accountability, however, need not always translate 
constitutional duties into private law duties enforceable by an action for damages, for there will be cases 
in which other appropriate remedies are available for holding the state to account. Where the conduct 
in issue relates to questions of state policy, or where it affects a broad and indeterminate segment of 
society, constitutional accountability might at times be appropriately secured through the political 
process, or through one of the variety of other remedies that the courts are capable of granting.’89 (My 
emphasis) 
 
This shows that we cannot always conflate delictual and constitutional damages, especially in 
view of the different utilities of each of these remedies. Further, it shows how delictual 
damages will not always apply where there are legitimate concerns to enforce public 
accountability in the interests of constitutional vindication.  
 
 
82 Kate O’Regan ‘Fashioning constitutional remedies in South Africa: some reflections’ (2011) April Advocate 41. 
83 Ibid 43. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid.  
88 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA).  
89 Ibid para 21. 
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O’Regan concludes on a similar note to Klaaren by opining that it remains a difficult question 
whether an infringement of a particular constitutional right, or of a statutory obligation 
should give rise to a claim for constitutional damages, but ‘an express statutory provision 
providing for damages will put the matter beyond doubt’.90 She is of the view that the 
legislature should intervene when it comes to constitutional damages.  
 
A much more positive outlook comes from Swart.91 Swart tackles judicial remedies in socio-
economic rights litigation and argues that there is reason to be critical of the relief granted in 
the CC’s socio-economic jurisprudence. She notes that the orders granted in cases such as 
Grootboom92 have actually not resulted in any change to the situation of poor litigants. She 
thus argues that the CC should be concerned with remedies that assist in realising socio-
economic rights, primarily affirmative remedies including declarations, damages, reading-in, 
mandatory interdicts and statutory interdicts.93 Of these, she argues, ‘constitutional damages 
and structural interdicts are particularly suitable as remedies that would increase government 
accountability.’94 Swart echoes the growing chorus that when it comes particularly to 
structural interdicts and damages, the CC’s jurisprudence has not been too encouraging, and 
she argues that the High Courts instead have been more adventurous in the remedies they 
grant, and the CC should follow suit.95   
 
As to the source of the court’s power to fashion remedies, Swart traces this back to the fact 
that superior courts have wide powers to fashion new remedies. She identifies the 
empowering provisions as being those that enjoin the courts to uphold the rights of all and to 
ensure compliance with constitutional values by granting ‘appropriate relief',96 ‘just and 
equitable’ orders97 and by developing the common law ‘taking into account the interests of 
justice.’98 In addition, the supremacy clause of the Constitution provides that the obligations 
imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled.99 Not only are courts empowered to fashion 
remedies, she argues, they have a constitutional mandate and obligation to develop 
appropriate remedies if existing conventional remedies fall short.100 
 
 
90 O’Regan (note 82) 44. 
91 Mia Swart ‘Left out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the poorest of the Poor’ (2005) SAJHR 
215. 
92 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
93 Swart (note 91) 218-19. Remedies that would not qualify as affirmative remedies, she says, would be remedies 
described by Hogg as ‘defensive remedies’ such as declarations of invalidity, reading down, severance, 
suspension of orders of invalidity, exclusion of evidence, etc. See Peter Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (3rd 
ed) (1992) 2, 909- 910. 
94 Swart (note 91) 215. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Section 38 of the Constitution. 
97 Section 172 (1) (a) of the Constitution. 
98 See Kate v MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 (1) SA 141 (SE) para 16. 
99 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
100 Swart (note 91) 216. 
56 
 
Swart is not oblivious to the transformative nature of constitutional remedies. She explicitly 
acknowledges that the development of constitutional remedies for which she is advocating is 
essentially an act of developing remedies for the poorest of the poor, the people described in 
the Grootboom judgment as ‘those most desperate’.101 Due to the deep-seated and large-
scale systemic conditions of poverty in which almost fifty per cent of the South African 
population lives, she says, the South African debate surrounding remedies should focus first 
and foremost on relieving desperate poverty.102  
 
Swart acknowledges the scepticism that has permeated constitutional damages in the 
country, specifically referring to Klaaren and his argument that courts should not be eager to 
grant damages, and should instead leave it to the legislature to pass legislation since it is a 
matter involving institutional funding and implementation.103 In spite of this scepticism by 
other scholars, Swart is positive and argues that ‘constitutional damages could be an effective 
remedy in appropriate circumstances and that the courts should not shy away from awarding 
damages.’104 In doing this, she addresses the argument of avoidance with reference to the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers105 judgment, an argument that is raised by antagonists of 
constitutional damages.106 She argues that after the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers judgment 
the principle of constitutional avoidance and indirect application of the Bill of Rights may no 
longer be appropriate in the area of constitutional remedies. Instead, she holds the firm belief 
that ‘[p]erhaps the time has come to resort directly to the Bill of Rights in claims for 
damages’.107 
 
Turning to Kriegler J and Ackermann J’s approach in Fose, Swart characterises the decision as 
‘unnecessarily conservative’.108 She takes to task Kriegler J's statement that punitive damages 
were inappropriate in this case because the problem of police torture was widespread and 
the damages would therefore not have a deterrent effect. She argues that deterrence is but 
one of the functions of an award of damages,109 and that damages also have a compensatory 
and vindicatory function.110 Swart also summarily discusses Modderklip,111 Jayiya,112 and 
 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid 225, citing Jonathan Klaaren ‘Judicial Remedies' in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa (2nd ed) (2004) 9-13. 
104 Swart (note 91) 225. 
105 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 
(2) SA 674 (CC). 
106 The argument of avoidance is discussed in Chapter 6 below.  
107 Dennis Davis ‘Socio Economic Rights in South Africa: The Record After Ten Years: Towards “Deference Lite”?’ 
(2006) 22 SAJHR 301 writes that the structural injunction is not intended to substitute the judiciary for the 
administration ‘but to relieve the judge from framing relief in a way which would constitute democracy by means 
of judicial decree’.  
108 Swart (note 91) 225. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Supra.  
112 Supra. 
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Kate,113 and how these cases tackled the question of damages, and dismisses the applicability 
of sovereign immunity as a defence available to the state. Her basis for this is that the idea of 
sovereign immunity in constitutional litigation is not only foreign, but even in those countries 
such as Canada and America where immunity exists the defence has been held to be 
inapplicable to constitutional damages.114  
 
Importantly, Swart attempts to answer the question of whether constitutional remedies can 
be granted in administrative law cases.115 She refers to Hoexter who writes that after the 
decision of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers116 it is clear that there is only one system of law, 
and that this system is shaped by the Constitution. In Hoexter's view, this case establishes 
that all cases dealing with control of public power are constitutional cases, even if they are 
not cases falling within the Bill of Rights.117 To her, this means that cases brought under the 
PAJA can also be classified as ‘constitutional’ even though they may involve the indirect 
application of the Constitution to the Act. She points out that there are two reasons for this: 
not only does the Act ‘give effect to’ s 33 of the Constitution but it is also manifestly concerned 
with the control of public power. Thus in light of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, the 
phrase ‘appropriate relief’ in s 38 of the Constitution must be read as encompassing the 
remedies provided by s 8 of PAJA. Similar to the remedies section in the Constitution, s 8 
allows for a tribunal to grant ‘any order that is just and equitable’ and lists a number of specific 
remedies.118 Swart sees the idea of unity of the common law and constitutional law and of 
statutory law and the Constitution119 as attractive not only for the elegance and harmony it 
brings to the law but also for its consistency with the constitutional imperatives of supremacy 
and legality.120 Given the wide scope and nature of the remedies in PAJA, she thinks it difficult 
to see how awarding a constitutional remedy would be irreconcilable with the wording of s 
8(2).121 
 
Swart concludes on a very hopeful and positive note: 
‘Now that the justiciability of socio-economic rights has gained acceptance and courts have gradually 
become less reluctant to intrude upon what has traditionally been understood as government terrain, 
the socio-economic debate should shift to the more practical question of crafting suitable remedies. 
The notion that remedies such as damages are not ideal constitutional remedies because constitutional 
 
113 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA). 
114 Swart (note 91) 226. 
115 Ibid 237. 
116 Note 105. 
117 Cora Hoexter The New Constitutional & Administrative Law Vol 2 (2002) 278. 
118 Ibid 280. 
119 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (note 105) para 50: `There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the 
Constitution which, is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the 
Constitution and is subject to constitutional control. What would have been ultra vires under the common law 
by reason of a functionary exceeding a statutory power is invalid under the Constitution according to the 
doctrine of legality'. 
120 Swart (note 91) 238. 
121 Ibid. 
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remedies should be forward-looking and community oriented rather than individualistic and corrective 
is outdated.’122 (My emphasis) 
 
One of the most substantial pieces of work on constitutional remedies generally is by 
Bishop.123 As with Swart, Bishops advances a liberal and progressive approach to 
constitutional damages, similar to the position taken by the SCA in Kate. In his book Chapter, 
Bishop devotes some pages to constitutional damages. There is recognition that in addition 
to its preference for private remedies rather than constitutional remedies, the Constitutional 
Court has also expressed a clear preference for indirect application rather than direct 
application of the Bill of Rights to the common law.124 Bishop then makes an interesting take 
that categorises constitutional damages into two: direct and indirect constitutional damages:  
 
‘There are two categories of damages in constitutional matters. The first category consists of damages 
awarded in terms of the common law or a statute that gives effect to a constitutional right. I call these 
“indirect constitutional damages” because they do not flow directly from the Final Constitution. The 
second category — “direct constitutional damages” — flow from the Final Constitution alone. As I 
explain in more detail below, courts will, where possible, award indirect, rather than direct damages. 
Indeed, the courts will do so even if the award of indirect damages necessitates a development or re-
interpretation of the law at issue.’125  
 
Both, he opinions, are rooted in the Constitution. The Constitution is not just the source of 
direct constitutional remedies; it also underwrites the creation and the award of indirect 
constitutional damages. Indirect constitution damages sourced in the Constitution generally 
occur where the Final Constitution is used to develop the common law or interpret a statute 
to provide a damages claim where no such claim was previously available. For the latter, 
Bishop cites Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security126 as the case that set the precedent 
for this kind of development.127 It appears that what Bishop calls ‘indirect constitutional 
damages’ is what some have sought to term ‘constitutional delict’, a term which Neethling 
and Potgieter conclude that should rather be avoided for conceptual clarity.128 
 
Naturally, Bishop discusses Fose, stating that Fose does not prevent litigants from bringing 
private claims and constitutional claims together when the relief they seek goes beyond what 
private law can provide.129 Fose, as he understands it, stands for the proposition that ‘[i]f a 
private remedy partially vindicates the constitutional right, then a litigant must rely on the 
private law for that part of the relief and may also rely on constitutional law for the relief 
 
122 Ibid 239 citing Currie and De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Vol 1 (2001) 288. 
123 Michael Bishop ‘Constitutional Remedies’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed 
(Original Service 06-08) 9-1.  
124 Ibid 9-82. 
125 Ibid 9-151. 
126 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
127 Bishop (note 123) 9-152. 
128 Johann Neethling and Johan M Potgieter Law of Delict (2010) Lexis Nexis, Durban at 21. 
129 Bishop (note 123) 9-80. 
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necessary to vindicate the rest of the right’.130 But for it to reflect practical application, he 
believes that principle warrants a slight modification as follows: 
 
‘If a private remedy fully vindicates a constitutional right, the litigant must rely on the private remedy. 
If the private remedy only partially vindicates the right, a litigant is entitled, but not obliged, to rely 
solely on constitutional law for all aspects of her relief. If she does so, the existence of a remedy under 
private law should not be a bar for granting the same relief under constitutional law’.131 
 
According to him, ‘this modest modification’ reflects the position taken by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in Kate.132 The Kate position departs slightly from that in Fose, where the rest of 
the judgment in Fose made quite clear that, generally constitutional damages will be 
inappropriate where the existing law — as developed and interpreted in light of the 
Constitution — provides a remedy that fully vindicates the right. But according to Bishop, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Kate has taken a view that permits direct damages in a somewhat 
wider set of circumstances.133 The reasoning in Kate, he believes, is far superior to that 
proffered in Fose. This is because, while the vast majority of cases can be adequately 
addressed through indirect damages, ‘a litigant should not have to fail at claiming indirect 
damages or prove that they will be ineffective to qualify for direct relief. Whether a court 
should award direct or indirect damages should depend on all the facts of the matter. The 
fact that a person framed a claim in terms of direct relief rather than indirect relief should not 
be used to deny them any relief at all. For what is ultimately at stake is the vindication of a 
constitutional right.’134 Practically, Bishop’s idea seems to be that what matters is the 
vindication that is sought, as opposed to the form in which the claim has been out. A claim 
should be supported on the facts, and it is those facts that would determine whether a 
constitutional damages claim is meritorious, or a delictual claim would have been more 
appropriate. He however sounds a caution: 
 
‘Although not a closed list, the Supreme Court of Appeal listed two factors that prompted it to grant 
direct constitutional damages. First, the constitutional infirmity was a direct breach of a specific 
normative right, not “merely a deviation from a constitutionally normative standard”. Second, the 
breach of the right was endemic and required a clear assertion of the importance of the constitutional 
— as opposed to only the private — right. The first justification goes further than my revision suggests 
because it would permit a constitutional remedy where the reliance is on a specific right, even if the 
private law completely vindicates the right. I am not sure if Nugent JA intended for the first justification 
alone to be a sufficient condition. One good reason to reject that proposition is that it could lead to the 
development of parallel systems of law. For example, there could be one set of rules for victims of 
police brutality who relied on the law of delict and another for those who based their claim on a direct 
violation of FC s 12. That is undesirable. In my view, the first reason — a direct violation — is a necessary 
but insufficient justification for a constitutional remedy. It will need to be supplemented by other 
factors, such as the systemic breach at issue in Kate.’135 (footnotes omitted)  
 
 
130 Bishop (note 123) 9-81. 
131 Ibid 9-81. 
132 Ibid 9-81. 
133 Ibid 9-156. 
134 Ibid 9-157. 
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As to how a remedy that is awarded to an individual litigant as an ‘individual remedy’ could 
remedy systemic violation, Bishop had his to say: 
 
‘I should stress again that individual remedies are not strictly separable from systemic remedies or 
remedies following findings of invalidity. All three types of remedies are rooted in similar textual 
sources, offer analogous forms of relief and often reinforce one another. In sum, all three remedies are 
interrelated and must be as part of the same basket of remedies available to a court. The three main 
remedies assayed under this heading — damages, declarations of rights and interdicts — are all 
available in most cases and the primary role of a court is to choose between them.’136  
 
In addition, Bishop says, ‘No formula or algorithm exists for courts charged with determining 
which remedy is appropriate. Indeed, the chosen remedy most often turns on the facts and 
the relief pursued by the person asserting a constitutional claim’.137 As to subsidiarity, Bishop 
does not see it as a stumbling block to the award of direct constitutional damages. He argues 
that subsidiarity in constitutional remedies works fine in theory. It should not prevent any 
constitutional right from being vindicated: ‘If common-law remedies are not adequate, then 
litigants are always entitled to bring a pure constitutional claim.’138  
 
What can be seen from the works above is that there is convergence when it comes to 
recognising constitutional damages as a remedy permissible in terms of the Constitution. 
Similarly common is how these writers all look to Fose for guidance, often concluding that 
caution must be taken in seeking constitutional damages as they are seldom available. There 
is however no clear nor common understanding among the scholars as to the circumstances 
under which the remedy is to be granted, nor of the specific rights for which damages can be 
awarded. Most of the scholars thus speculate that it is only when no common law remedy is 
available should one take to constitutional damages. Funnah and Sibanda as well as Swart 
provide much more forceful arguments for the full acceptance of constitutional damages, and 
make suggestions on how these ought to be granted. The arguments raised in the above 
literature survey are discussed and debated in subsequent Chapters below.  
 
The following section discusses the functions of constitutional damages. It must be stated 
that while with some of the functions there is consensus, there is still considerable debate on 
the other utilities as is evident in the literature survey above.   
 
3.4 UTILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES 
As with all other remedies both in private and public law, the viability and appropriateness of 
a remedy is premised on its purpose. This is what the term ‘appropriate relief’ means. Firstly, 
constitutional damages serve as compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary harm to 
an individual occasioned by the breach of an individual’s constitutional rights. This is not 
 
136 Ibid 9-150 to 151. 
137 Ibid 9-151. 
138 Ibid 9-80. 
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necessarily a loss-allocation exercise. This compensation is not confined to, nor defined by, 
restitution. In Ngomana v CEO of the SA Social Security Agency139 the Western Cape High 
Court pointed out that ‘[t]he purpose of constitutional damages is not primarily to 
compensate for financial prejudice or patrimonial loss; it is rather a means by which the courts 
may seek by surrogate relief to give expression to the fulfilment or realisation of a claimant’s 
abrogated constitutional rights by way of an award in monetary compensation’.140 In the 
words of Chayes who discusses public law litigation remedies in general, the relief ‘is not a 
terminal, compensatory transfer, but an effort to devise a program to contain future 
consequences in a way that accommodates the range of interests involved’.141 The decree, he 
correctly contends, seeks to adjust future behaviour, not to compensate for past wrong.142 It 
is therefore a remedy that is ‘deliberately fashioned rather than logically deduced from the 
nature of the legal harm suffered [and] provides for a complex, on-going regime of 
performance rather than a simple, one-shot, one-way transfer.’143 So actual financial loss is 
not a prerequisite although proof of such loss may lead to damages being granted.  
  
Secondly, it is possible that constitutional damages may also be awarded as punitive or 
‘exemplary’ damages in addition to other goals.144 This is notwithstanding that in Fose the CC 
rejected the punitive function as a stand-alone reason to grant constitutional damages.145 
While it may not be desirable to grant these damages solely for punitive purposes, there can 
be no denying that even where constitutional damages are granted with other goals in mind 
the punitive utility is incidental. That may be a good thing.  
 
Thirdly and closely related to the exemplary and punitive utility, constitutional damages serve 
as a deterrent for future breaches. Again, although the CC in Fose questioned whether 
constitutional damages actually achieve deterrence, this is not to say the relief is not 
deterrent. Not only is there no evidence to the effect that constitutional damages are not 
deterrent, but the natural consequences of a judicial pronouncement sounding in money 
causes one to be more cautious so as not to repeat their liability-attracting conduct. Hoexter 
endorses this view by drawing attention to the fact that constitutional damages are aimed at 
promoting respect for human rights and deterring future violations of rights.146 
 
Fourth and most importantly, constitutional damages serve the purpose of vindicating 
constitutional rights.147 Constitutional damages recognise that ‘rights must be maintained, 
 
139 2010 ZAWCHC 172. 
140 Ibid para 39. 
141 Abram Chayes ‘The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’ (1976) 89 Harv LR 1281. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Cooper-Stephenson (note 2) 364. 
145 See Funnah and Sibanda (note 67) 36 for a discussion of the decision in Fose.   
146 Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) Juta, Cape Town 503-4.  
147 See s 7(1) of the Constitution.  
62 
 
and cannot be allowed to be whittled away by attrition’.148 Vindication is the primary utility 
of constitutional damages. This is notwithstanding the fact that in the process of 
compensating in order to vindicate, restoration may be achieved. Although one may rightly 
argue that constitutional damages are inherently compensatory in nature as they are orders 
sounding in money, their unique dimension in form and function heralds what Harlow calls a 
‘shift from private law, concerned with security of the individual, to public law, concerned 
with welfare and social utility’.149 Beyond the individual, this remedy has the benefit of what 
Harlow terms ‘class justice’150 - vindicating and securing the rights of those who have no easy 
access to the courts. This is because the infringement of human rights is a wrong committed 
not only against individuals but also against the social order.151 Thus by a court pronouncing 
to be unconstitutional certain conduct committed against a claimant, other people in the 
position of the claimant benefit by the deterrent effect of that pronouncement on would be 
perpetrators, and in the precedent set – effectively a warning to government officials and 
departments against infringing rights.  Okpaluba states that the vindicatory approach serves 
more to emphasise the constitutional value attached to the right violated or sought to be 
protected.152 Here constitutional damages act as a useful and forceful ‘affirmative’ or 
‘positive’ remedy153 designed not only for individual interests, but community interests both 
for redressing the past and modelling the future.154  
 
The utility of constitutional damages cannot be disassociated from the functionality of public 
law remedies in general.155 These are generally multi-faceted in utility. Ultimately, 
constitutional remedies in their totality serve the joint purpose of enforcing the Constitution 
and vindicating fundamental rights. The objectives of constitutional damages are a common 
denominator for all constitutional remedies. Nevertheless, constitutional damages have a 
competitive advantage: they are the only remedy that singularly achieves most of the goals 
of constitutional remedies, giving substance and meaning to rights of the individual and 
society. 
  
3.5 LINES OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL AND DELICTUAL DAMAGES 
Although both delictual and constitutional damages are monetary in nature, there are 
important differences between the two.  
 
148 Vancouver City v. Ward 2010 SCC 27 para 25. 
149 Carol Harlow Compensation and Government Torts (1982) Sweet & Maxwell, London 38. 
150 Ibid 130. 
151 Swart (note 91) 239. 
152 Chuks Okpaluba ‘Vindicatory approach to the award of constitutional and public law damages: contemporary 
Commonwealth developments’ (2012) 45(2) Comparative and International LJ of Southern Africa 115. 
153 Cooper-Stephenson (note 2) 4. Also Swart (note 91) 218-19, who argues that affirmative remedies are much 
more effective at vindicating socio-economic rights especially.  
154 Cooper-Stephenson (note 2) 28-29. 
155 This comes out clearly in Chayes’ articulation of the general aspects common to public law remedies in Chayes 
(note 141) 1281.  
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3.5.1 Sources and purposes of remedies  
As a starting point, constitutional and delictual damages differ in their legal roots, purpose, 
and cause of action. Whilst private law damages are predominantly compensatory and 
restorative in nature, public law damages have a multi-faceted function as outlined above. 
Delict as a system of damages deals with civil wrongs and is derived from the law of 
obligations in Roman law.156 It has been described as ‘a loss-allocation exercise’.157 It focuses 
on wrongful loss-causing conduct with the chief aim of making good the loss. The common 
law does not recognise deterrence or prevention sole objectives in the award of damages. 
The law of delict is concerned with compensation, while punishment and deterrence are left 
to the criminal law. One finds these aspects in constitutional damages, whether as direct or 
incidental objectives. As has already been outlined, constitutional damages derive directly 
from the Constitution’s remedial clauses – ss 38 and 172(1). This is public as opposed to 
private relief, deriving from the fact that constitutional judicial power to decide a case 
includes the power to create a damages remedy.158 Tortell correctly points out that this is the 
principal distinguishing feature between ordinary torts and ‘constitutional torts’, as they are 
called in the United States.159 Tort remedies, he argues, arise from breaches of certain 
common law rights that individuals, based on the phenomenon of reciprocity, have against 
one another and in certain instances, against the government.160 Constitutional torts on the 
other hand are based on breaches of constitutional or fundamental rights. 
 
Constitutional and delictual damages have different substantive concerns. A delict occurs only 
when either a subjective right is infringed, or a legal duty is breached,161 and a subjective right 
is conceptually different from a fundamental right. Neethling et al recognise the difference 
between breach of a private interest and the infringement of a fundamental right, and that a 
victim of the breach of a fundamental right is entitled to approach a court for ‘appropriate 
relief’.162 The breach of a constitutional duty by the State or its functionary is not only 
wrongful in the delictual sense,163 hence the remedies granted in response thereto assume a 
public law character. Conceptually therefore, the public law remedy aims beyond making 
good a private loss. The private law concept of damages on the other hand is not designed to 
vindicate the values underlying the Constitution nor to deter and prevent future 
 
156 See François Du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9th ed) (2007) Juta, Cape Town 38 and 1092. 
Today delict in South Africa in an amalgam which evolved from Roman-Dutch and English law. See also Max 
Loubser and Rob Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South Africa (2nd ed) (2012) Oxford University Press 4. 
157 Loubser and Midgley (note 156) 5. 
158 Walter Dellinger ‘Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword’ (1972) 85 Harv LR 1532, 1542. 
159 Tortell (note 1) 80. 
160  George Fletcher Tort Liability for Human Rights Abuses (2008) Hart Publishing, Oxford 85-103. 
161 This is when a personal, private interest is infringed, or when a legal duty imposed on one to prevent 
infringement of a subjective right or to uphold such subjective right is infringed. See Johann Neethling, JM 
Potgieter and PJ Visser Law of Delict (6th ed) (2010) Lexis Nexis, Durban 6. 
162 Neethling et al (note 161) 20. 
163 Currie and De Waal (note 12) 200. 
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infringements.164 Rather, these damages are awarded using the principle of restitutio in 
integrum, a common law damages principle in which the objective is to return the claimant 
to the position he or she was in prior to the breach.165 Constitutional vindication in the process 
is a by-product, or incidental. Admittedly, damages in general have a common law 
background as a matter of course. In statute, the State Liability Act166 makes it clear that the 
State is liable for the delictual conduct if its servants. Nonetheless, the nature of the liability 
remains delictual at common law. Put differently, the statute simply seeks to add a further 
dimension to the common law. This does not imply that constitutional damages are not a 
unique species of damages nor that they fall under the common law. 
Characterising constitutional damages as a public remedy is the norm globally, as will be 
illustrated in Chapter 5 below. In the United Kingdom, for instance, Lord Bingham in the House 
of Lords in R (Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department167 went as far as 
stating that the Human Rights Act as a whole ‘is not a tort statute. Its objects are different 
and broader’.168 It is apparent that the court considers the remedy of breaches thereof to be 
a public law remedy or, at least, to have wider objectives than a private law remedy.169 
As a public remedy against the state, constitutional damages represent attempts to render 
governments, their officials and employees accountable, in damages, for the constitutional 
harm they cause.170 As Currie and De Waal have advanced, there are certain situations where 
a declaration of invalidity or an interdict makes little sense and an award of damages is then 
the only form of relief that will ‘vindicate the fundamental right and deter future 
infringements’.171 Further, the possibility of a substantial award of damages may encourage 
victims to come forward and litigate, in itself a vindication of the Constitution and a deterrent 
of further infringements.172 
What must be stressed is that infringement of a constitutional right does not equate to a 
delict, and the fact that damages may be awarded for the breach does not make it a delict. 
There are cases where the law of delict has been used to protect fundamental rights and that 
is certainly encouraged, but that is not the primary function, aim or prerogative of delict. 
Neethling and Potgieter assert that the possibility of the development of what they call 
‘constitutional delict’ should be recognised on the understanding that ‘a clear distinction 
should be made between a constitutional wrong and a delict, even though these two figures 
may overlap’.173 Furthermore, they argue that the requirements for a delict and those of a 
 
164 De Vos and Waaren Freedman (note 4) 409. 
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constitutional wrong differ materially,174 a position affirmed by the decision in Steenkamp NO 
v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape.175 They reiterate that unlike a delictual remedy 
aimed at compensation, a constitutional remedy – even in the form of damages – is aimed at 
affirming, enforcing, protecting and vindicating constitutional rights and at preventing or 
deterring future violations of the same.176  
 
3.5.2 Application of remedies 
 
Another fundamental difference between constitutional and delictual damages is the way the 
remedies are applied. Whereas constitutional damages are discretionary, delictual damages 
are not. With delict, damages are the default relief and are claimed as of right harm or loss 
and liability are proven.177 To the contrary, constitutional damages cannot be claimed as of 
right. This means the judge has the discretion to refuse to grant damages preferring an 
injunction, if it occurs to the judge that an injunction is a better remedy in the circumstances. 
Again, the point made by the Western Cape High Court in Ngomana178 is instructive: an award 
of constitutional damages is discretionary for the reason that the purpose of the relief is not 
primarily to compensate for financial prejudice or patrimonial loss, but rather ‘a means by 
which the courts may seek by surrogate relief to give expression to the fulfilment or 
realisation of a claimant’s abrogated constitutional rights’.179 
 
Under common law damages, ‘the scope of the relief is derived more or less logically from 
the substantive violation under the general theory that the plaintiff will get compensation 
measured by the harm caused by the defendants breach of duty – in contract, by giving 
plaintiff the money he would have had absent the breach; in tort by paying the value of the 
damage caused.’180 Again, this distinction between delictual and constitutional damages is 
not an isolated occurrence. The characteristic features of the public law model are very 
different from those of the traditional common law or private law model.181 Constitutional 
damages fall under what Chayes terms ‘public law litigation’, and have a different 
characterisation where the form of relief does not flow inescapably from the liability 
determination.182 This characterisation as it applies to damages is that they cannot be claimed 
as of right. I say this cognisant of the development in France and increasingly in the European 
Court of Human Rights to make the claiming of damages for breach of rights a right in itself, 
a movement which Quézel-Ambrunaz has termed the ‘fundamentalisation of the right to 
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177 See Tom Bingham The Rule of Law (2010) Allen Lane, London 51. 
178 Ngomana v CEO of the SA Social Security Agency 2010 ZAWCHC 172. 
179 Ibid para 39. 
180 Chayes (note 141) 1281. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
66 
 
obtain damages’.183 This is however not the general approach in commonwealth countries, 
certainly not in South Africa.184  
 
The discretion in constitutional damages stems from the fact that judicial review is a 
discretionary jurisdiction.185 This is generally in keeping with the ‘flexible and open-textured 
nature of the doctrines of public law’.186 Public law remedies such as injunctions, declarations 
and similar relief are discretionary remedies.187 This means that a court may, in its discretion, 
refuse to grant a remedy even if the claimant can demonstrate that a public authority has 
acted unlawfully.188 This does not mean unbridled discretion: the court has the power to make 
a choice as to whether to grant a remedy but this power of choice must be exercised by taking 
account of all relevant matters and discounting irrelevant ones.189 Relevant factors in the 
exercise of discretion include the conduct of the claimant and that of the defendant; delay; 
particular facts of the case; the injustice or prejudice suffered; the effectiveness and 
practicality of a remedy in the circumstances; and the interests of the claimant weighed 
against the need for good administration.190 Public interest and efficacy must also be 
considered.191 This discretion must be exercised based on clear, consistent and defensible 
principles, lest the courts run the risk of arbitrariness, making it impossible to predict the 
attitude of the courts.192 There must be legal certainty even with the exercise of discretion.  
 
Still with a discretionary approach, there may very well be cases where the discretion strongly 
points towards the granting of damages, limiting the latitude of the court in exercising 
discretion by requiring that that discretion be exercised in only one way – to grant damages. 
However, a discretionary approach is not without its flaws: ‘the combination of very open-
textured principles of judicial review and a relatively unstructured discretion at the remedial 
stage makes for a rather fragile set of public law rights’.193 This is a complex discussion in its 
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own right but fortunately, it is unnecessary for purposes of the present discussion to explore 
this argument further.  
 
Yet another important distinction between constitutional and delictual damages is that while 
delictual damages require six elements to be proven, that is conduct, wrongfulness, 
unlawfulness, fault, causation and harm, constitutional damages do not necessarily follow 
those criteria. The standards appropriate for awards of damages under the common law may 
not be appropriate for constitutional damages claims,194 and a litigant does not have to 
establish all the elements of a delict for constitutional damages to be granted.195 This means 
that insofar as constitutional damages are concerned, the South African law of damages 
which has focused largely on patrimonial loss has shifted considerably.196  
 
In the broader scheme, the delictual and constitutional damages dichotomy forms part of the 
wider distinction between public and private law remedies, a debate that itself is not exactly 
settled. One can find helpful this apt quote from the New Zealand High Court in Manga v 
Attorney-General197 per Hammond J, where he engages in a significant discussion of the 
differences between public and private law remedies: 
 
‘Cases based upon violations of the Bill of Rights are about the vindication of statutory policies which 
are not "just" private: they have overarching, public dimensions. The context of such a proceeding 
necessarily changes, in at least three ways. First, the case is not a winner-takes-all kind of case. Damages 
are an economic concept. Bill of Rights cases routinely involve a rearrangement of the social relations 
between the parties, and sometimes with third parties. The object is to promote mutual justice, and to 
protect the weak from the strong. Secondly, the future consequences of such a case are every bit as 
important as the past, and the particular transgression. Thirdly, there is a distinct interface with public 
administration, and indeed, the governance of a given jurisdiction […]’198 
 
What emerges quite clearly is that a constitutional wrong and a delict together with their 
damages remedies ought not to be treated alike, and it is for this reason that Neethling and 
Potgieter conclude that the term constitutional ‘tort’ or ‘delict’ should rather be avoided for 
conceptual clarity.199 This is an apt suggestion, and throughout this thesis damages granted 
for violation of constitutional rights are consistently referred to as ‘constitutional 
damages’.200  
 
194 Jonathan Klaaren ‘Judicial Remedies’ in Stu Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa [Revision 
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SA 419 (CC); F v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC) and similar fundamental rights 
68 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
It is correct that delict is now also used to vindicate constitutional rights.201 At the turn of the 
constitutional era the law of delict has been ‘constitutionalised’, meaning it has come to be 
read and applied in line with values as required by s 39(2) of the Constitution.202 As Price puts 
it, human rights norms ushered in by the new constitutionalism have influenced ‘the judicial 
development of the private common law, [that is], the creation, alteration and abolishment 
of private common-law rules and principles by judges.’203 Where the common law has been 
found wanting, the outlet has been the development of the common law in terms of s 8(3) of 
the Constitution. It is also correct that in addition to its commendatory utility, delict also plays 
a normative role in prescribing a set of ethical rules and principles for social interaction.204 
The golden question then is: what is it that constitutional damages bring as a remedy over 
and above the common law that cannot be achieved by interpreting the common law in line 
with constitutional values and developing the common law? The answers are to be found in 
the utility of constitutional damages discussed above, which unlike delict, achieve 
compensation, vindication, deterrence and sometimes punishment, all at once. This 
argument is advanced further in subsequent Chapters. Importantly as well, the discordance 
among South African scholars on many aspects of constitutional damages that has been 
revealed above mirrors largely the discordance among the courts themselves, as the next 
Chapter shows. The next Chapter proceeds to discuss the constitutional provisions giving birth 
to constitutional damages, legislated damages relief for constitutional violations, and how the 
courts have thus far dealt with this relief. 
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201 Du Bois (note 140) 1092; Neethling et al (note 161) 16-17. 
202 Neethling et al (note 161) 16-17; Loubser and Midgley (note 156) 34-37. 
203 Alistair Price ‘The Influence of Human Rights on Private Common Law’ (2012) 129 SALJ 345. 
204 Loubser and Midgley (note 156). 
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CHAPTER 4 
A CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN LAW ON CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES - THE GOOD AND THE BAD 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to better understand the problems associated with constitutional damages in South 
Africa and suggest a practical framework, it is important to explore the legal foundations of 
the remedy as well as the judicial attitudes towards the remedy. In what follows, I examine 
the enabling provisions in the Constitution, the statutory provisions that have legislated 
constitutional damages, culminating in a discussion of the seminal cases that have shaped the 
discourse of the remedy. In the process, gaps and shortcomings are identified in the approach 
to the relief, exposing the problems that subsequent Chapters will seek to address.  
4.2 THE CONSTITUTION 
The source of constitutional damages in South Africa is the Constitution itself. There is no 
provision expressly mentioning constitutional damages as a remedy, but the broad scheme 
of the remedial provisions in the Constitution allows for courts to grant appropriate relief. 
Section 38 of the Constitution gives the courts broad and creative discretionary powers to 
develop existing remedies and fashion new ones should those in existence fall short. This was 
reiterated by Kriegler J in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security,1 who went on to say that ‘[i]t 
is left to the Courts to decide what would be appropriate relief in any particular case […] If it 
is necessary to do so, the courts may even have to fashion new remedies to secure the 
protection and enforcement of all these important rights.’2  
The phrase ‘appropriate relief’ is broad enough to include constitutional damages. There is 
nothing in the Constitution preventing monetary damages from being among the possible 
remedies that the courts may grant.3 The concept of appropriate relief entails that when a 
court is faced with a constitutional violation, it must pronounce relief that ‘strikes effectively 
at the source of that infringement’.4 The goal ultimately is to do justice. There may well be 
instances where a mere declaration of rights is appropriate relief. But in some instances, such 
as in a case of severe and crippling torture by the police, a mere declaration of rights may well 
be worth little more than an insult to the victim, and such relief would be entirely 
inappropriate in those circumstances. Another example would be the Modderklip scenario5 
 
1 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 69.  
2 Ibid. Also Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) para 38. 
3 Iain Currie and Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6th ed) (2013) Juta, Cape Town 200; and Cora Hoexter 
Administrative Law in South Africa (2nd ed) (2012) Juta, Cape Town 568-574. 
4 Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 45. 
5 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). The 
case is discussed in detail below.  
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where a landowner had practically lost his land. In those circumstances, a declaration of rights 
or an interdict was clearly inappropriate and ineffective for any corrective justice.  
 
The notion of ‘appropriate relief’ is closely tied to the concept of ‘effective relief’. Effective 
relief is relief that works in either stopping constitutional harm, reversing it, or vindicating the 
rights of the affected and the sanctity of the Bill of Rights. Closely linked to effective and 
appropriate relief is the principle that a court will not give an order that it cannot enforce, 
known as the ‘principle of effectiveness’.6 Save for declaratory orders, an effective remedy in 
the form of an enforceable verdict must follow each case. The premise is that there must be 
an effective remedy for each right, as rights and remedies are complementary.7 
 
Together with s 38, s 172(1) provides yet another blank cheque for the courts to come up with 
remedies that are ‘just and equitable’. Again, the goal is resolute on achieving justice. 
‘Equitable’ in this context speaks to remedies that match the infringement that has occurred. 
Much more heinous and reprehensible infringements call for stronger and sterner sanctions. 
This would qualify, if one likes, for a corollary to the principles of natural justice. There are, 
therefore, instances where in light of the nature of the infringement and resulting harm, 
physical or otherwise, monetary damages would constitute appropriate and just and 
equitable relief. For a court considering options for relief, the question then becomes: to what 
extent do constitutional damages constitute ‘appropriate relief’ under the circumstances?8 
Invariably, it becomes a case-specific fact-pattern enquiry.  
 
4.3 STATUTORY LAW 
Since the adoption of the Interim Constitution in 1993, and subsequently the 1996 
Constitution, monetary damages have come to be expressly mentioned as a remedy in a 
number of statutes enacted to give effect to rights in the Bill of Rights. One can come up with 
multiple examples of legislation falling into this category: the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA)9 and the Employment Equity Act10 pursuant 
to s 9(4); the Labour Relations Act (LRA)11 pursuant to ss 23(5) and (6); the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)12 pursuant to s 33; the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act (PAIA)13 pursuant to s 32; and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act14 
 
6 Currie and De Waal (note 3) 179 put it this way: ‘Courts are more likely to be more hesitant to find a violation 
of a right in situations where there is no appropriate remedy for the violation.’  
7 The concept is discussed by Centlivres CJ in Minister of the Interior and Another v Harris and Others 1952 (4) 
SA 769 (A) at 780H-781B and several subsequent cases.  
8 See Kate O’Regan in ‘Fashioning constitutional remedies in South Africa: some reflections’ (2011) April 
Advocate 41.  
9 Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA). 
10 Act 55 of 1998.  
11 Act 66 of 1995.  
12 Act 3 of 2000. 
13 Act 2 of 2000. 
14 Act 28 of 2002. Arguably promulgated to give effect to s 24(b)(iii) and s 25(5), read with s 25(4)(a). 
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and the National Environment Management Act (NEMA)15 pursuant to s 24(2). Further 
citation can be made to legislation such as the Expropriation Act16 pursuant to s 25(2); 
Restitution of Land Rights Act17 pursuant to s 25(7); the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 
(ESTA)18 pursuant to s 25(6); and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act (PIE)19 pursuant to s 26(3). 
A number of these statutes mention damages as relief for violation of the right that each was 
enacted to protect. Because these statutes were enacted specifically to give content and 
effect to specific rights in the Bill of Rights, their enforcement cannot be severed from 
constitutional vindication. For discussion purposes I will examine four of these statutes. These 
are the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA),20 the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA),21 the Employment Equity Act (EEA),22 and 
the Labour Relations Act (LRA).23 One could, of course, find more similar statutes, but these 
four have been chosen as illustrative case studies because the courts have quite extensively 
pronounced on the relevant provisions of at least three of them.  
4.3.1 The PAJA 
The PAJA was enacted in 2000 to give effect to s 33 of the Constitution on administrative 
justice. Section 8 of the Act deals with remedies for administrative law breaches. In relevant 
part, the section reads as follows: 
‘8 Remedies in proceedings for judicial review 
(1) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6 (1), may grant any order 
that is just and equitable, including orders- 
    … 
     (c)   setting aside the administrative action and- 
    … 
   (ii)   in exceptional cases- 
   … 
   (bb) directing the administrator or any other party to the proceedings to pay 
compensation; 
     …’ 
 
This section allows a reviewing court or tribunal to, in exceptional cases, pay compensation. I 
join with Swart to opine that the damages envisaged in s 8(2) of PAJA are essentially 
constitutional damages.24 It was made clear beyond doubt by the CC in Allpay 2 that 
 
15 Act 107 of 1998.  
16 Act 63 of 1975. 
17 Act 22 of 1994. 
18 Act 62 of 1997. 
19 Act 19 of 1998. 
20 Act 3 of 2000. 
21 Act 4 of 2000. 
22 Act 55 of 1998. 
23 Act 66 of 1995. 
24 Mia Swart ‘Left out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the poorest of the Poor’ (2005) SAJHR 
238, citing Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 50. 
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compensation under s 8 of PAJA is not a private law remedy.25 I accept however that not all 
public remedies are necessarily constitutional remedies in the sense that they stem directly 
from the Constitution. Nonetheless, the statement in Allpay 2 is revealing and advances the 
argument towards the public nature of an administrative right violation.  
 
However, in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape,26 Conradie JA expressed the view that 
PAJA does not allow for the recovery of constitutional damages.27 Instead, he believed that 
constitutional damages might appropriately be awarded in the absence of statutory remedies 
or adequate common law remedies, but ‘[w]here the lawgiver has legislated statutory 
mechanisms for securing constitutional rights, and provided, of course, that they are 
constitutionally unobjectionable, they must be used.’28 While these obiter comments have 
not yet been dissected by another court, Conradie JA’s views must be taken to task. This 
interpretation of the law was firmly rejected by Froneman J in Kate29 as discussed below. 
Additionally, the remarks in Jayiya are disputed by what Langa CJ and O’Regan J said in a 
dissenting opinion in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape30 where they 
opined that the s 8 of PAJA might result in the development of administrative law principles 
governing the payment of compensation to vindicate the constitutional right to 
administrative justice.31 
Hoexter conducts an examination of the cases that have sought compensation under PAJA. 
Of interest is the case of Minister of Defence v Dunn.32 Therein, the SCA overturned the finding 
by the court a quo awarding compensation on the reasoning that there was no basis to set 
aside the administrative decision that was vacated. The SCA also concluded that, if it was a 
monetary award the applicant wanted, he should have proven some loss. The SCA found that 
compensation was not justifiable, even if the administrative action complained of were 
reviewable.33 This approach of the SCA raises numerous questions about the approach to 
damages under PAJA, including whether actual pecuniary loss is required. The SCA seemed to 
suggest that loss is required, and in actual fact, this is the basis on which relief was refused. 
Following in the SCA’s footsteps, in Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town34 the 
Western Cape High Court found that the unsuccessful tenderer could be entitled to 
compensation for out-of-pocket expenses.35 It, therefore, appears that the courts are 
interested in actual pecuniary loss in order to grant compensation under PAJA.  
 
25 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency and Others (No 2) 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC) para 72.  
26 2004 (2) SA 611 (SCA). 
27 Ibid para 9.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Kate v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape [2005] 1 All SA 745 (SE). 
30 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC). 
31 Ibid para 97. 
32 2007 (6) SA 52 (SCA). 
33 Para 40. 
34 2007 (4) SA 488 (C). 
35 See also Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA) paras 38-39. 
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Although this string of cases seems to suggest that PAJA damages are not constitutional law 
damages, I contend that the courts in those cases misunderstood the PAJA compensation 
provision and engaged in unwarranted limitation thereof. The court misconstrue the PAJA 
provision as affording a private law remedy that requires proof of pecuniary loss before the 
section could be triggered to award damages. This is clearly at odds with the public law nature 
of the statutory provision which was enacted to give recourse for breach of a public law right 
in the Constitution. In fact, the CC has recently pronounced in Allpay (2) that compensation 
under PAJA is not a private law remedy.36 Corroborating the views of Swart, which I share, 
that the damages envisaged in s 8(2) of PAJA are essentially constitutional damages,37 
d'Oliveira writing in LAWSA makes it clear that the term ‘compensation’ as used in s 8 is the 
administrative law equivalent of ‘constitutional damages’.38 
 
Correctly so, Swart further argues for an alternative; in administrative cases, it seems that the 
court does not have to resort to s 8(2).39 In Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 
and Another,40 a case in which the applicant waited for nine months for her disability grant to 
be approved, Leach J turned to s 38 of the Constitution for a mandate to fashion ‘appropriate 
relief’. The reason why he turned to the Constitution was because he did not think the 
common law provided a solution. He stated that the applicant would have been entitled to a 
mandamus obliging the administrator to make a decision, yet that would be ineffective a 
remedy.41 Leach J then ordered the respondents to pay the applicant, with interest, the 
amounts she would have been paid if her grant had been approved within the standard three 
months, under the banner of constitutional damages. Hoexter agrees with Swart’s analysis. 
According to Hoexter the orders crafted in Mahambehlala as well as in a similar case, Mbanga 
v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and another,42 suggest that there is no particular need for 
the statutory remedies created by s 8(2) as the court can still turn directly to s 38 of the 
Constitution, but they are nevertheless a welcome addition to the law. She speculates, 
correctly in my view, that grounds of review and remedies which are spelt out in statutory 
form would be more accessible than their common law or constitutional counterparts.43 To 
this I would add Swart’s convincing conclusion that even though the courts can essentially 
look directly to s 38 of the Constitution for relief: 
  
‘[the] idea of unity of the common law and constitutional law and of statutory law and the Constitution 
is attractive not only for the elegance and harmony it brings to our law but also for its consistency with 
the constitutional imperatives of supremacy and legality. In light of the wide scope and nature of the 
 
36 Allpay (2) (note 25) para 72. 
37 Swart (note 24) 238. 
38 Jan Adriaan van Schoor d'Oliveira ‘Administrative Justice’ in Law of South Africa (LAWSA) (3rd ed) Volume 2, 
67. 
39 Swart (note 24) 237. 
40 2002 (1) SA 342 (SE) 
41 Ibid.  
42 2002 (1) SA 359 (SE). 
43 Hoexter (note 3) 278, 282. 
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remedies in PAJA it is difficult to see how awarding a constitutional remedy would be irreconcilable 
with the wording of s 8 (2)’.44 
 
Whichever route one elects to follow, it is untenable to seek to deny the public character of 
the damages permitted by s 8(2) of the PAJA, as the courts in Jayiya, Dunn and Darson 
Construction sought to do. To hold otherwise would be, as Plasket argued, a narrow and 
incorrect interpretation of s 8 since it fails to give effect to its constitutional pedigree under 
ss 38 and 172 of the Constitution.45 One cannot overlook the fact that since the advent of the 
constitutional dispensation, administrative justice – in its broadest sense - has become a 
constitutional imperative.46 
 
4.3.2 The PEPUDA, the EEA and the LRA 
The PEPUDA was enacted to give effect to s 9 read with item 23(1) of Schedule 6 to the 
Constitution, 1996. The Act creates Equality Courts as the fora for adjudication of equality and 
discrimination disputes. In its remedial provisions, the Act provides for ‘an appropriate order’ 
that in s 21(d) includes, inter alia, ‘an order for the payment of any damages in respect of any 
proven financial loss, including future loss, or in respect of impairment of dignity, pain and 
suffering or emotional and psychological suffering, as a result of the unfair discrimination, 
hate speech or harassment in question’. This subsection expressly provides for damages to 
remedy the breach of the fundamental constitutional rights to equality and dignity. Although 
to date no court has yet dealt with this compensation provision, mention of the provision 
suffices to demonstrate the clear allowance of what are damages for breach of constitutional 
rights.  
The statute enacted to give effect to the equality provisions of the Constitution in the 
workplace is the Employment Equity Act (EEA). This Act, unlike the PEPUDA, is litigated in the 
Labour Court, together with the LRA. Where an employment equity matter goes for 
arbitration and conciliation, s 48(2) of the Act allows for the commissioner to award payment 
of compensation and damages by the employer to an employee. Where the Labour Court is 
the forum, the Act provides in s 50 as follows: 
 
‘(1) Except where this Act provides otherwise, the Labour Court may make any appropriate order 
including- 
    … 
     (d)   awarding compensation in any circumstances contemplated in this Act; 
     (e)   awarding damages in any circumstances contemplated in this Act; 
… 
(2) If the Labour Court decides that an employee has been unfairly discriminated against, the Court may 
make any appropriate order that is just and equitable in the circumstances, including- 
 
44 Swart (note 24) 238, citing Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (note 24) at para 50: `There is only one system of 
law. It is shaped by the Constitution which, is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives 
its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control. What would have been ultra vires under 
the common law by reason of a functionary exceeding a statutory power is invalid under the Constitution 
according to the doctrine of legality'. 
45 Clive Plasket 'Administrative Justice and Social Assistance' (2003) 120 SALJ 494, 504. 
46 Steenkamp NO (note 30) para 28. 
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     (a)   payment of compensation by the employer to that employee; 
     (b)   payment of damages by the employer to that employee; 
…’ 
In so far as s 50 is concerned, the case of Piliso v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (SA) 
Limited and Others47 is instructive. In this case a delictual claim for sexual harassment at work 
failed because no particular employee was identified as having been the perpetrator, as 
required by the vicarious liability on the employer contemplated in delict and in terms of s 60 
of the Act. But the further alternative of constitutional damages was successful. In support of 
this claim, the applicant referred to the fact that s 50(1) of the EEA requires the court to make 
an order which is appropriate. It was suggested that, in the determination of ‘appropriate 
relief’, it requires the court to consider the various interests, including the need to redress 
the wrong caused by the infringement, the deterrence of future violations, the dispensing of 
justice which is fair to all those who might be affected, and the necessity of insuring that the 
order can be complied with.48   
 
Then there is the LRA, among whose objectives are ‘to give effect to and regulate the 
fundamental rights conferred by section 27 of the Constitution’.49 Section 158 of the Act deals 
with the powers of the Labour Court and provides as follows: 
 
‘(1) The Labour Court may,  
(a) make any appropriate order, including  
[…]  
(v) an award of compensation in any circumstances contemplated in this Act;  
(vi) an award of damages in any circumstances contemplated in this Act; and  
[…];’ (My emphasis) 
 
It will be noted here that the above provision mentions the award of both ‘compensation’ 
and ‘damages’ separately. The implication is that in the context of the LRA, compensation and 
damages are to be taken to refer to different types of awards. As to the ‘circumstances 
contemplated in this Act’ that the provision speaks of, ss 193-5 provides for those 
circumstances, which include unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices. 
 
A number of cases have considered the application of section 193. In Republican Press (Pty) 
Ltd v Ceppwawu and Others,50 a case of unfair dismissal, the SCA found that the Act allows 
for any one of three remedies to be granted to a worker who has been unfairly dismissed: the 
employer may be ordered to reinstate the worker, or the employer may be ordered to re-
employ the worker, or the employer may be ordered to pay compensation.51 The court found 
that the legislatively preferred remedy is the restoration of the worker to employment either 
by reinstatement or by re-employment, and either of those remedies must be granted except 
 
47 (C32/2005) [2006] ZALC 107. 
48 See ibid para 90.  
49 See s 1(a) of the Act.  
50 2008 (1) SA 404 (SCA).  
51 Para 17, citing s 193(1) of the Act. 
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in specified circumstances,52 in which case compensation may be ordered.53 Importantly, the 
SCA found that the back-pay to which a worker ordinarily becomes entitled when an order 
for reinstatement is made is not to be equated with compensation,54 agreeing with Davis AJA 
in Kroukam v SA Airlink (Pty) Ltd55 that the remuneration that becomes due under the terms 
of the contract itself and does not constitute compensation as envisaged by s 194.56  
In Food and Allied Workers Union v Ngcobo NO and Another57 the SCA affirmed the position 
that the LRA governs the right of a worker who is unfairly dismissed, to claim and recover 
compensation for his or her dismissal.58 Other important cases that have dealt with s 194 are 
Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt59 and Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others.60 In the latter case, the CC restated that 
back-pay awarded at reinstatement is not the compensation envisaged by the Act.61 
 
A most important provision is s 195. This section provides that ‘An order or award of 
compensation made in terms of this Chapter is in addition to, and not a substitute for, any 
other amount to which the employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective agreement or 
contract of employment.’ This provision is crucial in that, just as with s 158(1), is makes it clear 
that the compensation involved here is not delictual or contractual, but additional 
compensation to these two other potential claims. In Fedlife Assurance62 the SCA dealt with 
compensation in terms of s 195 and affirmed the position that an order or award of 
compensation in consequence of an unfair dismissal is 'in addition to and not a substitute for 
any other amount to which the employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective agreement 
or contract of employment'.63 Importantly, the SCA stated that there is no reason to restrict 
the plain – and conceivably broad – meaning of s 195.64 
In Food and Allied Workers Union,65 the latest SCA case to comprehensively deal with the s 
195, the SCA stated that the LRA clearly distinguishes between claims for compensation and 
 
52 193(2): ‘The Labour Court or the arbitrator must require the employer to reinstate or re-employ the employee 
unless –  
(a) the employee does not wish to be reinstated or re-employed; 
(b) the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are such that a continued employment relationship 
would be intolerable; 
(c) it is not reasonably practical for the employer to reinstate or re-employ the employee; or 
(d) the dismissal is unfair only because the employer did not follow a fair procedure.’ 
53 Para 17, citing s 193(1) read with s 194. 
54 Para 19. 
55 (2005) 26 ILJ 2153 (LAC). 
56 Para 19, referring to Davis AJA’s ruling in Kroukam para 55. 
57 2013 (5) SA 378 (SCA).  
58 Para 3. 
59 2002 (1) SA 49 (SCA).  
60 2009 (1) SA 390 (CC). 
61 Para 44. 
62 Note 59 above.  
63 Para 19.  
64 Ibid.   
65 Note 57 above.   
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claims for damages.66 The SCA stated that: ‘It seems to be accepted that “compensation" is a 
form of recompense (satisfaction for some misdeed or offense) and comprises recompense 
for sentimental as well as patrimonial loss. It also seems to be accepted that an employee will 
be able to recover a solatium for the injury to his feelings that was caused by the manner in 
which he was dismissed.’67 Further, the SCA stated that: ‘The compensation for the wrong in 
failing to give effect to an employee’s right to a fair procedure, according to Froneman DJP, is 
not based on patrimonial or actual loss but is in the nature of a solatium for the loss of the 
right and is punitive to the extent that an employer who breached the right must pay a penalty 
for causing the loss.’68 The SCA concluded that the compensation envisaged by the section 
remains in the nature of a solatium for being subjected to unfair treatment, and while the 
quantum of the severance pay, the mitigation of loss and the other factors alluded to in the 
judgment may be relevant considerations, they do not necessarily preclude the payment of 
compensation.69 This position was subsequently confirmed by the CC in Equity Aviation70 per 
Nkabinde J. With respect, I find fault with Nkabinde J’s ruling, however, where she states in a 
subsequent paragraph that: ‘The remedies in section 193(1)(a) are […] in the alternative and 
mutually exclusive.’71 This finding seems to be to be at odds with the clear stipulation of s 195 
that compensation is payable in addition to the other monetary awards granted in terms of 
any other law. This debate, however, does not detract from the point to be made here, that 
the compensation envisaged is not delictual or contractual, but damages of a different nature. 
This compensation is not given a specific name in this provision and anywhere in the statute. 
It can only be compensation envisaged in the Constitution for breach of a constitutional right, 
that is, a statutory reiteration of constitutional damages. One can find no evidence to the 
contrary. 
 
It will be seen that most of these statutes allow for the granting of any other ‘appropriate 
remedy’ or ‘any appropriate order that is just and equitable in the circumstances’, a 
reiteration of the Constitution’s broad and flexible approach to constitutional remedies. Thus 
even for those statutes, where there may not be express mention of ‘compensation’, 
compensation may well constitute ‘appropriate relief’ depending on the facts and 
circumstances before a court. The point to be made is that, unless the context indicates 
otherwise, the damages payable under this class of statutes are not common law or private 
 
66 Para 6, citing that ‘section 158(1) of the LRA empowers the Labour Court to award either and s 195 empowers 
the Labour Court to award, in addition to “compensation”, any other amount to which the employee may be 
entitled in terms of any law or contract of employment’. 
67 Para 6, citing Ferodo (Pty) Ltd v De Ruiter (1993) 14 ILJ 974 (LAC).  
68 Para 59, citing Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial Union (1999) 20 ILJ  89 (LAC) para 41 
and Highveld Steel & Vanadium Corporation Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (2004) 25 ILJ 
71 (LAC), the LAC considered the factors to be taken into account in determining whether to grant compensation 
for procedurally unfair retrenchments. 
69 Para 61. 
70 (Note 60) para 40. 
71 Para 42. She cites Republican Press (note 50) at para 17 and Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair 
Labour Practices (2nd ed) (2007) Juta, Cape Town. 
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law damages. One may argue that these are ‘statutory damages’ by virtue of them appearing 
in the statutes, but in the broader scheme of things, damages are either private or public, and 
these ‘statutory damages’ find themselves falling under public law damages. In this 
submission, I am fortified by the finding of the CC in Allpay (2).72  
 
4.4 THE COURTS’ CURRENT APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES 
South African courts have thus far been seized with a sizeable number of cases on whether 
constitutional damages should be granted, and if so, under what circumstances.73 While 
accepting that there is legal scope for constitutional damages to be granted, the courts seem 
to be saying that, in short, constitutional damages are a rare phenomenon and the litigant 
has a lot of persuasion to do to the bench before such award is made. Generally, the courts 
have not taken a pro-active approach in defining a framework to guide themselves and the 
litigants in seeking the relief.  
It has already been shown that the Constitution simply allows for constitutional damages to 
be granted but provides no guidance as to how constitutional damages are to be granted, and 
this is true of all constitutional remedies.74 It has been left to the judges therefore to ‘make 
the law’ on the granting of constitutional damages.75 On this mandate, the courts have fallen 
short. In a number of cases rights holders have sought to assert their rights in the courts by 
seeking constitutional damages. At the forefront of these constitutional rights have been the 
right to protection of private property,76 right to social assistance,77 right to just 
administrative action,78 right to freedom and security of the person,79 and right to parental 
care.80 In these cases, the courts have been called upon to decide not only if the rights under 
claim are worthy of constitutional damages, but also if the circumstances are befitting of such 
claims.  
The general approach the courts seem to have taken is that where there is an existing delictual 
or statutory remedy that is applicable, then it is unnecessary to consider constitutional 
damages as a remedy,81 and in most cases, the courts have proceeded to grant such delictual 
 
72 (Note 25) para 72. 
73 A number of key cases are discussed below.  
74 Iain Currie and Johan de Waal (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 (2001) 287. 
75 See Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 19: ‘It is left to the courts to decide what 
would be appropriate relief in any particular case’. This is turns means that the Constitution allows a permissible 
approach to remedies. See Sanderson v Attorney-General (Eastern Cape) 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) para 38 and S v 
Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 54 where the court held that even greater flexibility is allowed under the 
1996 Constitution than under the interim Constitution.  
76 S 25 (President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC)). 
77 S 27 (MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA)). 
78 S 33 (Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another 2002 (1) SA 342 (SE)). 
79 S 12 (Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC)). 
80 S 28(1)(b) (Minister of Police v Mboweni and Another (657/2013) [2014] ZASCA 107). 
81 See for example the remarks in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, EC [2006] JOL 16488 (Ck) at para 34: 
‘…The empowering legislation may also provide for an effective remedy. In Knop Botha JA said that on “the 
broader considerations of policy … an aggrieved applicant does not need an action for damages to protect his 
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or other alternative remedies. To illustrate this, the SCA is Olitzki Property Holdings v State 
Tender Board & Another82 considered the question of whether ‘damages for lost profit are an 
appropriate remedy for the infringement of a fundamental constitutional right 
(‘constitutional damages’)’.83  The court stated that: 
‘The award, we were urged, would vindicate the purposes of the Constitution, and inhibit 
maladministration in public bodies. Those claims must on their own premises be assessed with an eye 
on their public purposes, and the fact that interdictory relief was available to the claimant, at an early 
stage in the dispute, must be relevant to assessing its position in asserting them.’84  
This attitude has permeated most of the constitutional damages cases facing the courts. In 
what follows, I discuss the seminal cases that have reached the courts, followed by a 
discussion on the attitudes and approach emanating from this jurisprudence.  
4.4.1 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security85 (‘Fose’) 
 
The founding authority on constitutional damages in South Africa is Fose, before the 
Constitutional Court. The plaintiff was assaulted by members of the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) and claimed damages in delict. Over and above these common law damages, 
he claimed constitutional damages for the infringement of his constitutional right not to be 
tortured and subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and for infringements to his 
rights to dignity and privacy, and this was couched as to include ‘an element of punitive 
damages’.86 The constitutional damages claim was raised in terms of s 7(4)(a) of the Interim 
Constitution, which was the equivalent of s 38 of the current 1996 Constitution. The 
respondent raised an exception arguing that such a claim was not good in law and did not 
disclose a cause of action, and this was accepted by the court a quo.87  
 
In the CC Ackermann J, for the majority, looked at Canadian jurisprudence for guidance where 
s 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for relief that is ‘appropriate 
and just in the circumstances’ where rights are violated and concluded that although certain 
of the lower Canadian courts had awarded constitutional damages, the Canadian Supreme 
Court had not yet done so.88 In considering the United States authorities he pointed out that 
while the Supreme Court had recognised a claim for constitutional damages, this remedy had 
grown out of the peculiarities intrinsic to United States jurisprudence and provided little real 
guidance to a South Africa court. He reached a similar conclusion in relation to judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights.89 
 
interests; he has readily at hand the appeal procedure provided for in the legislative framework”. This approach 
resonates in many judgments’.  
82 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA). 
83 Ibid para 1.     
84 Ibid para 39. 
85 Note 75. 
86 Ibid para 13. 
87 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (2) BCLR 232 (W). 
88 Fose (note 75) para 39. 
89 Ibid para 15. 
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While accepting that, strictly speaking, there is no delict of ‘torture’ in its own name in South 
African law, Ackermann J pointed out that the common law does recognise different degrees 
of assault and that where plaintiffs prove that they have been tortured, the particular 
malevolence associated with such unlawful acts ‘can be accommodated within the common 
law by an appropriate (and if needs be, punitive) order for the payment of damages.’90 So in 
order for the law to protect those constitutional rights that seem to fall out of the scope of 
common law, it was Ackermann J’s finding that ‘[t]he South African common law of delict is 
flexible and under section 35(3) of the interim Constitution should be developed by the courts 
with “due regard to the spirit, purport and objects” of Chapter 3.’91 The court also found that 
in the circumstances of this case punitive damages would be inappropriate. 
Significantly, Ackermann J however proceeded to note as follows:  
‘Notwithstanding these differences it seems to me that there is no reason in principle why “appropriate 
relief” should not include an award of damages, where such an award is necessary to protect and 
enforce Chapter 3 rights. Such awards are made to compensate persons who have suffered loss as a 
result of the breach of a statutory right if, on a proper construction of the statute in question, it was 
the legislature’s intention that such damages should be payable, and it would be strange if damages 
could not be claimed for, at least, loss occasioned by the breach of a right vested in the claimant by the 
Supreme law. When it would be appropriate to do so, and what the measure of damages should be, 
will depend on the circumstances of each case and the particular right which has been infringed.’92 
What has to be decided, he said, is whether on the allegations made in the pleadings the 
plaintiff would be entitled to constitutional damages.93 Despite having said this however, 
Ackermann J ventures into self-contradiction. Ackerman J, despite stating earlier that 
constitutional damages are a possible remedy, went on to seemingly withdrawing from his 
earlier statements:  
 
‘I have considerable doubts whether, even in the case of the infringement of a right which does not 
cause damage to the plaintiff, an award of constitutional damages in order to vindicate the right would 
be appropriate for purposes of s 7(4). The subsection provides that a declaration of rights is included in 
the concept of appropriate relief and the Court may well conclude that a declaratory order combined 
with a suitable order as to costs would be a sufficiently appropriate remedy to vindicate a plaintiff's 
right even in the absence of an award of damages. It is unnecessary, however, to decide this issue in 
the present case. […]’94 
 
This discordance that was picked by Kriegler J in his separate concurring judgment: 
‘On one point, I respectfully suggest, Ackermann J is uncharacteristically ambivalent. As I understand 
the reasoning in paras [69]-[73] of his judgment, my learned Colleague in principle condemns punitive 
damages as a potential remedy for infringements of constitutional rights but at the same time seeks to 
found the current rejection on the particular facts of this case. For reasons that I hope to make plain 
shortly, I agree that we should unequivocally reject punitive damages as a remedy in this case. I do 
 
90 Ibid para 16. 
91 Ibid para 58. 
92 Ibid para 60.  
93 Ibid para 61.  
94 Fose (note 75) para 68. 
81 
 
believe, however, that we should refrain from any broad rejection of any particular remedies in other 
circumstances …’95 
Kriegler J further makes reference to the separate concurring opinion of Didcott J in the 
judgment when he held the view that punitive or exemplary damages are not claimable from 
the state for breaches of constitutional rights, leaving open however the case of other 
infringers of such rights. ‘Notwithstanding the circumscribed ambit of the rejection of 
punitive/exemplary damages,’ Kriegler J opined, ‘I believe that we need not and should not 
go as far as Didcott J in rejecting for all time the possibility that a case may arise where 
punitive or exemplary damages are “appropriate” redress for infringement of constitutionally 
protected rights.’96 The import of this is that the decision in Fose should not be read as 
denying the remedy of constitutional damages, but rather as having denied the remedy on 
the facts of the case before it. One cannot therefore rely on Fose as authority is denying 
constitutional damages as good at law.  
While the court took precaution to intricately balance the need for state liability and the legal 
basis for that liability, the court missed an opportunity to judicially articulate parameters of 
state liability for human rights violations, parameters not rooted in the Roman Dutch law but 
in the Constitution the country has adopted for itself. In so doing the court ‘passed the buck’, 
deciding instead that it was ‘prudent not to anticipate a question of constitutional law in 
advance of the necessity of deciding it’.97 In the court’s words: 
‘It needs to be emphasised again that the issue we are called upon to decide is a narrow one. We are 
not required to answer the question raised by the exception in the broad terms in which it was framed, 
nor as it was presented in plaintiff’s argument; namely, whether an action for damages in the nature of 
constitutional damages exists in law and whether an order for payment of damages qualifies as 
appropriate relief for purposes of section 7(4)(a) of the interim Constitution in respect of a threat to or 
infringement of any of the rights in Chapter 3. We are concerned with the much narrower task of 
answering these questions only in relation to the rights allegedly infringed in the present case and then 
only in respect of the separate claim for constitutional damages …’98 (my emphasis)  
It is clear that Ackermann J’s criticism is directed towards ‘punitive’ damages as opposed to 
constitutional damages. The wrong unstated assumption on which he seemed to ground his 
reasoning and approach was that punishment is the sole existential utility of constitutional 
damages. Alternatively, the court was simply addressing this utility or motivation for the 
reason that the court narrowed down the discussion to the circumstances of this case. This is 
clear from the wording of Ackermann J’s conclusion holding that: ‘[W]e ought not, in the 
present case, to hold that there is any place for punitive constitutional damages. I can see no 
reason at all for perpetuating an historical anomaly which fails to observe the distinctive 
functions of the civil and the criminal law and which sanctions the imposition of a penalty 
 
95 Ibid para 91.  
96 Ibid para 92.  
97 Ibid para 21. 
98 Ibid para 20.  
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without any of the safeguards afforded in a criminal prosecution.’99 This is also amplified by 
Didcott J’s separate concurring judgment when he said: 
‘The claim assailed at present must be characterised and treated, in my opinion, as one for punitive or 
exemplary damages in the sense of those sought not to compensate the plaintiff for any loss or other 
harm suffered by him or her, but solely to punish or make an example of the wrongdoer for extremely 
egregious misbehaviour on his or her part. That we are concerned with such a claim alone is, to my 
mind, clear. ... In substance it was a claim for punitive or exemplary damages and nothing else. ...’100 
The court did not dwell much on the vindication utility of the remedy save to opine that an 
award of substantial delictual damages in itself will be a powerful vindication of the 
constitutional rights in question, requiring no further vindication by way of an additional 
award of constitutional damages.101 On the whole, the court stayed clear of making 
substantive pronouncements on the circumstances under which constitutional damages may 
be awarded, and for what rights. Conveniently, the court chose to narrow down the issue to 
punitive damages. However, a little more instructive jurisprudence emerged after Fose.  
4.4.2 Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another (‘Mahambehlala’)102 
and Mbanga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and another (‘Mbanga’)103 
Both Mahambehlala and Mbanga were Eastern Cape High Court matters in which 
constitutional damages were granted as just and equitable relief under s 33(1) read with ss 
38 and 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, and pursuant to the principle formulated in Fose, for 
unconscionable delays in the processing and payment of welfare grants. 
In Mahambehlala, the applicant waited for nine months for her disability grant to be 
approved, when it ought reasonably to have taken no more than three. An order was sought 
to compel the respondents to consider the plaintiff’s application. Leach J turned to s 38 of the 
Constitution because he did not think the common law provided a solution. The court took 
the view that the negligent delay ‘resulted in an unlawful and unreasonable infringement of 
[Mahambehlala’s] fundamental right to just administrative action as set out in s 33(1) of the 
Constitution’,104 and ordered the respondents to pay the applicant the amounts she would 
have been paid had her grant had been approved after three months, with interest. 
 
Leach J saw no prospects of the applicant getting the relief she needed in the form of back 
payments of the grants under common law. Nor did he believe that a mandamus obliging the 
administrator to make a decision, to which the applicant was entitled, would be sufficient 
relief. Leach J held that appropriate relief under s 38 is not restricted to existing common law 
remedies: 
 
 
99 Ibid para 70. 
100 Ibid para 79.  
101 Ibid para 67.  
102 2002 (1) SA 342 (SE). 
103 2002(1) SA 359 (SE). 
104 At 353D-E. 
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‘In my opinion, in the light of these considerations, the applicant's common-law remedies are 
insufficient to be regarded as appropriate relief as envisaged by s 38 of the Constitution. … I am of the 
view that it is incumbent upon this Court to attempt to fashion what may loosely be referred to as 
“constitutional relief” to cater for the fact that the common-law relief to which the applicant would be 
entitled is insufficient to address the effects of the delay of her social grant for five months and that it 
is unrealistic to expect her to institute a separate action to claim damages.’105  
 
Leach J endorsed the notion that there is a transformative element to constitutional relief. He 
cited Froneman J’s remarks in Ngxuza and Others v Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another106 and stated that ‘a remedy for administrative justice 
should be determined against the background of a large proportion of the people living in this 
province [Eastern Cape] being poor, access to legal assistance being limited and the necessary 
financial assistance to take an unhelpful and unresponsive public administration to court 
being problematic.’107 In order to vindicate the Constitution, he added, one should have 
regard to the basic values and principles enshrined therein.108 
Leach J was compelled to address some ‘principles’ affecting the granting of constitutional 
relief: ‘In essaying the determination of appropriate relief it is important to bear in mind that, 
although constitutional remedies will often be forward-looking to ensure that the future 
exercise of public power is in accordance with the principle of legality […] they may also be 
backward-looking’.109 For that reason, he believed that ‘it would be just and equitable for an 
aggrieved person in the position of the applicant to be placed in the same position in which 
she would have been had her fundamental right to lawful and reasonable administrative 
action not been unreasonably delayed’.110 
The above comments also give direction in valuation of quantum. Leach J awarded damages 
equivalent to the amount the applicant ought to have received had the grant application been 
approved within three months after application, and interest on that amount up until date of 
payment. This interest at the prescribed rate of 15,5% per annum was not granted according 
to common-law principles given that no claim on interest could be established at common 
law.111 Rather, together, this relief was framed as 'constitutional relief'.112 This was a practical 
approach to quantification.  
A similar order was made in Mbanga,113 a case with materially similar circumstances to 
Mahambehlala. Two and a half years lapsed after application of a grant, prompting an 
application for an injunction. The applicant's grant was eventually awarded a month before 
the matter came before the court. The only issue for the court to decide was whether the 
 
105 Mahambehlala (note 102) 354I-J and 355A-B. 
106 2001 (2) SA 609 (E) at 1329H-I. 
107 At 355G-H. 
108 At 355-356.  
109 At 355-366J-A. 
110 At 356D. 
111At 357A-I. 
112 Mahambehlala (note 102) 356G 
113 Note 103.  
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applicant was entitled to interest on the monthly arrears that became due at the date the 
application should have been granted. The court found the delay of 32 months in considering 
the application to be unreasonable, as was agreed to by the parties.  
 
The decision in Mahambehlala was applied, and the court found that the applicant was 
entitled to 'constitutional relief' for infringement of the right to social assistance and just 
administrative action under s 33(1) read with s 38 of the Constitution.114 The court held that 
the applicant had to be placed in the same position he would have been had his application 
been dealt with within a reasonable time.115 The total amount payable was therefore the 
quantum of the back payment from the date the application should have been approved plus 
interest at the prescribed rate of 15.5% per annum, which the court termed ‘constitutional 
relief’ as the common law did not provide for such relief.116 
 
4.4.3 Jayiya v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another 
(‘Jayiya’)117 
Following on the lines of Mahambehlala and Mbanga, the applicant in Jayiya had experienced 
excessive delays in having a permanent disability grant considered. The High Court granted 
‘constitutional damages’ of a lump sum payment of amounts that would have been payable 
to the applicant had a decision been made timeously, together with interest. On appeal in the 
SCA, Conradie JA acknowledged that the impetus for the claim was the decision of Leach J in 
Mahambehlala.118 Conradie JA disapproved of Leach J's decision, suggesting that the type of 
relief that Leach J granted would not be possible in terms of the PAJA. Conradie JA pointed 
out that the PAJA was passed by Parliament to give effect to the constitutional guarantee of 
just administrative action, thus the appellant should have sought her remedy in the then 
recently enacted Act. PAJA, he argued, did not provide for the kind of relief that had been 
afforded to the appellant, that is, the back pay and interest. Instead, Conradie JA argued that 
it provides in s 8(1) (c)(ii)(bb) that a court may in proceedings for judicial review, exceptionally 
direct an administrator to pay compensation.119  
Conradie JA held the view that constitutional damages might appropriately be awarded in the 
absence of statutory remedies or adequate common law remedies, but ‘[w]here the lawgiver 
has legislated statutory mechanisms for securing constitutional rights, and provided, of 
course, that they are constitutionally unobjectionable, they must be used.’120 This view is one 
that ought to be taken to task, as was ably done by Plasket, who argued that Conradie JA's 
view was based on a narrow and incorrect interpretation of s 8 since it failed to give effect to 
 
114 At 370G-H. 
115 At 368I - 369B/C. 
116 At 370G-H. 
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its constitutional pedigree under ss 38 and 172 of the Constitution and the opening phrase of 
s 8(1) of PAJA which states that: ‘The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in 
terms of s 6(1), may grant any order that is just and equitable […]’121 Plasket, correctly in my 
view, argues that the specific remedies mentioned in s 8(1) do not constitute a closed list as 
Conradie JA appears to suggest.122 
Subsequent to a temporary grant being awarded, the appellant lodged an administrative 
appeal to get a permanent disability grant, and she was successful. Fortunately for her, the 
Department paid her all the amounts due to her as per the original order of the High Court, 
except for costs. An intelligent guess is that the Department took this route on the basis of 
the earlier rulings in Mahambehlala and Mbanga notwithstanding the divergent views of the 
SCA in this case. Despite this development, Jayiya is a retrogressive judgment denying relief 
to the appellant, notwithstanding that the court had itself described the Department as a 
‘terminally lethargic Welfare Department’ for all its delays and maladministration.123 
4.4.4 Piliso v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (SA) Limited and Others124  
In Piliso the Labour Court had occasion to consider a claim for constitutional damages 
pursuant to a violation of the Employment Equity Act (‘EEA’).125 Ms Piliso was sexually 
harassed in the workplace with offensive inscriptions made on her photographs at work, 
photographs of which were then seen by workmates. The applicant did not know who it was 
who had perpetrated the sexual harassment, but the respondents admitted that sexual 
harassment of the applicant had occurred. In the alternative to an EEA claim, Ms Piliso claimed 
in delict on the basis that the first respondent failed in its duty to ensure that its workplace 
was safe. In the further alternative, Ms Piliso claimed for constitutional damages by virtue of 
the violation of her constitutional rights.  
 
The Labour Court dismissed the main claim and the delictual claim on the basis that no 
particular employee was identified as having been the perpetrator, a requirement of the 
vicarious liability provided under s 60 of the EEA.126 However, the further alternative of 
constitutional damages was successful, with the applicant receiving an award of R45 000. The 
applicant had referred to the fact that s 50(1) of the EEA requires the court to make an order 
which is appropriate. The court cited Conradie JA in Jayiya127 and made an award for 
constitutional damages on the basis that the employer’s conduct in response to the sexual 
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125 Act 55 of 1998. 
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harassment fell short of the standards required by the legal convictions of the community 
viewed objectively and reasonably,128 and violated the minimum fair labour practices 
required where an employee has been traumatised by sexual harassment, even by an 
unknown perpetrator. Thus if the employee cannot obtain relief through any statutory or 
common law remedies, and his or her constitutional right to fair labour practices is found to 
have been violated, then such employee may approach the court ‘in appropriate 
circumstances’ for relief in terms of ss 23(1) and 38 of the Constitution.129 In any event, the 
court proceeded, the conduct constituted crimen injuria, and the police ought to as well have 
been called in to assist, yet this was clearly not thought to be necessary by the employer.130 
The court stated that: ‘The award I make herein should also serve as a deterrent for future 
violations’.131  
 
4.4.5 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate (‘Kate’)132 
 
Perhaps the second most important decision on constitutional damages after Fose is Kate. In 
this case Froneman J in the Eastern Cape High Court firmly rejected Conradie JA’s approach 
in Jayiya and awarded constitutional damages in a disability grant matter.133 On appeal to the 
SCA, a unanimous five-member bench upheld Froneman J’s stance. It had taken forty months 
for Mrs Kate’s disability grant application to be approved, depriving her during that period of 
her constitutional right to receive a social grant.134 The unlawfulness of the conduct of the 
Eastern Cape Department of Welfare was not contentious.135 What was contentious was 
whether an award of monetary damages was an appropriate remedy for the admitted 
constitutional breach,136 specifically interest during the period from the date the application 
was made to the date that Kate was notified of approval. During that period interest did not 
accrue to Kate on ordinary principles because the debt was not yet payable.137  
The Department of Welfare argued that Kate had delictual remedies that were sufficiently 
restorative of any loss that was caused to her and that a remedy of constitutional damages 
was not required.138 In answer to this submission, the court raised the following: 
‘The question that submission raises is not so much whether the remedy that is now proposed is an 
appropriate one to remedy Kate’s loss but rather whether a constitutional remedy should be granted 
at all. No doubt the infusion of constitutional normative values into delictual principles itself plays a 
role in protecting constitutional rights, albeit indirectly. And no doubt delictual principles are capable 
of being extended to encompass state liability for the breach of constitutional obligations. But the relief 
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that is permitted by s 38 of the Constitution is not a remedy of last resort, to be looked to only when 
there is no alternative – and indirect – means of asserting and vindicating constitutional rights. While 
that possibility is a consideration to be borne in mind in determining whether to grant or to withhold a 
direct s 38 remedy it is by no means decisive, for there will be cases in which the direct assertion and 
vindication of constitutional rights is required. … In my view the breach in the present case warrants 
being vindicated directly for two reasons in particular. First, I see no reason why a direct breach of a 
substantive constitutional right (as opposed to merely a deviation from a constitutionally normative 
standard) should be remedied indirectly. Secondly, the endemic breach of the rights that are now in 
issue justifies – indeed, it calls out for – the clear assertion of their independent existence.’139 (My 
emphasis). 
The SCA per Nugent JA, rejected the use of constitutional damages as a remedy of last resort. 
A mandamus would not have been the best remedy in this case given the prompt action 
required if the wrong was to be averted before any loss occurred. In addition, the court took 
the view that the rights in issue were directed towards the very poorest in the South African 
society, who have little or nothing to sustain them and who can be expected to have little or 
no knowledge of where their rights lie nor the resources readily available to secure them.140 
This is in line with Froneman J’s remarks in Ngxuza141 that a remedy for administrative justice 
should be determined against the background of a large proportion of the people living in this 
province being poor, access to legal assistance being limited and the necessary financial 
assistance to take an unhelpful and unresponsive public administration to court being 
problematic. The court awarded constitutional damages in the form of interest on accrued 
amounts at the prescribed rate of 15, 5% per annum, affirming the High Court’s approach in 
Mahambehlala and Mbanga. 
 
4.4.6 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 
(‘Modderklip’)142 
Eight years after Fose, the CC had occasion to revisit the question of constitutional damages 
on the subject of illegal occupation of land and evictions. Over 36 000 people had illegally 
occupied Modderklip farm and the respondent obtained an eviction order for which the 
Sheriff insisted on payment of R1,8 million to execute ‘because it required the assistance of 
private contractors’. The state refused to contribute to the costs of eviction and Modderklip’s 
appeal for assistance to the President and the Ministers of Safety and Security; Agriculture 
and Land Affairs and of Housing was futile.143 Modderklip continued to actively search for 
ways to resolve the problem, including offering to sell to the municipality the portion of the 
farm that was unlawfully occupied at a negotiable price of R10 000 per hectare.144 The police 
refused to enforce the eviction order, regarding the matter as a private civil dispute between 
Modderklip and the occupiers. 
 
139 Ibid para 27, footnotes omitted.  
140 Ibid para 31.  
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With Modderklip now holding an eviction order that it could not enforce, the Pretoria High 
Court granted a structural interdict, ordering the government to produce a plan to end the 
unlawful occupation and find alternative accommodation for the squatters.145 Among other 
things, it declared that Modderklip’s property rights under s 25(1) of the Constitution had 
been violated by the illegal occupation and the failure of the occupiers to comply with the 
eviction order. It also held that the state had breached its obligations to take reasonable steps 
within its available resources to realise the right of the occupiers to have access to adequate 
housing and land.  According to the High Court, this failure by the state effectively amounted 
to the unlawful expropriation of Modderklip’s property and also infringed Modderklip’s right 
to equality by requiring it to bear the burden of providing accommodation to the occupiers, 
a function that should have been undertaken by the state.146  
On appeal by the state, the SCA agreed in general with the findings of the High Court, and 
declared that the rights of both the landowner (right to property) and the squatters (rights to 
housing) had been impaired, and that the squatters were entitled to remain on the land until 
alternative accommodation was made available by the local government, and that the land 
owner was entitled to constitutional damages calculated in terms of the Expropriation Act147 
for the loss of use of the land during the period for which the land had been occupied.148 The 
SCA cited Fose, and stated that the courts ‘have a duty to mould an order that will provide 
effective relief to those affected by a constitutional breach.’ Fundamentally, it pointed out 
that:  
‘…[C]onstitutional remedies will differ by circumstance. The only appropriate relief that, in the 
particular circumstances of the case, would appear to be justified is that of “constitutional” damages, 
i.e. damages due to the breach of a constitutionally entrenched right. No other remedy is apparent.  
Return of the land is not feasible. There is in any event no indication that the land, which was being 
used for cultivating hay, was otherwise occupied by the lessees or inhabited by anyone else. Ordering 
the State to pay damages to Modderklip has the advantage that the Gabon occupiers can remain where 
they are while Modderklip will be recompensed for that which it has lost and the State has gained by 
not having to provide alternative land. The State may, obviously, expropriate the land, in which event 
Modderklip will no longer suffer any loss and compensation will not be payable (except for the past use 
of the land). A declaratory order to this effect ought to do justice to the case. Modderklip will not 
receive more than what it has lost, the State has already received value for what it has to pay and the 
immediate social problem is solved while the medium and long term problems can be solved as and 
when the State can afford it.’149   
This pragmatic order was upheld by the CC per Langa ACJ.150 The CC held that Modderklip had 
not been idle nor did it neglect to assert its rights of ownership from the outset. It had 
immediately engaged the municipality and the other organs of state in search of a humane 
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way out of the impasse. The municipality, for its part, refused to involve itself or to cooperate 
with Modderklip in the search for solutions, while negative and unhelpful conduct of the state 
throughout was consistent with the view articulated on its behalf in court that the 
responsibility for the implementation of the evictions rested solely on Modderklip.151 The 
state denied its duty to provide accommodation to the affected arguing that providing 
housing to the affected people would amount to 'queue-jumping' which to them was 
unacceptable and ‘would be disastrous for the existing programmes […] leaving the land 
reform and housing programs in chaos.’152 Yet, as the SCA argued (per Harms JA), the 
occupation had not occurred with the intent of obtaining precedence over any other person, 
but rather because people had nowhere to go.153 The CC found that Modderklip could not be 
blamed for any delay in instituting eviction proceedings and for the failure to consummate 
the eviction order.154 As the court accepted, Modderklip ‘found itself in a checkmate position, 
having followed the correct legal procedures and having obtained a court order, only to find 
that the organs of state were either unwilling or unable to assist in enforcing it.’155 Yet it was 
obvious that only the state held the key to the solution of Modderklip’s problem.156 The state 
never gave any acceptable explanation for its failure to assist Modderklip to extricate itself, 
nor on why Modderklip’s offer for the state to purchase a portion of Modderklip’s farm was 
not taken up.157 
Langa ACJ rejected a declaratory order as ineffective for the goals at hand,158 and expressed 
no opinion on whether the state can be ordered by a court to expropriate land, regardless of 
the will of the owner.159 He found that the award of constitutional damages made by the SCA 
was the most appropriate remedy in the circumstances,160 and held that should the state 
decide to expropriate the land on Modderklip’s farm, the sum to be awarded as compensation 
would be set off against compensation to be given for the expropriation.161 Regarding 
quantum, the court found that the difficulty of quantifying the compensation was met by 
resorting to the mechanism provided in s 12 of the Expropriation Act.162 
 
 
151 Ibid para 31.  
152 Ibid para 24. 
153 Ibid para 25.  
154 Ibid para 38.  
155 Ibid para 44. 
156 Ibid para 42.  
157 Ibid para 50.  
158 Ibid para 60. 
159 Ibid paras 62-64.  
160 In granting the relief, the court referred to the decision in Fose para 60 where Ackermann J stated, ‘[I]t seems 
to me that there is no reason in principle why ‘appropriate relief’ should not include an award of damages, 
where such an award is necessary to protect and enforce chap 3 rights. …’ 
161 Modderklip (note 142) para 65.  
162 Ibid para 59.  
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4.4.7 Minister of Police v Mboweni and Another (‘Mboweni’)163  
In Mboweni constitutional damages were sought in the SCA for loss of support and parental 
care after a Mr Mahlati suffered fatal injuries from assault by fellow inmates while in police 
custody. The police neither detected the assault nor did anything to prevent it or protect the 
victim. No grounds were found for his arrest and detention, and on release he died five days 
later after being taken to a doctor.164 Ms Mboweni and the second respondent were both 
mothers of children of the deceased, and on behalf of their daughters sued in delict for loss 
of support, and sought constitutional damages because their daughters’ ‘right to parental 
care as provided for in s 28(1)(b) of the Constitution was impaired upon’ when their father 
died as a result of ‘the unconstitutional conduct’ of the members of the police.165 In respect 
of the delictual claim, judgment was given for the amounts as agreed to by the parties.166 
In the High Court Mothle J allowed the claim ‘for proven constitutional damages arising out 
of the unlawful deprivation of their father’s parental care’ and referred the quantum of those 
damages to trial.167 On appeal by the Minister, Wallis JA was of the view that while the CC in 
Fose accepted that there may be circumstances in which damages are a just and equitable 
remedy for the breach of a constitutional right, the cases of Modderklip and Kate wherein the 
relief was granted differed entirely from the matter at hand. To uphold the judgment of the 
court below would thus break new ground.168 
The High Court had made its decision on the basis of an agreed statement of facts, and the 
SCA took issue with what it perceived as inadequate relevant facts, thus failure to comply with 
the requirements of rule 33(2)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court: ‘The parties and the court 
below approached the matter as if there was a clear-cut issue of law capable of resolution 
with the barest minimum of factual matter being placed before the court. That was an error. 
[…] Here there were no facts dealing with the question of the loss of parental care.’169 
According to Wallis JA, the statement of facts provided virtually no detail in regard to the 
children’s claims, other than to claim that the children had been robbed of parental care as 
the deceased provided parental care to his two daughters.170 Wallis JA thought that the 
information that should have been placed before the court included whether the father was 
actually taking care of the children, since in every case whether the parent who has died 
provided parental care in terms of the Constitution would depend on the relationship 
between the parent who has died and the children in respect of whom the claim is being 
made.171 According to Wallis JA, the provided statement of facts also lacked information on 
 
163 Minister of Police v Mboweni and Another 2014 (6) SA 256 (SCA).  
164 Ibid para 1.  
165 Ibid para 2.  
166 Ibid.  
167 Mboweni (note 163) para 3. 
168 Ibid para 4.  
169 Ibid para 5.  
170 Mboweni (note 163) para 9.  
171 Ibid para 13. 
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whether the inaction of the police in failing to safeguard and care for Mr Mahlati while in 
police custody, constituted a wrongful act in relation to the children. For these reasons, Wallis 
JA was not convinced that the trial court judge was in a position to assess whether there had 
in fact been any loss of parental care.172  
Wallis JA did not end there: ‘Even if those issues could be and had been determined in favour 
of the respondents there remained the further issue of whether constitutional damages were 
the appropriate constitutional remedy for that breach.’173 Again, Wallis JA reflected the 
prevailing judicial attitude of first resorting to common law remedies: 
‘The court below did not consider whether a remedy by way of a claim for damages for loss of support 
was an appropriate remedy for any breach of the children’s rights in this case. Its approach was that 
the Constitutional Court in Fose had recognised the possibility of a claim for constitutional damages as 
an appropriate remedy for a breach of a constitutional right and the only issue was whether such 
damages should be awarded for a breach of the right in s 28(1)(b) of the Constitution. That approach 
was incorrect. The court should first have considered the adequacy of the existing remedy. If it was 
inadequate then it should have considered whether the deficiency could be remedied by a development 
of the common law to accommodate a claim more extensive than one for pecuniary loss. Ackermann J 
pointed out in Fose that the common law of delict is flexible and falls to be developed with due regard 
to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. …’174 (My emphasis)  
Wallis JA reasoned that the court below failed to address issues of a factual and a legal 
character that were central to the decision, and for those reasons the judgment of the court 
below could not stand.175 The action was referred back to the High Court for trial in 
accordance with the findings of the judgment.176 Important is that while the SCA upheld the 
appeal, the court did not deny the claim as unsound nor did it refuse the relief. Instead, the 
court called for proper information to be presented before the court before a ruling could be 
made. This is therefore not a decision that necessarily contributed negatively to the 
constitutional damages jurisprudence per se, save to restate the unfortunate approach that 
resort had to be had to common law relief first. 
4.4.8 Other cases 
In Ngomana v CEO of the SA Social Security Agency177 the Cape High Court provided some 
pointers on the nature of the constitutional damages relief: ‘[T]he award of constitutional 
damages is discretionary’.178 In so far as the court understood the utility of the remedy, it 
opined as follows: ‘The purpose of constitutional damages is not primarily to compensate for 
financial prejudice or patrimonial loss; it is rather a means by which the courts may seek by 
surrogate relief to give expression to the fulfilment or realisation of a claimant’s abrogated 
constitutional rights by way of an award in monetary compensation. …’179 
 
172 Ibid para 15.  
173 Ibid para 20. 
174 Ibid para 22.  
175 Ibid para 26. 
176 Ibid para 27.  
177 2010 ZAWCHC 172.  
178 Ibid para 39. 
179 Ibid.  
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In Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Von Abo180 the SCA reversed the 
decision of the High Court that awarded damages to the plaintiff for breach of his property 
rights by the Zimbabwean Government during the land reform process. However, the SCA 
cited Fose and other cases and stated that ‘Section 38 of the Constitution empowers a court 
to grant appropriate relief when it concludes that a breach of rights under the Bill of Rights 
has been established’ and that ‘a monetary award of damages for a constitutional breach 
could in appropriate circumstances be made.’181  Of procedural relevance, the court 
suggested that the issue of causation will be relevant in determining the appropriateness of 
constitutional relief.182 The SCA seemed to suggest that proof of causation and loss are 
prerequisites.  
 
In Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape183 the CC mentioned the award of damages 
after acquittal as possible ‘appropriate’ relief when delays in prosecution result in prejudice 
to the accused.184 The court provided no further elaboration on this aspect, but this 
compensation in certainly not delictual but constitutional relief for violation of a right.  
 
In Snyman v Van Tonder,185 the plaintiff claimed for constitutional damages for a solatium for 
infringement by the defendant of certain of the plaintiff’s basic rights. The court held that 
‘[w]hether a remedy in constitutional damages is appropriately available in a case depends 
on the given circumstances. The existence and character of the circumstances allegedly giving 
rise to a cognisable claim for such damages would have to appear in the particulars of claim 
in any action in which such damages were claimed’.186 The court took the view that legal 
policy determines whether or not a claim for such damages is cognisable in the 
circumstances.187 The court cited with approval Joubert et al (eds)’s submission in LAWSA 
that: ‘A constitutional remedy does not aim to compensate and such an award should be 
considered in only the most exceptional circumstances, when compelling reasons so dictate, 
and only if there is no other compensatory remedy available in law.  In delict, an award for 
damages is the primary remedy; in constitutional law, an award for damages is a secondary 
remedy, to be made only in appropriate cases when other remedies would not be effective’.188 
The court proceeded under the view that if the infringements complained of are compensable 
in a delictual action, compensatory damages should be sought in delict.189 The court then 
upheld the defendant’s exception to the plaintiff’s particulars of claim on the basis that a 
 
180 2011 (5) SA 262 (SCA). 
181 Para 32, citing Minister of Health & others v Treatment Action Campaign & others (No 1) 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC); 
Modderklip (note 148); Kate (note 132). 
182 Para 33. 
183 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC).  
184 Para 39 
185 [2017] ZAWCHC 60.   
186 Para 4.  
187 Para 5.  
188 Para 5 (citing 3rd ed, Vol 15, Law of South Africa (LAWSA), Delict, para 6, 10). 
189 Para 6.  
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prohibitory interdict and delictual compensation should have been sought.190 This case 
advances the exceptional remedies and remedy of last resort mantra. What is notable 
however is that this is a case of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, with a private citizen 
suing another. 
In Pinkie v Commissioner of the South African Police and Another,191 in a claim for 
constitutional damages for police dereliction of duty, the court found that the cases of Fose, 
Modderklip and Kate ‘demonstrate that the question of remedy can only arise after the 
relevant right has been properly identified and the pleaded or admitted facts show that the 
right has been infringed’.192 The court concluded that the plaintiff must identify and plead the 
relevant constitutional right infringed by the defendants.193 The court proceeded to state that 
even then, that does not necessarily establish the right to claim damages as a further issue is 
whether the actions or inaction of the police constituted a wrongful act in relation to the 
plaintiff.194  
Yet another case involving children was Mbhele v MEC for Health for the Gauteng Province,195 
in which constitutional damages were claimed based on the right to rear a child. The SCA 
awarded damages in delict for the Department of Health’s failure to take reasonable care to 
prevent stillbirth, but found a claim of constitutional damages to be unsustainable as, inter 
alia, a child can only recover damages for pre-natal injuries if subsequently born alive.196 
A case similar to Modderklip came before the High Court in Fischer.197 Applicant sought an 
eviction against a large number of illegal occupiers on its farm. On constitutional damages, 
the court held the view that ‘[w]hile the facts of Modderklip are broadly similar to those in 
the instant case, it supports constitutional damages as a form of relief, but offers no real 
authority on other forms of relief’.198 The court also addressed the question of appropriate 
relief citing Fose, and stating that should there be no existing appropriate relief, the court is 
obliged to forge new and creative remedies in order to ensure effective relief where a 
constitutional right has been infringed.199 In so doing, it said, the historical, social and 
economic situation cannot be ignored.200  
 
 
 
190 Para 8.  
191 [2017] ZAGPPHC 939.   
192 Para 6.  
193 Para 7.  
194 Ibid.  
195 [2016] ZASCA 166.   
196 The court based this on the dictum in Pinchin & another, NO v Santam Insurance Co. Ltd 1963 (2) SA 254 (W) 
260B.  
197 Fischer v Persons listed on Annexure X and two other cases 2018 (2) SA 228 (WCC).  
198 Para 42.  
199 Para 160.  
200 Para 161.  
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4.5 OBSERVATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF THE COURTS’ APPROACH 
The jurisprudence of the courts, more specifically that of the CC, has not been very 
encouraging.201 From the above is seen an array of views, from cases that raise doubt and 
questions about the very nature of the relief; to those that have rejected the remedy under 
specific circumstances; to those that have granted the remedy; and to those that have 
expressed no opinion regarding the application of damages in other rights that have not been 
tested before the courts.  
The ‘founding’ case on this relief, Fose,202 recognised that in principle monetary damages are 
capable of being awarded for a constitutional breach.203 The CC emphasised that its decision 
was not on whether an order for the payment of damages qualifies as appropriate relief in 
respect of a threat to or infringement of any of the rights in the Bill of Rights, but was 
concerned only with the much narrower task of deciding whether an award of damages was 
appropriate in relation to the particular breach that was in issue, and for the specific punitive 
reason for which the remedy was sought.204 The court narrowed down its enquiry, the goal 
being seemingly to avoid any form of statements that could be seen as guidelines on the 
application of the remedy in other circumstances and on other rights. If one looks at 
Mboweni, for instance, the SCA was quick to mention that while the CC in Fose accepted that 
there may be circumstances in which damages are a just and equitable remedy for the breach 
of a constitutional right, the relief had only been granted in Modderklip and Kate, both of 
which differed entirely from the matter in Mboweni, such that to award the damages in that 
case would break new ground.205 This was recognition of the limited and very specific 
circumstances in which constitutional damages have thus far been awarded. The SCA in 
Mboweni was hesitant to break new ground.  
One is not too off the mark to argue that insofar as giving elaboration to the relief and how it 
ought to operate, and the circumstances in which it should be granted, several courts have 
found refuge in passing the buck. This was the case with Fose. In Mboweni, Wallis JA chose 
instead to dispose the matter on procedural grounds, deciding that the stated case did not 
provide adequate facts upon which a decision could be made.  
One observation is the inconsistency with which courts have understood and applied 
constitutional damages. A quite prevalent view espoused is that a litigant and court must first 
look to alternative remedies and then consider constitutional damages only as a remedy of 
last resort. This is a question that arose in Fose and was subsequently supported in cases such 
as Jayiya and Mboweni.206 In this class of cases is also found the view that preference lies in 
 
201 Ian Currie and Johan de Waal (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1, Constitutional 
law (1st ed) (2001) Juta, Cape Town 297. 
202 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
203 Ibid para 69.  
204 Ibid para 20. 
205 Mboweni (note 163) para 4.  
206 Ibid para 22.  
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developing the common law where common law remedies are inadequate, as opposed to 
granting constitutional relief. If one accepts these approaches, there is a danger in abdicating 
the utility of constitutional remedies to common law remedies. This erroneously assumes that 
the goal meant to be achieved by a constitutional remedy will necessarily be achieved by a 
common law remedy. Such an approach tends to undermine the importance of the rights 
concerned and stands to elevate common law remedies as the key ‘fossilised’ remedies to be 
preferred at all times. Such an approach deprives the right holder of the constitutional 
promise, as there is a constant retreat to Roman Dutch law for answers, giving pre-eminence 
to common law remedies despite the emergence of a new constitutional culture. We are 
therefore seeing elements of judicial conservatism that carries with it the risk of limiting the 
reach of constitutional relief to litigants. 
However, Kate raised a crucial counter-argument,207 which is that the fact that delictual 
damages can be used indirectly to vindicate constitutional rights as was done in Carmichele208 
and Van Duivenboden209 among others, must not mean that constitutional remedies have no 
place as direct vindication. The interpretation of constitutional damages as a remedy of last 
resort was firmly rejected by Nugent JA in Kate.210  
 
In Jayiya,211 Conradie JA was of the view that the appellant in Mahambehlala should have 
sought her remedy in PAJA rather than in the Constitution,212 and in his view PAJA does not 
allow for the recovery of constitutional damages.213 Whilst these obiter comments have not 
yet been dealt with by another court, Conradie JA’s views must be taken to task. Minister of 
Defence v Dunn214 and Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town215 go further to 
suggest that proof of pecuniary loss is a pre-requisite for a damages claim under PAJA, as Von 
Abo216 also seemed to intimate. These remarks and those made in Jayiya are disputed by what 
Langa CJ and O’Regan J said in a dissenting opinion in Steenkamp NO217 where they found that 
s 8 of PAJA might result in the development of administrative law principles governing the 
payment of compensation to vindicate the constitutional right to administrative justice.218 
Mahambehlala and Mbanga essentially granted constitutional damages in what are squarely 
administrative law circumstances governed by PAJA. Again, it was made clear beyond doubt 
 
207 Kate (note 132) para 27.  
208 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
209 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden [2002] 3 All SA 741 (SCA). 
210 Kate (note 132) para 27.   
211 2004 (2) SA 611 (SCA). 
212 PAJA came into operation on 30 November 2000. Whether it was applicable to events that had occurred 
before then was not pertinently considered in Jayiya.  
213 Jayiya (note 117) para 9.  
214 2007 (6) SA 52 (SCA). 
215 2007 (4) SA 488 (C). 
216 Supra (SCA).  
217 Steenkamp NO (note 30). 
218 Ibid para 97. 
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by the CC in Allpay 2 that compensation under s 8 of PAJA is not a private law remedy,219 
meaning that they are public law damages.  
 
The issue of whether constitutional damages are a remedy of last resort is therefore an aspect 
that falls to be addressed in this thesis, including the wisdom of allowing constitutional 
damages claims in cases where delictual remedies may apply. Within the Bill of Rights itself, 
it is not clear whether generally a breach of any of the rights contained therein can 
substantiate a constitutional damages claim, or some are excluded from the purview of the 
relief. As with Fose, the court in Kate declined to answer the question stating that it was taking 
a narrow approach to the facts at hand.220 Again, we see caution in the way the courts have 
dealt with the subject.  
In Modderklip, the SCA reasoned that the structural interdict granted by the High Court as 
well as the broadly formulated declaratory order were not the best orders under the 
circumstances.221 So was expropriation. This was the case with Mahambehlala and Mbanga 
wherein a mandamus was not seen to be useful. These cases are therefore a demonstration 
of how handy and valuable constitutional damages become as a matter of pragmatism. It is 
important to note that although these three cases used constitutional damages out of 
necessity, none of them spoke of constitutional damages as being a remedy of last resort.  
In summary therefore, two points can be taken from the jurisprudential analysis. There are 
contesting views among the courts. In one camp, the approach the courts have taken is that 
where there is a possible existing remedy in delict, that should be pursued rather than 
constitutional damages, and where such common law remedies fall short they must be 
developed. In this camp the discourse has primarily been one of avoidance, with convenient 
sweeping aside of the constitutional damage case to make it one of delict, and then refuse to 
pronounce on how constitutional damages work in precedent-setting fashion. In the other 
camp, are the proponents of direct vindication of constitutional rights through direct 
invocation of constitutional relief where circumstances call for such, notwithstanding the 
possible applicability of other common law relief. But again, avoidance and narrowed down 
approaches is a feature in this camp, clearly avoiding creating a framework for the relief.  
Both these sides, unfortunately, expose problems in the judicial approach. In view of the 
inconsistent approaches, one is not too far off the mark to say that a certain negative energy 
is emitted by most courts where constitutional damages are concerned, and many courts 
have missed the opportunity to vindicate constitutional rights in a manner that speaks to the 
wider status quo of people who find their rights at the mercy of government and its 
functionaries but are unable themselves to seek redress through the courts due to issues of 
 
219 Allpay (No 2) (note 25) para 72.  
220 Kate (note 132) para 25. 
221 Modderklip SCA (note 148) para 39.  
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access to justice. What emerges therefore is a pressing need to streamline the approaches of 
the various courts to forge consistency in approach and understanding of the remedy. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter the constitutional foundations of constitutional damages have been explored, 
as have been those instances in which this relief has been legislated in various statutes that 
give scope and content to rights in the Bill of Rights. I have then proceeded to look at the 
judicial approach, and have examined a line of cases that have addressed constitutional 
damages, all post 1993. Through this, the development of the remedy in the new 
constitutional dispensation has been traced, and the weak points exposed. A clear problem 
statement has been established on which the following Chapters will build and seek to 
address. There is seemingly the absence of a strong will by the judiciary, especially the 
Constitutional Court, in making pronouncements that will set good precedent in the way of a 
framework for the awarding of constitutional damages.  
What is clear is that the debate on the interface between private law and public law remedies 
is still raging, and is yet to be fully resolved.222 Constitutional damages find themselves caught 
up in this debate as the concept of ‘damages’ is one which can now be found in both private 
and public law remedies. The judiciary has decidedly taken a reactive as opposed to a 
proactive stance to this subject, and in those cases where the judiciary addresses the subject 
relatively, there is cold feet in extending the frontiers of legal protection to the powerless 
through constitutional damages. It is with this in mind that the following Chapters proceed to 
suggest approaches that the courts can take in awarding constitutional damages. To set the 
pace, the next Chapter looks at how constitutional damages have been treated in 
comparative jurisdictions.  
 
  
 
222 As Moseneke DCJ indicated in Steenkamp NO (note 30) at para 1, it is a complex debate.  
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CHAPTER 5 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional damages are not a South African invention. They have been awarded both in 
the common law and civil law traditions across the world, albeit with different nomenclature. 
The United States of America (US), Canada, France, India, Trinidad and Tobago, Sri Lanka, New 
Zealand and Botswana have all awarded constitutional damages. One can thus look at these 
jurisdictions for insights and best practices in modelling a local framework. This Chapter 
examines the recognition of constitutional damages in other jurisdictions, and the courts’ 
approach and circumstances under which the relief has been granted.  
 
The comparators discussed have been selected, firstly and primarily, for the wealth of 
jurisprudence developed on the subject. This is the case with Canada, the US, India, Trinidad 
and Tobago, New Zealand and Sri Lanka. Secondly, comparators have been chosen on the 
basis that the countries share the common law tradition with South Africa, and have 
developed constitutional protection of rights. Canada, India, New Zealand and the US all place 
a high premium on constitutional protection of rights. India in particular is important as it is a 
developing country with an almost similar transformative constitutional culture as South 
Africa. Botswana is added to this list for its recent important case that was decided on the 
subject. Finally, France is included for fullness of the picture as a representative of the civil 
law tradition.  
As a preliminary point, I heed the caution of Goliath J in Tlouamma and others v Speaker of 
the National Assembly and others1 that insofar as use of comparative law in constitutional law 
is concerned, one must be cautious of uncritical reliance on legal doctrines from foreign 
jurisdictions that bear constitutionally dissimilar features to South Africa, and that ‘foreign 
jurisprudence must be viewed through the prism of the Bill of Rights and our constitutional 
values’.2 I must therefore add that the following assessment does not seek to engage in 
wholesale consumerism of comparative legal doctrine, but to understand approaches and 
progress and challenges on the subject in comparable jurisdictions. The Chapter ends with a 
brief analysis of the positions in the comparative jurisdictions, and brief remarks on the 
position of international law on constitutional damages.   
 
 
 
 
1  2016 (1) SA 534 (WCC).  
2 Ibid para 133, citing City of Cape Town v South African National Roads Authority Limited and Others 2015 (3) 
SA 386 (SCA) para 31 and H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 (2) SA 193 (CC) para 31. 
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5.2 CANADA AND CHARTER DAMAGES 
Canada is a leading jurisdiction on constitutional damages. Constitutional damages are 
awarded for violations of rights in terms of s 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,3 earning them the name ‘Charter damages’.  
5.2.1 Jurisprudence  
Whilst phrases such as ‘new endeavour’ and ‘an area that has not matured yet’ have been 
used in reference to Charter damages as recently as 2010,4 the earliest known case in which 
constitutional damages were awarded is Crossman v R5 in 1984. Various appellate courts in 
Canada have found that an action for constitutional damages is an appropriate and just 
remedy.6 Contrary to South Africa as seen particularly in Fose, exemplary or punitive damages 
have been awarded in several cases in the form of Charter damages.7 In Collin v Lussier (1983)8 
and Lord v Allison (1986)9 punitive damages were awarded in addition to compensatory 
damages. This culminated in a Supreme Court decision in 2010: Vancouver (City) v Ward.10 It 
will be recalled that in Fose11 one of the objections put forward by the CC against reliance on 
Canadian law for authority was that while the Canadian High Courts had pronounced in favour 
of constitutional damages, the Supreme Court was yet to do so.12 Ward changed this.  
Ward was a case of mistaken identity in which the Supreme Court upheld a s 24(1) claim 
against unreasonable search and seizure, guaranteed in s 8 of the Charter.13 Ward was 
wrongfully arrested because he fitted the vague description of a person who was suspected 
of trying to throw a pie at the former Prime Minister. The police seized his car and strip-
 
3 (1984) (4th) 588.  
4 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 paras 21, 33 and 43. 
5 [1984] 1 FC 681 (TD). See also Pilkington ‘Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms’ (1984) 62(4) Canadian Bar Rev 517. 
6 In Patenaude v Roy (1994) 123 DLR (4th) 78 (Que CA) exemplary damages of $50 000 were awarded where 
police officers used excessive and unnecessary force in executing a search warrant. The appeal court increased 
the amount of damages to $100 000. In McKinney v University of Guelph (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 545 621, Wilson J 
reasoned that ‘the remedial scope of s 24(1) was not intended to be limited to that available at common law’. 
See also Guimond v Quebec (Attorney General) (1996) 138 DLR (4th) 647 (SCC) para 15; Mackin v New Brunswick 
(Minister of Finance); Rice v New Brunswick (2002) 209 DLR (4th) 564 (SCC) para 79; Dulude v Canada [2001] 1 
FC 545; Dix v Canada (Attorney General) (2002) 7 Alta LR (4th) 205; Chrispen v Kalinowski (1997) 148 DLR (4th) 
720 (Sask QB); and Persaud v Donaldson (1995) 130 DLR (4th) 701 and Vespoli v The Queen (1984) 12 CRR 185 
(Fed CA).  
7 The Constitutional Court in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 40 attempted to 
sidestep adopting the Canadian approach as follows: ‘Exemplary or punitive damages as Charter remedies have 
been awarded in several cases. This must, however, be seen in the light of the fact that Canada’s private law 
system of torts which, in common with that of other common law countries, recognises exemplary or punitive 
damages in appropriate circumstances in ordinary tort claims, but goes somewhat further even than courts in 
the United Kingdom.’ 
8 (1983) 6 CRR 89, 107.  
9  3 BCLR (2d) 300 (SC).  
10 Note 4 above. 
11 Fose (note 7). 
12 Ibid para 15.  
13 Part I of the Constitution Act 1982.  
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searched him. In the court a quo, the decision was primarily focused on the issue of whether 
mala fides was required in order for damages to be awarded for a Charter violation. It had 
been argued that the police lacked mala fides and thus damages should not be awarded to 
Ward. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s ruling that bad faith, abuse of power, or 
tortious conduct were not necessary requirements for awarding Charter damages.14 The 
Supreme Court did not directly deal with this issue, but its decision implied that mala fides is 
not a requirement. McLachlin CJ for the unanimous Supreme Court found that anyone whose 
rights have been violated may approach a court for any ‘appropriate and just’ remedy in terms 
of s 24(1) of the Charter. The Supreme Court found that the language of s 24(1) is broad 
enough to include the remedy of constitutional damages.15 To this end, Canada’s s 24(1) of 
the Charter converges with South Africa’s s 38 of the Constitution.  
The Supreme Court set out a two-staged enquiry. The first step is to establish that a Charter 
right has been breached, and the second step is to show why damages are a just and 
appropriate remedy, ‘having regard to whether they would fulfil one or more of the related 
functions of compensation, vindication of the right, and/or deterrence of future breaches.’16 
McLachlin CJ stated that: 
 
‘Damages for breach of a claimant’s Charter rights may meet these conditions. They may meaningfully 
vindicate the claimant’s rights and freedoms. They employ a means well-recognized within our legal 
framework. They are appropriate to the function and powers of a court. And, depending on the 
circumstances and the amount awarded, they can be fair not only to the claimant whose rights were 
breached, but to the state which is required to pay them.’17  
 
Correctly so, the court opined that the evolution of s 24 of the Charter to meet the challenges 
and circumstances of cases brought before the courts seeking for appropriate relief, might 
require novel and creative features when compared to traditional and historical remedial 
practice because ‘tradition and history cannot be barriers to what reasoned and compelling 
notions of appropriate and just remedies demand’.18 
 
The Supreme Court found that Charter damages are not private law damages, and cited New 
Zealand’s jurisprudence19 as authority for the proposition that an action for public law 
damages ‘is not a private law action in the nature of a tort claim for which the state is 
vicariously liable but [a distinct] public law action directly against the state for which the state 
is primarily liable’.20 The court found that the nature of the remedy is to require the state or 
 
14 Vancouver (City) v Ward (2009) 89 BCLR (4th) 217 (BCCA) per Low JA, Finch CJ, concurring, Saunders JA, 
dissenting. 
15 Note 4 para 21. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid para 21. See also Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) [2003] 3 SCR 3 paras 55-58 (per 
Iacobacci and Arbour JJ). 
18 Doucet-Boudreau (note 17) para 59.  
19 Dunlea v Attorney-General, [2000] NZCA 84, [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 136 para 81, a case dealing with New 
Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act 1990.  
20 Ward (note 4) para 22. 
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society as a whole to compensate an individual for breaches of their constitutional rights, and 
such an action subsist against the state as opposed to individual actors.21 Distinctively, actions 
against individual actors should be pursued in accordance with existing causes of action, that 
is, at common law and in statute, although the underlying policy considerations that are 
engaged when awarding private law damages against state actors may be relevant when 
awarding public law damages directly against the state.22 To illustrate how distinct the Charter 
damages claim is to the tort action, Ward had sued the officers for assault as well as the City 
and the Province for negligence, but the fact that the plaintiff’s claims in tort were dismissed 
did not defeat his Charter damages claim, nor did it change the fact that his s 8 Charter right 
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure was violated. Again, no tort action was 
available for that violation and a mere declaration of rights would not have made good the 
violation. Importantly, it was recognised that granting Charter damages was ‘a new 
endeavour’ and for that reason an approach to when damages are appropriate and just 
should develop incrementally.23 The Court however did not stop there.  
5.2.2 Four-step test for establishing a Charter damages claim 
As to how Charter damages are to be adjudicated and awarded, the Supreme Court came up 
with a four-step test.24 First, the claimant must establish that a Charter right has been 
violated. Second, the claimant must show why damages are an appropriate and just remedy 
to the extent that they serve a useful function or purpose, whether compensation, vindication 
of the right, deterrence, or a combination of any of these. The court found that pecuniary or 
physical loss is not a prerequisite. 
The third step involves a shift in onus, with the government rebutting the damages award 
through presenting countervailing factors that defeat the functionality of damages or renders 
them inappropriate or unjust. This includes the availability of other remedies that would 
adequately satisfy the need for compensation, vindication and/or deterrence.25 Charter 
damages will also be barred where a concurrent action in tort or private law would result in 
double recovery.26 Claimants need not show that they have exhausted all other recourses. 
Rather, it is for the state to show that other remedies including private law remedies or 
another Charter remedy are available in the particular case that will sufficiently address 
the Charter breach. The court however was clear in expressing that this must be distinguished 
from a case where the claimant does not have a concurrent tort action. In such a scenario, 
the mere existence of a potential tort claim would not preclude a claimant from claiming 
Charter damages, and it is so because ‘[t]ort law and the Charter are distinct legal avenues’.27 
 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid para 21. 
24 Ibid paras 4 and 74. 
25 Ibid para 33. 
26 Ibid para 36. 
27 Ibid para 35.  
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Another example of a countervailing consideration would be the potential for constitutional 
damages to thwart effective governance.28 This factor is best illustrated in Mackin v. New 
Brunswick (Minister of Finance),29 wherein the Supreme Court denied public law damages for 
government action taken under a statute which was subsequently declared invalid, holding 
that an exception would have been when the government conduct was ‘clearly wrong, in bad 
faith or an abuse of power’. The rationale was that government officials would be hindered 
in executing their duties for fear of being held liable whenever a statute is subsequently 
declared invalid. Incidentally, this factor speaks to the point of mala fides as a non-
requirement for liability. Although in Ward the Supreme Court did not directly address mala 
fides, this countervailing factor indirectly does so. 
 
Should the government fail to rebut the damages claim, the court moves on to the fourth and 
final step, which is the assessment of quantum. The guiding principle, again, is that the 
amount awarded should be just and appropriate. The Supreme Court endorsed four general 
considerations previously established in the case of Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister 
of Education)30 which are that an appropriate and just remedy will: ‘(1) meaningfully vindicate 
the rights and freedoms of the claimants; (2) employ means that are legitimate within the 
framework of our constitutional democracy; (3) be a judicial remedy which vindicates the 
right while invoking the function and powers of a court; and (4) be fair to the party against 
whom the order is made.’31 Again, the Supreme Court moved for a goal-oriented, functional 
approach even in the assessment of quantum, applying the phrase ‘appropriate and just’ 
mutatis mutandis to the consideration of quantum.32 Thus where compensation is the 
function of the claimed damages, the damages must restore the claimant to his original 
position as this would be making good pecuniary loss.33 But non-pecuniary loss is also 
permitted, and in such a case the goal would not be restorative but vindication and 
deterrence, and the appropriate determination is an exercise in rationality and 
proportionality.34 Generally, the more egregious the breach and the more serious the 
repercussions on the claimant, the higher the award for vindication or deterrence will be.35 
This is because to be ‘appropriate and just’ an award of damages must represent a meaningful 
response to the seriousness of the breach and the objectives of s 24(1) damages.36  
 
Finally, the court emphasized that in considering quantum, the court must focus on the 
breach of Charter rights as an independent wrong, worthy of compensation in its own right. 
 
28 Ibid paras 38 and 42. 
29 2002 SCC 13. 
30 2003 SCC 62. 
31 Ward (note 4) paras 20-21. 
32 Ibid para 46. 
33 Ibid para 48. 
34 Ibid para 51. 
35 Ibid para 52. 
36 The court held at para 52 that: ‘The seriousness of the breach must be evaluated with regard to the impact of 
the breach on the claimant and the seriousness of the state misconduct’.   
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Thus in doing so, damages under s 24(1) should not duplicate damages awarded under private 
law causes of action, where compensation of personal loss is at issue.37 It is also within the 
court’s discretion to take into account the public interest in good governance, the danger of 
deterring governments from undertaking beneficial new policies and programmes, and the 
need to avoid diverting large sums of funds from public programs to private interests.38 It has, 
however, been Canada’s position as was held in the ground-breaking decision of R v 
Schachter,39 that the courts should not be precluded from rendering judgments with direct 
budgetary consequences for the state as long as those consequences are appropriate. 
 
Of importance, the case of Ward laid a firm foundation for claims for Charter damages as an 
alternative cause of action to tort damages, and ‘[b]eing a unanimous judgment, Ward has 
removed that initial lack of consensus as to the principles governing the assessment of 
damages for breach of Charter rights in Canada.’40 Interestingly, the Canadian Supreme Court 
referred with approval to Didcott J’s observation in Fose41 that vindication as a utility of 
damages focuses on the harm the infringement causes society, and that violations of 
constitutionally protected rights harm not only their particular victims but society as a 
whole.42 
 
This position in Ward has been widely affirmed in scholarly review in Canada.43 
Comparatively, Ward is perhaps the most progressive and detailed of all superior court cases 
on constitutional damages worldwide. Since Ward, other Charter damages cases have come 
before the Canadian Supreme Court, the latest being the 2017 case of Ernst v Alberta Energy 
Regulator.44 In another case, Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General),45 the British 
Columbia Supreme Court cited Ward and awarded $7.5 million in Charter damages, including 
for deterrence, to the claimant for the violation of his Charter rights resulting in his wrongful 
conviction and imprisonment for 27 years. This was in addition to a separate award for 
compensation for past loss of income and special damages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 Ward (note 4) para 55. 
38 Ibid para 53. 
39 [1992] 2 SCR 679.  
40 Chuks Okpaluba ‘The Development of Charter Damages Jurisprudence in Canada: Guidelines from the 
Supreme Court’ (2012) 1 Stell LR 63. 
41 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
42 Ward (note 4) para 28. 
43 See Pilkington (note 5) 519 and the and the numerous references therein. 
44 2017 SCC 1. 
45 2016 BC 1038.  
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5.3 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE BIVENS CLAIMS 
 
The United States has a developed jurisprudence in what is referred to as ‘constitutional 
torts’, pursuant to Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.46 As far back as 1946 
the court had ruled in Bell v. Hood47 that an action for damages arising out of alleged Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment violations should not be dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction.48  
This allows for state (as opposed to federal) officials to be held liable. In its original 
formulation the remedy was described as a ‘civil action for deprivation of rights’, which was 
developed to create ‘a species of tort liability’ in favour of persons deprived of federally 
secured rights.49 It was seen as ‘an avenue through which individuals can directly appeal to 
the Constitution as a source of right to remedy government-inflicted injury.’50 According to 
Park, the term ‘constitutional tort action’ encompasses all claims for damages brought against 
government officials for violating an individual's federal constitutional rights.51  
Currently, constitutional torts are code-named the Bivens actions, so named after the 
founding and most authoritative case on this remedy for federal state agents – Bivens v Six 
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents52 before the Supreme Court. It is this case that allowed 
federal state officials to be liable for constitutional damages. As Nichol puts it, Title 42, Section 
1983 of the US Code creates an action at law for constitutional violations sustained at the 
hands of persons acting ‘under color’ of local or state authority53 and that there is, however, 
no counterpart to section 1983 for federal officials. Bivens becomes important in respect of 
federal officials: it ruled that federal officials can be sued for damages. The court found that 
injuries consequent to an illegal search by federal officials would give rise to a cause of action 
for compensatory relief.54 In a subsequent case, Gomez v Toledo,55 an important statement 
was made by the court: ‘[a] damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component 
of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees’. 
It was seven years after Bivens in Carey v Piphus56 that the Supreme Court handed down a 
decision concerning the types of damages recoverable for an infringement of constitutional 
rights. In that case the court ruled that while presumed compensatory damages may not be 
 
46 See Marshall Shapo ‘Constitutional Torts: Monroe v Pape, The Frontiers and Beyond’ (1965-1966) 60 
Northwestern LR 277, 323-4; Eisenberg and Schwab ‘The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation’ (1986-1987) 72 
Cornell LR 641, 643-4; John M Greabe ‘A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law’ (2008-2009) Constitutional 
Commentary 25189, 193; Michael W Dolan ‘Constitutional Torts and the Federal Tort Claims Act’ (1980) 14(2) 
Uni of Richmond LR 281, 283. 
47 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
48 See Gene R Nichol ‘Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims’ (1989) 75(6) Virginia LR 1118. 
49 See Smith v Wade 103 S. Ct. 1628 (1983) and also Carey v Pilphus 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
50 James J Park ‘Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy’ (2003) 38 Harv Civil Rights-Civil Liberties LR 393, 
395. 
51 Ibid.  
52 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
53 Nichol (note 48) 1118. 
54 Bivens (note 52) 395. 
55 Gomez v Toledo 446 US 635, 639 (1980). 
56 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
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awarded in a Section 1983 action for a violation of procedural due process, nominal and 
proven compensatory damages are appropriate to redress such a grievance.57 Precedence 
was thus set and became applicable in the Bivens actions that a successful plaintiff will be 
entitled to recover nominal and proven compensatory damages.58 
As with South Africa and other jurisdictions, constitutional torts in the US pertain only to 
government as the defendant.59 The peculiarity is that in the US, it is government officials in 
their official capacity that are liable, and not the state itself. The involvement of the 
government as a tortfeasor is necessary to found a constitutional tort action,60 premised on 
the notion that only the government necessarily acting through living agents can violate the 
Constitution and that individuals as individuals lack the legal capacity to violate the 
Constitution.61 As to the reasons for this approach, Brennan J writing for the majority in Bivens 
made the following remarks: ‘An agent acting—albeit unconstitutionally—in the name of the 
United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser 
exercising no authority other than his own’.62 From this, the public nature of the tortfeasor is 
seen as a distinct feature of constitutional tort law.63  
As with most jurisdictions the US has grappled with the distinction between constitutional 
torts and ordinary torts. In Paul v Davis64 the Supreme Court tried to draw a bright line 
between the two. Park suggests the following: 
‘Under one formulation, a common law tort is simply "a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for 
which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages." More concretely, common 
law torts typically involve four elements: (1) a common law duty from one individual to others; (2) that 
is breached through action or inaction; (3) that causes; (4) injury to another individual. Constitutional 
torts track the same four elements except that the duty originates from the Constitution instead of the 
common law.’65  
Thus while constitutional torts and ordinary torts are recognised and treated as distinct 
causes of action, there is an inclination in the US to use some of the elements of ordinary torts 
in constitutional torts enquiries. Nominally, damages actions for violations of constitutional 
rights do not require proof of fault, except as dictated by the definition of the underlying 
right.66 The cause of action is not itself fault based, even though the underlying right may have 
a fault component.67 At a point of convergence however, Jefferies Jr asserts that ‘both 
constitutional tort law and ordinary tort law are an uneasy amalgam of regulation and 
 
57 Jean C Love ‘Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights’ (1979) 67 Cal LR 1242, 1243. 
58 Ibid 1281. 
59 See Park (note 50) 398.  
60 Theodore Y Blumoff ‘Some Moral Implications of Finding No State Action’ (1994) 70 Notre Dame LR 95, 97. 
61 Greabe (note 46) 194. 
62 Bivens (note 52) 392. 
63 Eisenberg and Schwab ‘The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation’ (1986-1987) 72 Cornell LR 641, 644. 
64 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
65 Park (note 50) 398 (footnotes omitted). 
66 Jeffries Jr ‘Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts’ (1989) 
75(8) Virginia LR 1467. 
67 Ibid.  
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compensation. That is, both regimes share an instrumental concern to inhibit undesirable 
conduct and a non-instrumental desire to compensate injured persons. In constitutional tort 
law, at least, the regulatory aspect predominates.’68 The US has thus adopted a goal-oriented 
approach to remedies.69 Nichol states that constitutional history demonstrates that federal 
courts have adjusted the remedial mechanisms available to them in a broad-based effort to 
correct the ‘offending’ condition, and judges have employed a full panoply of both legal and 
equitable tools to assure the vindication of constitutional interests.70 
Subsequently, Carlson v Green71 made use of the Bivens methodology and held that the Eighth 
Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments provides the basis for a federal 
damages claim, despite the existence of a possible alternative remedy under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act.72 This means that despite an overlap in the protection of rights in tort law and 
constitutional law, one can elect to pursue their claim in constitutional law, and the claimant 
reserves the right to elect to pursue his claim in tort as an alternative.73 
The principle of subsidiarity is seen at play in the US expressly in circumstances where the 
constitutional claim will fail if Congress, by providing an alternative remedy or by clear 
legislative directive, has indicated that judicial power should not be exercised.74 This position 
gives credence to the present legal position in South Africa as demonstrated in Chapter 6 
below, that the principle of subsidiarity would only apply where legislation enacted by 
Parliament specifically deals with a constitutional right and its remedies.75  
An argument still rages in the US between judicial authority and judicial deference on the 
subject of constitutional damages.76 There is a string of rulings - which Nichol labels as strange 
for rulings applying a constitutional mandate - that openly embrace and employ the curious 
‘special factors’ rationale.77 This is the notion, which initially South African judges seemed 
drawn to, that constitutional damages will be granted in exceptional circumstances and such 
circumstances are dictated by the presence of ‘special factors’. This string of cases in the US 
has seen the refusal of damages claims despite assertion of prima facie constitutional 
violations ‘on the strength of largely unelucidated declarations of special circumstance’.78 
There is no enumeration of what those ‘special circumstances’ are, or at the very least 
 
68 Ibid 1462.  
69 See Gomez v Toledo 446 US 635, 639 (1980). 
70 Nichol (note 48) 1140. 
71 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
72 Ibid 19-23. 
73 See also Jeffries Jr (note 66) 1461-1462.  
74 Nichol (note 48) 1120. This principle was stated in Bell v Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). 
75 See discussion on the principle of subsidiarity or avoidance in Chapter 6.  
76 For a discussion of this, see Nichol (note 48) 1122-1125. 
77 Nichol (note 48) 1124. 
78 Ibid. Examples of such cases are Schweiker v Chilick 208 S. Ct. 2460 (1988) and Bush v Lucas 462 U.S. 367 
(1983). 
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providing a guiding description of such.79 In Nichol’s view, ‘[a]t its most ambitious, this 
discretionary rationale would cast a considerable shadow over the practice of constitutional 
review.’80 Fortunately, this approach has not taken root in South Africa. 
For determination of quantum, the Supreme Court gave guidance in Memphis Community 
School District v Stachura.81 Where a plaintiff seeks damages for violation of constitutional 
rights, it held that the level of damages must be determined according to principles derived 
from common law. This it did while commenting that it is vital for a court to always keep in 
mind that damages based on the ‘value’ of the constitutional rights were an ‘unwieldy tool’ 
for ensuring compliance with the Constitution.82 Thus the court rejected an approach based 
on the ‘value’ of the right.  
On the whole, Nichol argues that enforcement of the Constitution through the recognition of 
remedial damages awards is not only an appropriate exercise of judicial power, but also an 
indispensable component of constitutional oversight.83 A few decisions by various courts, 
however, have made the Bivens claim unsettled by going back and forth, including on 
doctrinal issues. Bivens in Nichol’s view is clearly legitimate, but what such other courts are 
doing is not.84 These shortcomings in the courts’ doctrine, Nichol adds, result primarily from 
judicial ambivalence about the validity of the entire Bivens enterprise.85 Nichol concludes that 
an award of compensation for the deprivation or substantial impairment of constitutional 
interest is an appropriate remedy that falls comfortably within the US’s judicial traditions.86 
 
5.4 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND THE MAHARAJ CASE 
According to Okpaluba,87 the concept of constitutional damages in Commonwealth 
constitutional jurisprudence owes its origin to the Privy Council (PC)’s seminal unlawful 
imprisonment judgment in Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (Maharaj 2)88 
which established that damages could be recovered as ‘appropriate relief’ to enforce a right 
in the Bill of Rights.89 In Maharaj 2,90 the PC understood a constitutional tort to be ‘a claim in 
public law for compensation’, referring to constitutional damages as a cause of action that 
 
79 ‘Under Chilicky's regime, not only are courts given far too much discretion to deny relief, but too little direct 
attention is shown to the factors that should bar a constitutional damages claim – adequacy of alternative 
remedies and articulated principles of separation of power.’ Nichol (note 48) 1153.  
80 Nichol (note 48) 1124. 
81 477 US 299 (1969). 
82 See Oatile v The Attorney General 2010 (1) BLR 404 (HC) at 415H per Dingake J discussing this case.  
83 Ibid 1121. 
84 Ibid 1129. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid 1141. 
87 Chuks Okpaluba ‘Constitutional damages, procedural due process and the Maharaj legacy: A comparative 
review of recent Commonwealth decisions (part 1)’ (2011) 26(1) SAPL 256.   
88 [1979] AC 385 (PC).  
89 Okpaluba (note 87) 256. 
90 Note 88 above, 407. 
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was ‘totally new’.91 The PC held this remedy not to be a liability in tort at all but a liability in 
the public law of the state, which was newly created by s 6(1) and (2) of the Constitution.92 
Constitutional damages in Trinidad and Tobago have since then always been treated as 
distinct from civil law remedies, but as an independent public law cause of action. Per the PC, 
the state is directly and not vicariously liable.93 Interestingly, the PC reserved its opinion as to 
whether compensation against the Crown to redress infringement of a constitutional right 
can ever include an exemplary or punitive award.94 
The PC emphatically stated that s 6 of the Constitution which empowered the High Court to 
‘make such orders, issue such writs, and give such directions as [it] may consider appropriate 
for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement’ of the fundamental rights was 
intended to create a new cause of action for the contravention of fundamental rights 
including the recovery of monetary compensation.95 Since ‘redress’ in this context bore its 
ordinary meaning of reparation or compensation, including monetary compensation, it 
followed that damages could be claimed.96 We thus see here similarities to s 38 in the South 
African Constitution insofar as both provisions make no specific mention to constitutional 
damages.  
On quantification, Lord Diplock clarified that such compensation would include any loss of 
earnings consequent on the unlawful imprisonment of the appellant, and recompense for the 
inconvenience and distress he suffered during incarceration.97 The PC sought to award 
constitutional damages to compensate for pecuniary loss, but also for non-pecuniary harm. 
Interestingly, Trinidad and Tobago allows for a claimant to make claim for ‘compensatory 
damages’ and ‘vindicatory damages’. At times, ‘exemplary damages’ are added. The 
‘compensatory’ damages would be to cater for pecuniary loss. Subsequent to Maharaj 2, this 
was done by the Privy Council in Subiah v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago,98 with 
Lord Bingham noting that when deciding whether to award vindicatory damages, the answer 
‘is likely to be influenced by the quantum of the compensatory award, as also by the gravity 
of the constitutional violation in question to the extent that this is not already reflected in the 
compensatory award’. This was also done by the Court of Appeal in Robert 
Perekebena Naidike v The Attorney General.99 In the latter, the court awarded vindicatory 
damages over and above compensation, and Jamadar JA in his separate concurring judgment 
referred to vindicatory damages as ‘an additional award, beyond compensation, to reflect 
specifically the vindication of the constitutional violation where the award for compensation 
 
91 Page 407. 
92 Maharaj 2 (note 88) 399F-G. 
93 679j. 
94 Maharaj 2 (note 88) 400. 
95 677b-c. 
96 679a and d. 
97 Maharaj v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [1978] 2 All ER 670 (PC) 680a-c and d. 
98 PC 3 Nov 2008.  
99 Civil Appeal No. 86 of 2007.  
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may not fully achieve this’.100 It appears that the issue of double compensation does not arise 
in Trinidad and Tobago and one is not confined to claiming only delictual pecuniary damages.  
 
5.5 NEW ZEALAND AND THE BAIGENT REMEDY 
 
In New Zealand monetary damages for violation of fundamental rights are known as the 
‘Baigent remedy’ following the founding case of Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent’s 
case).101 Additional terms that have been used to identify the remedy include ‘Baigent 
compensation’, ‘public law compensation’ or ‘New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA) 
compensation’. The remedy has been understood as ‘an action in the nature of tort for a 
monetary remedy’.102 The broader terms ‘public law action’ and ‘public law remedy’ have also 
been used,103 and the Baigent case has been accepted as having established a new cause of 
action and remedy to compensation for a breach of the NZBORA 1990.104 This is in spite of 
the silence of the NZBORA on the type of remedies that can be awarded. The focus of awards 
is broader and the objective is not only to compensate for the particular breach but also to 
affirm the right in question and to deter future breaches.105 
 
5.5.1 Simpson v Attorney-General 
 
In this founding case the Court of Appeal upheld damages against the police for an 
unreasonable search in breach of the NZBORA. Until then, no case had ever been brought 
seeking damages for breach of the NZBORA. The Crown’s defence was that it had immunity 
from prosecution under s 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act of 1956, alternatively, the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy other than a declaration of non-compliance.  
 
In response to the question of immunity, the Court held that neither the particular statutory 
immunities in favour of the police nor s 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act protect action 
taken mala fides. Significantly, the court decided that a breach of the NZBORA gives rise to a 
new civil cause of action for monetary compensation in public law which lies directly against 
the Crown. The court felt that a mere declaration would be ‘toothless’ and awarded damages. 
In its reasoning, the court placed great weight in Trinidad and Tobago’s Maharaj 2. Unlike in 
Trinidad and Tobago and Canada, the NZBORA does not have a remedial provision 
empowering the courts to provide appropriate redress for infringement of the protected 
rights. To this the court made a statement of note: the Supreme Court of Ireland has asserted 
the power to grant appropriate remedies (including awards of compensation) for violation of 
 
100 Para 42.  
101 [1994] NZLR 667. 
102 Ibid per Gault J. Also Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, 231. 
103 Ibid per Casey J. 
104 Dunlea (note 19). 
105 Juliet Philpott ‘Damages Under the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998 and the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990’ (2007) 5(2) NZJPIL 211, 216.  
110 
 
constitutional rights despite the absence of an express remedies provision on the ground that 
the framers of a supreme law guaranteeing fundamental rights must have intended to confer 
a general power of enforcement on the courts.106 It was the majority’s belief that Parliament 
would not have intended the NZBORA to be ‘little more than sounding brass or tinkling 
cymbal’,107 particularly as the NZBORA was enacted to affirm New Zealand's commitment to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).108 As regards the development 
of existing relief to remedy breaches, the court held the belief that there would be problems 
in adapting traditional common law remedies such as negligence and trespass to encompass 
all the rights and freedoms in the NZBORA in order to give appropriate redress for their 
infringement.109 In the result, in certain cases an award of monetary compensation will 
constitute an (and on occasion, the only) effective remedy,110 although the remedy to be 
awarded will be determined by the court on the facts of each case.111 
 
There is a further point which illustrates the activism and creativity with which the Court of 
Appeal approached this case, as Smillie was to later note:  
 
‘[T]he New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is not an entrenched supreme law like the Constitutions of 
Ireland and the United States. It was enacted as an ordinary statute, capable of repeal or amendment 
by a simple majority vote in Parliament. In fact, the Act does not even carry the force of an ordinary 
statute. Section 4 instructs the courts that even prior enactments are not to be held to be impliedly 
repealed or revoked, or in any way invalid, ineffective or inapplicable by reason of inconsistency with 
the Bill of Rights Act.’112  
 
All but one member of the bench were not deterred. The response of the court to this is in 
four stages, as paraphrased from Smillie’s articulate summary113: 
 
1. The rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill are basic human rights which are ‘fundamental to a 
civilised society’. The courts are therefore justified in adopting a ‘straightforward and generous’, 
‘liberal, purposive’, ‘rights-centred’ approach to interpretation of the Bill.  
 
2. Judicially enforceable remedies are necessary in order to ensure that the affirmed rights are 
protected and promoted. This is reinforced by reference to the International Covenant, Article 2(3) of 
which requires each state party to ensure that persons whose rights are violated ‘shall have an effective 
remedy’. Traditional common law remedies would often prove ineffective because the Bill does not 
impose ‘duties’ capable of founding a tort action for breach of statutory duty, and some of the rights 
receive no recognition at all under existing private law doctrine. In any event, common law remedies 
‘will often be so uncertain or ringed about with Crown immunity as to render them of little or no value’. 
 
106 Explained in Ibid. The Ireland decision the court was referring to is Byrne v Ireland [1972] IR 241. 
107 Simpson (note 101) at 693 per Hardie Boys J and at 691 per Casey J. Philpott (note 105) 214 notes that earlier 
judgments had emphasized that a generous interpretation of the NZBORA was required to give individuals the 
full effect of their fundamental rights and freedoms. 
108 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Long Title. See Simpson (note 101) at 699 per Hardie Boys J; and see also 
R v Grayson and Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399, 409 (CA) Judgment of the Court. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Simpson (note 101) at 676 per Cooke P; 692 per Casey J; 703 per Hardie Boys J and 718 per McKay J. 
111 Ibid at 692 per Casey J and 718 per McKay J. 
112 John A Smillie ‘The Allure of Rights Talk: Baigent's Case in the Court of Appeal’ (1994) Otago LR 191. 
113 Ibid 191-192.  
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While the courts could always make a declaration that rights have been infringed, such a remedy would 
be ‘toothless’, and reduce the Bill to ‘no more than legislative windowdressing’. The rights affirmed by 
the Bill are ‘intended to have substance and to be effective’.  
 
3. The omission of an express remedies provision was ‘probably not of much consequence’. It did not 
indicate an intention by Parliament to confine the courts to existing common law remedies. The best 
interpretation was that Parliament was content to leave it to the courts to provide appropriate 
remedies for breach of the protected rights and ‘inclusion of a statement to that effect in the Act was 
unnecessary’. 
 
4. The ‘fundamental’ nature and international dimension of the affirmed rights are more important 
than the legal form in which they are declared. Consequently, the reasoning of foreign courts 
interpreting entrenched constitutional guarantees of human rights is fully applicable to the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
 
Although Smillie seems to suggest that the court overreached by suggesting that Parliament, 
despite deliberately enacting the Bill as an ordinary statute, nevertheless intended it to carry 
a higher constitutional status,114 the court essentially engaged in creative and liberal 
interpretation to protect rights. Smillie herself in fact does recognise that ultimately the 
decision of the majority in Simpson rests on a simple assertion that the courts are the ultimate 
guardians of human rights and they must enforce those rights regardless of Parliament's 
intention, accepting Sir Robin Cooke's assertion that some common law rights ‘lie so deep 
that not even Parliament could override them’.115 
 
As to quantum, Cooke P said that in addition to any physical damage intangible harm such as 
distress and injured feelings may be compensated for, and the gravity of the breach and the 
need to emphasise the importance of the affirmed rights and to deter breaches are also 
proper considerations.116 Extravagant awards are to be avoided, and global awards under the 
Bill of Rights should be awarded if one has another claim at common law for which they are 
successful so as to avoid double compensation.117 
 
What the court did in Simpson, was to abandon the traditional principle that the civil liability 
of the Crown is governed by the same law as applies to private citizens, and created a special 
regime of public civil liability.118 Where a plaintiff has an existing cause of action but feels the 
remedy is insufficient, they are also able to sue under this ground additionally. There is 
therefore no mutual exclusivity in remedies. Admittedly, as Smillie argues, the scope of this is 
highly uncertain.119 The majority in Simpson concluded that an action for damages under the 
NZBORA was not a private law action in the nature of a tort claim for which the state was 
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vicariously liable.120 To this end, Simpson followed the same approach as Trinidad and Tobago 
of recognising the existence of the action as a public law action, despite the fact that the 
NZBORA makes no express provision of monetary damages.  
 
5.5.2 Decisions since Simpson 
 
Simpson was met with criticism for its judicial activism. Nonetheless, the legal reform it 
introduced succeeded. The decision was applied by the Court of Appeal in subsequent cases, 
including one decided on the same day, Auckland Unemployed Workers' Rights Centre Inc v 
Attorney-General.121 Through these cases, constitutional damages have become a recognised 
separate cause of action and have been awarded by various courts in New Zealand. The 
position is such that the civil action for breach of the Bill of Rights is a novel form of ‘public 
liability of the state’ which can be maintained only against the Crown. This action is not 
available against the individual State agents or private citizens responsible for the breach: 
their liability remains confined to tort and subject to common law limitations and statutory 
immunities.  
 
Simpson was later vindicated by the Supreme Court in Taunoa v Attorney General,122 wherein 
the court was unanimous in holding that damages rather than declarations were the 
appropriate remedy for the breaches of the right to human dignity arising out of the 
maltreatment and inhumane conditions in which the appellant prisoners were held.123 
Regarding quantum, Blanchard J in a separate concurring judgment held that once a court 
decides to award NZBORA damages, it should not proceed on the basis of any equivalence 
with the quantum of awards in tort. The sum chosen must, however, be enough to provide 
an incentive to the defendant and other State agencies not to repeat the infringing conduct 
and also to ensure that the plaintiff does not reasonably feel that the award trivialised the 
breach.124  
 
As with the Canadian case of Ward,125 a four-staged albeit different enquiry was resorted to 
by Henry J in his judgment concurring with those of Tipping and Blanchard JJ in Taunoa.126 
According to him, the appeal required the court to particularly consider: (a) the approach the 
courts should take when determining whether, in the circumstances of a case, s 9 of the 
NZBORA has been breached; (b) whether s 9 was breached in respect of the prisoners or any 
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of them; (c) the approach the court should take regarding an award of damages for a Bill of 
Rights Act breach; and (d) whether the awards made by the courts below were appropriate. 
 
Most recently in Currie v Clayton127 the Court of Appeal reiterated Simpson’s finding that: ‘The 
liability of the Crown is not vicarious. Rather, it is a direct liability of the Crown - the state - in 
public law as a guarantor of the rights and freedoms contained in the NZBORA’.128 
Accordingly, the court proceeded, it exists independently from, and is unaffected by, any 
specific statutory immunities available to individuals, such as s 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings 
Act.129 In that case, the court proceeded to restate some fundamental principles as follows:130  
 
• Baigent damages are an ‘exceptional remedy’,131 only available in ‘egregious cases’.132  
• It is not obvious that the Crown should be liable for all breaches of the NZBORA, 
especially when the Crown cannot control the actions of various state sector bodies, 
for example those with financial autonomy.133  
• Compensation will normally only be appropriate where the rights cannot be 
vindicated by means other than the award of compensation, for example where the 
breach of the right has resulted in some sort of irreparable harm.134  
• Those who have been through the criminal process and have had their NZBORA rights 
vindicated through remedies such as exclusion of evidence or a stay of prosecution 
will find it difficult to obtain a further remedy of compensation.135 
 
Other cases have tended to follow an eliminatory approach in confining the application of 
constitutional damages. In Brown v Attorney General,136 William Young J expressed the view 
that New Zealand courts should not award compensation as a remedy for unfair trial process. 
Among his several reasons was that such complaints should rather be raised with either the 
trial judge or on appeal, and that for the courts to recognise claims for compensation in 
relation to unfair trial process would create a fiscal burden on the taxpayer which Parliament 
can hardly be seen to have authorised. The same decision was reached in Combined 
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Beneficiaries Union Incorporated v Auckland City COGS Committee137 and McKean v Attorney 
General.138 In Minister of Immigration v Udompun,139 the Court of Appeal opined that there 
was force in the proposition that compensation should not be available for breaches of 
natural justice as a matter of course, as it should not lightly be assumed that the NZBORA has 
overtaken the existing law on administrative law damages to this extent – including other 
remedies such as setting aside the decision and a declarator.140 Where an effective remedy 
already exists, the court stated, the Bill of Rights Act compensation will not be needed,141 and 
the court cited this principle as having been applied by the European Court of Human Rights 
and as being required by s 8(3) of the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998.142 
 
In Attorney General v Chapman,143 a divided Supreme Court restricted the application of 
damages to only acts done by the executive or legislative branches, thereby excluding 
damages for breaches by the judiciary. In doing so, the three majority judges overturned a 
unanimous Court of Appeal judgment to the contrary,144 and the trend of both judicial and 
academic authority since Baigent.  
 
The courts in New Zealand do not consider constitutional damages to be a case in which to 
dabble into the dichotomy between private and public law.145 It has therefore never been a 
requirement that in awarding public law damages the plaintiff must first seek redress under 
ordinary tort law. This public law remedy of constitutional damages has been treated as 
different from that granted between two private citizens, and it is one particularly intended 
to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in 
legislative majorities.146 This is the exact opposite of what has obtained in South Africa, where 
the hurdle has been to differentiate constitutional damages from delictual damages, as the 
courts have gravitated towards delictual damages as a first resort. New Zealand courts have 
cautioned against moving towards a ‘constitutional tort-based approach’ owing to conceptual 
and practical difficulties, since damages in tort are generally recoverable as of right, whereas 
public law remedies are discretionary.147 Whether constitutional damages would be 
appropriate is for the court to determine.148 Further, principles such as causation, remoteness 
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and mitigation which take precedence in tort law may not fit well with cases where 
fundamental rights have been breached.149 
 
Philpott150 concludes that remedies for a breach of the NZBORA are in part forward-looking; 
the future consequences of a breach may be as important as the impact of the violation on 
the claimant. In addition, the focus is not just on the claimant, but on the community's interest 
in continued respect for the right.151 Reinstating respect for the right and ensuring that public 
bodies conduct their affairs in accordance with the NZBORA, Philpott argues, are important 
objectives as is ensuring that the claimant is duly compensated for his or her loss.152 
Nonetheless, one is also correct to some extent to say that New Zealand treats damages as a 
remedy of ‘last resort’, pursuant to statements made by the courts including in Anufrijeva v 
Southwark London Borough Council153 and in Udompun v Attorney-General.154 In the latter, 
Glazebrook J writing for the Court of Appeal stated that ‘[w]here there already is an effective 
remedy, [NZBORA] compensation is not needed […]’.155 Yet, as Philpott puts it;156 ‘It was 
precisely the fact that common law remedies may not adequately protect NZBORA rights that 
led the Court in Baigent's Case to conclude that a specific remedy for breach of the NZBORA 
was necessary’.  
 
As to valuation of quantum, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages are open for 
consideration, and the mechanism of valuation was not exactly prescribed by the court in 
Simpson. Cooke P nonetheless provided some guidance: ‘[I]n addition to any physical damage, 
intangible harm such as distress and injured feelings may be compensated for; the gravity of 
the breach and the need to emphasise the importance of the affirmed rights and to deter 
breaches are also proper considerations; but extravagant awards are to be avoided’.157 This 
suggests that a compensatory award under the Bill of Rights action may embrace all the heads 
of damages available in tort, and reference to a deterrent function suggests that an exemplary 
component may also be appropriate.158 Cooke P proceeds as follows: ‘I am disposed to think 
that any Bill of Rights award will be usually best made globally, with no breakdown into the 
different elements taken into account,'159 noting further that when concurrent actions in tort 
also prove successful, it is appropriate ‘to make a global award under the Bill of Rights and 
nominal or concurrent awards on any other successful causes of action’.160 It seems that the 
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quantum of such ‘global’ awards may be quite substantial, but the court was express to state 
that in any event there must be no ‘double recovery’. In practice however, the courts have 
aligned to the idea that ‘extravagant awards are to be avoided’.161 In Manga v Attorney-
General,162 Hammond J suggested that the judiciary should award remedies ‘with restraint’ 
to enhance public confidence, democratic decision-making and public morality. Nonetheless, 
and correctly so, Philpott questions this approach, submitting that it is difficult to reconcile a 
direction for modest awards with the objectives, adopted in New Zealand at least, of affirming 
the value of the right in question and deterring future breaches. The danger is that if public 
authorities receive only a small penalty for seriously infringing the NZBORA, their respect for 
fundamental rights will be minimal.163 
 
5.6 INDIA, SRI LANKA, BOTSWANA AND ZIMBABWE 
As far back as the 1980s constitutional torts were recognised in India for the infringement of 
a constitutional right.164 Following two initial setbacks where constitutional damages were 
denied without any meaningful explanation,165 the recognition and development of 
constitutional tort actions became more pronounced and significant.166 The remedy for 
constitutional torts has been fashioned from Article 32 of the Constitution167 which is the 
Constitution’s permissive remedies clause. This is despite the fact that the clause contains no 
express reference to monetary damages. In its genesis, the action was confronted with the 
defence of sovereign immunity. However, in Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa and Ors168 the 
Supreme Court dismissed the defence as inapplicable and alien to the concept of 
guaranteeing fundamental rights. Verma J pointed out that for this public law remedy to serve 
its proper function, the court was obliged to forge new tools in order to do complete 
justice.169   
In Sri Lanka, the Supreme Court in Saman v Leeladasa and Another170 in its application of 
Article 126 of the Sri Lankan Constitution,171 recognised that constitutional damages as 
redress for the violation of a fundamental right are a new public law remedy imposed directly 
on the state by the Constitution and not one in delict based on vicarious liability. The Sri 
Lankan jurisprudence emphasises that where compensation is awarded for the breach of a 
fundamental right it is by way of a solatium for the hurt caused and ‘not as a punishment for 
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duty disregarded or authority abused.’172 This was express rejection of a punitive rationale for 
damages. The idea of using a constitutional damages remedy as a deterrent against the state 
was similarly rejected, not only as being futile but also because it ‘ultimately shifts the burden 
to the taxpayer’.173  
Closer to home in Botswana, the case of Oatile v Attorney General174 in the High Court, and 
subsequently before the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Oatile175 provide useful 
perspective. Dingake J sitting in the High Court awarded constitutional damages and the Court 
of Appeal upheld the relief but reduced quantum. Dingake J suggests that the South African 
courts have been timid in approaching the remedy, a conclusion that I also reach in Chapter 
4. This was the first time the question of constitutional damages was being raised before the 
courts in Botswana, and the court felt at large to approach the case ‘with some kind of 
trepidation and a heightened sense of constitutional duty’.176 The matter pertained to 
violation of the right to fair trial within reasonable period of time as per s 10(1) of the 
Constitution of Botswana. The plaintiff was tried and acquitted 12 years after arrest, and the 
State offered no explanation for this delay. 
The High Court considered that the word ‘redress’ in the remedial clause of the Constitution 
- s 18(1), is neither defined nor qualified, and is sufficiently wide or elastic to include ‘a right 
to constitutional damages’, having regard to the well-known canons of constitutional 
interpretation such as affording a constitutional provision a generous and liberal 
interpretation.177 Dingake J however does not explain further what he meant by ‘a right to 
constitutional damages’ insofar as the court’s exercise of discretion is concerned. As to the 
circumstances under which constitutional damages may be awarded, Dingake J held the view 
that each case will turn on its own circumstances.178 
Dingake J recognised that there may be some situations where common law remedies may 
be regarded as sufficient or broad enough to provide all relief that would be appropriate for 
breach of constitutional rights.179 However, he proceeded, where the court finds the common 
law remedies inadequate, it must fashion appropriate remedies to develop the common law 
or to provide a remedy in damages for breach of fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individuals.180 Reminiscent of Fose, Dingake J opined that such an approach would be critical 
for purposes of protecting all individuals who may be aggrieved, especially the disadvantaged 
people, who are the most frequent victims of non-compliance with the constitutional 
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injunction to be brought to trial within reasonable time, a phenomenon which he states is 
becoming endemic in Botswana.181  
The High Court understood constitutional damages as being ‘a specific public law 
constitutional damages remedy’, which is ‘separate and distinct from any common law 
remedy’ that the claimant may be entitled to.182 Following on the New Zealand and Trinidad 
and Tobago jurisprudence, Dingake J held the view that the primary purpose of delict is to 
regulate relationships between private parties - to provide compensation for harm caused to 
a private party by the wrongful action of another, whilst s 18 of the Constitution of Botswana 
aims at giving concrete effect to the Bill of Rights. He thus concluded: ‘It is my considered 
view therefore that the mere fact that an aggrieved party may have a claim in delict, over an 
unconstitutional conduct, does not  limit the right of a litigant to approach the court for 
constitutional damages’.183 Dingake J opined that whilst deterrence and exemplary damages 
should not be ruled out in principle, the real focus should be compensating the victim, by 
which he meant vindicating the victim’s rights.184 Where a public authority exhibits reckless 
or callous disregard of an individual’s fundamental human rights, punitive damages may be 
granted.185 The court held the view that any inevitable overlap between common law and 
constitutional remedies may be resolved by judicial discretion on a case by case basis.186 By 
so stating, Dingake J refrained from pronouncing constitutional damages as a remedy of last 
resort, but leaves it to judicial discretion.  
In assessing quantum, the court applied the UK case of Merson v Cartwright and Another,187 
and Dingake J proposed that the court may use the analogy of delict when dealing with injured 
feelings, distress and mental anguish.188 He proceeded to adopt that methodology, accepting 
however that the amount to be awarded is within the discretion of the judge.189 
The Court of Appeal agreed with Dingake J’s fundamental holding, but curiously considered it 
unnecessary to classify constitutional damages as either public or private, choosing instead 
that it is neither, and it is ‘an action in its own right’.190 The Court of Appeal rejected further 
categorising constitutional damages as exemplarity or punitive, arguing that punitive 
damages are inappropriate, departing from the court a quo’s position that they may be 
appropriate in certain circumstances. The Court of Appeal preferred instead the ‘once and for 
all rule’ where concurrent actions lie in delict and constitutional law so as to avoid double 
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compensation. In reducing Dingake J’s award, the Court of Appeal argued that the approach 
to awards of damages generally and in particular to awards against the state, will dependent 
on the socio-economic circumstances and on the conditions prevailing in the relevant 
country.191  
In Zimbabwe the 2013 Constitution expressly provides for constitutional damages, albeit 
without a framework on how and when they may to be granted.192 The locus standi clause, s 
85(1), which is framed along the same lines as s 38 of the South African Constitution, allows 
for monetary damages as included under the ‘appropriate relief’ the courts may grant. This 
gives impetus to the legal standing of constitutional damages as a cause of action in its own 
right in constitutional law. It remains to be seen how constitutional damages jurisprudence 
will develop in Zimbabwe, suffice to mention that there is no challenge as to the soundness 
of public law damages as a matter of principle and law. The challenge when the appropriate 
case arises, will be on establishing a framework to guide the courts and litigants in the 
approach to this relief.  
 
5.7 FRANCE 
 
In the civil law tradition, France awards damages as a way of enforcing human rights 
violations.193 As with all the jurisdictions discussed above, this position developed from 
confirmation of the legality of such an award in a judicial determination, in the case of France 
in a 2007 ruling of the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State).194 In that pioneering case the state 
was compelled to compensate for damage caused by the enactment of a statute which was 
contrary to international covenants ratified by France,195 a position that goes a step further 
than holding the state liable for damages caused by administrative acts in implementing 
national statutes.196 This is because in 1990, the Conseil d’Etat expressly recognised the supra-
legislative value of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),197 making the 
protection of ECHR rights more effective in the context of domestic legal proceedings.198 
What the 2007 decision then did was to clarify the consequences attached to state liability in 
case of a violation of an international convention by a national statute. Breach of rights guar-
anteed under the ECHR in itself is a ground for compensation.199  
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The underlining reasoning and justification of constitutional damages in France identifies with 
the reasoning and justification advanced elsewhere. Firstly, it is recognised that obtaining an 
amount of money, even a large one, cannot be expected to be adequate compensation for 
the huge pain that a victim suffers as a result of breaches of fundamental liberties. 
Notwithstanding, getting something may be better than nothing – at least to the extent that 
it pronounces on the condemnation of the breaches and recognised the victimhood of the 
victim.200 The view is that in the case of breaches committed by the State or by citizens, an 
award of damages appears to be the best means to enforce human rights.201 More interesting 
in light of the approach such as of New Zealand where modest compensation has been 
preferred, the French perspective seems to be different: 
 
‘[T]he economic analysis of law furnishes an ambiguous answer that the State will be incentivised to 
prevent the violation of human rights only if the cost of compensation for any violation is higher than 
the cost of prevention of such violations. […] By this approach, the higher the damages are, the better 
the enforcement of human rights is.’202   
Secondly, France advances the argument that it is politically indecent for a State to be found 
liable for violation of human rights. To this end, the ruling itself, without regard to the amount 
of damages, may help in the enforcement of human rights.203 This is similar to a sentiment 
that was shared by the House of Lords in M v Home Office204 albeit dealing with contempt of 
court by a Minister of State.  
Importantly, Quézel-Ambrunaz addresses the elements of a damages case. According to the 
Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), he says, mere proof of violation of privacy entitles the 
victim to obtain compensation.205 Whereas in an action for civil liability the plaintiff must 
prove fault or other basis for liability, the damage caused and the causation, according to this 
ruling he cites the proof of the fault alone is sufficient and damage and causation are 
presumed because of the nature of the right infringed. Regarding quantum, the character of 
the right in question attached to the violated interest inform the judges approach towards 
proof of damage,206 bearing in mind that French tort law does not apply a hierarchy among 
the protected rights and full compensation of any legal injury is the rule and the defences are 
the same whichever interest is violated.207 
Constitutional damages in France stretch the boundaries of this remedy for one more reason: 
there is now a move to make damages a human right. The debate has moved on from 
existential arguments to considerations of whether the right to obtain damages is itself a 
fundamental human right, a phenomenon which Quézel-Ambrunaz calls ‘fundamentalisation 
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of compensation’.208 The argument for fundamentalisation is anchored on the premises that: 
‘the infringement of a human right warrants the payment of compensation;’ that 
‘[c]ompensation is inextricably linked to human rights’; that ‘the right to obtain compensation 
is part of a triptych of equality, liberty and property’; and that ‘the “fundamentalisation” of 
the award of damages is a way offered to victims to secure their compensation’.209 From a 
French perspective, it is more the right of the victim to obtain compensation than the duty of 
the wrongdoer to pay the damages which is protected.210 Quézel-Ambrunaz prefers not to 
answer the question whether this fundamentalisation of compensation or the development 
of compensation for breaches of human rights, is the way forward for other countries.211 This 
thesis does not advance that argument either, but poses it as a question for further research. 
Although Quézel-Ambrunaz makes the point that ‘an award of damages may appear to be an 
opportunity for enforcement of human rights, including in horizontal relationships’,212 the 
courts in France have not extended the application of constitutional damages to horizontal 
relationships and none of the jurisdictions discussed in this Chapter have done so.  
 
5.8 MONETARY DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Given that human rights in general have found wider acceptance and stronger domestic 
recognition primarily through the influence of international law, an assessment of the global 
picture on constitutional damages cannot be complete without looking at the position in 
international law. I deal with international law here simply to highlight the existence and 
treatment of the remedy in international law, and by no means is this to suggest the equality 
in status between international law remedies and domestic constitutional law remedies. 
 
The payment of damages for violations of human rights is seldom enshrined in international 
texts on human rights, except for some breaches such as unlawful detention.213 Some of those 
texts, however, such as Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) mention the 
exigency of an ‘effective remedy’. We thus find certain clauses that do not necessarily specify 
the kind of remedies that a court could award, but clauses that are broad and permissive 
similar to ss 38 and 172 of the South African Constitution.  
In Europe, claims for damages seem to have become the foremost means to enforce human 
rights before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Though Article 41 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that satisfaction is subsidiary,214 Article 13 
 
208 Quézel-Ambrunaz (note 193) 190. 
209 Ibid.  
210 Ibid 200-202. 
211 Ibid 202. 
212 Ibid 200-202. 
213 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9. 
214 Quézel-Ambrunaz
 
(note 193) 191. 
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provides that the victim of a rights breach is entitled to an effective remedy. In one forced 
eviction case, Connors v United Kingdom,215 the court awarded substantial non-pecuniary 
damages. In the United Kingdom when the courts are determining whether to award damages 
and the amount to be awarded, the courts are directed in terms of s 8(4) of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 to take into account principles applied by the ECtHR when making awards under 
Article 41 of the Convention. 
 
Closer to home, the African Commission on Human Rights has awarded non-pecuniary 
damages for violation of human rights in Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) 
and Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria.216 In this precedent-setting socio-
economic rights case Roach correctly observes that the ‘dualistic approach’ was followed, 
with the Commission awarding a remedy aimed at compensation for past violations but also 
at ensuring compliance in the future.217 Roach argues that ‘[s]uch awards can help make 
socio-economic rights meaningful and counter concerns that they are second-class rights in 
relation to political and civil rights’.218 
What we can extract from international law is that monetary damages are a legitimate and 
above-board remedy for violation of human rights. We get very little however on process and 
approach.  
 
5.9 SOME OBSERVATIONS AND A COMMENT ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A DEFENCE  
 
Constitutional damages in their nascent days in a number of jurisdictions constitutional 
damages were met with the defence of sovereign or state immunity. The South African CC 
highlighted this in Fose.219 Owing to its development in a ‘tentative fashion’,220 several 
variations and degrees of immunity are manifest in several legal systems, particularly in the 
US where distinctions between constitutional and tort violations end up determining the 
variant of immunity to be imposed.221 This notwithstanding, gradually the idea took hold that 
it is a fundamental feature of the rule of law that government officials are in the same position 
as any individual committing a legal wrong, and crown or sovereign immunity cannot be used 
to mask impunity.222  
 
215 [2004] 40 EHRR 9. 
216  (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001) No. 155/96.  
217 Kent Roach ‘The Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Violations of Socio-economic Rights’ 46 in Malcolm 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law Cambridge 
University Press (2008).  
218 Ibid.   
219 Supra para 27. 
220 Christina B Whitman ‘Constitutional Torts’ (1980) 17(1) Michigan LR 5, 64. 
221 Dolan (note 46) 287-8. For an examination of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see George W Pugh 
‘Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity’ (1952-1953) 13 Louisiana LR 476, 476. 
222 From Mia Swart ‘Left out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the poorest of the Poor’ (2005) 
SAJHR 215, 226, citing Kent Roach Constitutional Remedies in Canada (1994) 2-18. 
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In the US immunity was initially seen as a defence,223 and some cases found government 
officials to have qualified immunity in instances of constitutional violations and absolute 
immunity at tort law.224 This was until the notion of a constitutional tort was accepted and 
vindicated by the Supreme Court in Bivens.225 This, however, only applies to individual 
government officials. With regard to the government itself, the Supreme Court made it 
abundantly clear in Bivens that however desirable a direct remedy against the government 
might be as a substitute for individual official liability, the sovereign still remains immune to 
suit.226 The Bivens remedy was therefore possible ‘[b]y authorising causes of action against 
individual persons in their capacities as private jural entities separate and apart from their 
public capacities as agents through whom the government acts’.227  
 
In Canada cases such as Chaput v Romain228 before the Supreme Court affirmed the idea that 
damages would only be available for flagrant abuses by individual officials, until Ward 
recognised Charter damages against the state. In India, as in New Zealand, the state is not 
immune from liability for constitutional violations.229 In New Zealand, the defence of 
immunity was raised in Simpson but did not succeed. Cooke P found that although 
enactments such as s 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950, and the sections in the Crimes 
Act of 1961 and the Police Act of 1958 contain exemptions from certain liabilities, none of 
them is directed at Bill of Rights liability.230 Similarly, Ireland disallows sovereign immunity as 
a defence.231 In Attorney General v Chapman,232 the New Zealand Supreme Court restricted 
the application of damages to only acts done by the executive or legislative branches, thereby 
excluding damages for breaches by the judiciary. There is nothing strange in this given that 
judicial immunity is a well-established principle worldwide,233 and is necessary for the 
functioning of the judiciary.  
 
 
223 See e.g. Nixon v Fitzgerald 4, 5 7 U.S. 731 (1982) (holding that presidential immunity shields President from 
liability for alleged violation of administration official’s first amendment rights).  
224 Dolan (note 46) 287-8. 
225 403 US 388 (1971). See Nichol (note 48) 1119 for comment on how Bivens opened the doors for constitutional 
damages.  
226 Bivens (note 52) 410.  
227 Greabe (note 46) 195; see Whitman (note 220) 57. 
228 [1955] SCR 834. 
229 Behera v State of Orissa AIR 1993 SC 1960 at 1969; Lisa Tortell Human Rights Law in Perspective: Monetary 
Remedies for Breach of Human Rights: A Comparative Study (2006) Hart Publishing, Oxford 107. 
230 Simpson (101) per Cooke P. 
231 See State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] IR 70; Kearney v Minister of Justice, Ireland, and the Attorney-General [1986] 
IR 116. 
232 [2011] NZSC 110. 
233 See South Africa: Claassen v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another 2010 (6) SA 399 
(WCC) para 22; Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA 2006 (1) SA 
461 (SCA) paras 17-19; and May v Udwin 1981 (1) SA 1 (A) at 14-19; England: McC v Mullan and Others [1984] 3 
All ER 908 (HL); Australia: Fingleton v R (2005) 216 ALR 474; United States: Mireles v Waco, 502 US 9 (1991). The 
only exception has been when the judge's conduct was malicious or in bad faith. 
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In the US, given that constitutional torts are claimed against government officials in their 
individual capacity, the concept of vicarious liability appears to either be non-existent or of 
limited effect.234 However, the government often does indemnify its employees in the event 
that they are eventually found liable in their individual capacity.235 In Trinidad and Tobago, 
the state assumes direct liability. This is evident from the following finding by the Privy 
Council: ‘This is not vicarious liability; it is a liability of the state itself. It is not a liability in tort 
at all; it is a liability in the public law of the state, not of the judge himself, which has been 
newly created by section 6 (1) and (2) of the Constitution.’236 The position in New Zealand is 
much the same as in Trinidad and Tobago. Thomas J held: 
 
‘As an action for damages under the Bill of Rights is not a private law action in the nature of a tort claim 
for which the state is vicariously liable but a public law action directly against the state for which the 
state is primarily liable [..] the state is liable to compensate the plaintiffs for the breaches of the Bill of 
Rights which occurred.’237  
In India, however, the state assumes vicarious liability.238 
In the South African context, constitutional supremacy should mean that state officials are 
not above the law and that arguments of state immunity are now archaic and can no longer 
hold under the current constitutional order. The state assumes liability both directly and 
vicariously, as vicarious liability is an established manner of apportioning fault. Instructive to 
this discourse is Froneman J’s analysis of attribution of liability in F v Minister of Safety and 
Security,239 although he was dealing with a delictual case. In a concurring opinion he found 
that the Minister should be held directly rather than vicariously liable on the grounds that the 
actions of state officials are in effect the state’s own actions, and that the normative 
considerations for determining liability may be appropriately assessed under the 
wrongfulness inquiry in a direct delictual action. Constitutional law cannot be spared of this. 
At least in theory, constitutional liability by means of damages is invariably liability directly 
against the state. Practically, however, it makes no substantive difference whether such 
liability is couched as direct or vicarious, save for the fact that it appears a stronger 
formulation to frame it as direct state liability for the conduct of government officials.  
Yet the fact that sovereign immunity is now foreign to South Africa may prompt another 
argument for critics of constitutional damages to argue that there is no longer a bar from 
using the law of delict to claim from the state, hence constitutional damages may be 
unnecessary. The downfall of this argument is that the development of constitutional 
damages is not singularly premised on lack of avenues to hold government accountable. 
Rather, it is to meet a specific purpose of constitutional vindication. In no country has 
 
234 Tortell (note 229) 110. 
235 Ibid.  
236 Maharaj 2 (note 88) 399. 
237 Dunlea (note 19) para 81. 
238 SAHELI, A Women’s Resources Centre v Commissioner of Police, Delhi AIR 1990 SC 513 at 516. 
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constitutional damages evolved necessarily as a way to sidestep sovereign immunity. In those 
countries where sovereign immunity exists, the Bills of Rights have invariably been spared of 
such defences.  
 
5.10 CONCLUSION 
 
As per Dingake J’s conclusion in Oatile, the net effect of a majority of the decisions discussed 
above is that constitutional damages are now almost universally accepted as viable 
constitutional redress.240 From the preceding analysis one can note distinct jurisdictional 
approaches to constitutional damages. The clearest distinct approaches, as was also 
established by Okpaluba, are the Maharaj (2)/Baigent case approach adopting a strict, if more 
regimented approach, and the Ward approach ‘which maintains a middle course allowing for 
the resort to the private law threshold in appropriate circumstances’.241 The current South 
African approach measured against these alternative approaches, comes across as primarily 
one which does not strictly distinguish between constitutional and private law damages, but 
nonetheless places more emphasis on the common law as a means of vindicating 
fundamental rights breaches.242 
 
One sees that although constitutional damages are decades old in some jurisdictions, the 
remedy is relatively new and developing in most legal systems. Most have nevertheless 
embraced the remedy and have moved on to the second phase of defining a framework. It is 
to this stage that South African courts must move, and this thesis seeks to aid to the process. 
The following chapters proceed to demonstrate how a functional, goal-oriented framework 
is a more attractive approach for South Africa.    
  
 
240 See Oatile (note 174) 420E.  
241 Okpaluba (note 40) 74. 
242 Ibid. 
126 
 
CHAPTER 6 
SUBSIDIARITY, THE CO-EXISTENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON-LAW DAMAGES, 
AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
‘[The evolution of s 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights] may require novel and creative features when 
compared to traditional and historical remedial practice because tradition and history cannot be barriers to 
what reasoned and compelling notions of appropriate and just remedies demand.’ - Iacobucci and Arbour JJ in 
Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) [2003] 3 SCR 3 para 59. 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
If the invasion of a constitutional right could be treated by delictual remedies, as was done in 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security,1 K v Minister of Safety and Security,2 Van Eeden 
v Minister of Safety & Security,3 Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development,4 and F v Minister of Safety and Security,5 among a long list of cases, then where 
do constitutional damages come in? Would constitutional damages be a ‘gap-filler’ in the 
remedial matrix? Would they be an additional remedy to an existing one, or would the litigant 
be given a choice between delictual and constitutional damages? 
It is to these questions that this Chapter turns. Building on the unique nature of constitutional 
damages, this Chapter proceeds to explore the circumstances under which they could be 
awarded. Throughout the Chapter, the common themes are a clear differentiation of 
constitutional damages from delict, and a motivation for the full acceptance of constitutional 
damages as viable and necessary relief for constitutional wrongs.   
 
6.2 CO-EXISTENCE OF COMMON LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES 
6.2.1 Can the existence of delictual redress negate constitutional damages? 
The co-existence of constitutional damages with delictual damages is one of the most 
contentious issues in the constitutional damages debate. The argument by critics of 
constitutional damages is that they are unnecessary given that delictual damages can do the 
job. This is a problematic submission, as I will demonstrate.  
Firstly, the rights in the Bill of Rights are such that some lend themselves to redress under 
delict, while some do not. For the latter, there may be no prospects of damages at all if one 
 
1 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). The state paid damages for the negligent conduct of duty by a senior public prosecutor 
and the police in releasing on bail a young man prone to sexual violence, who then proceeded to assault plaintiff.  
2 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
3 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA). The state was held delictually liable for the rape of a 19-year-old girl who was sexually 
assaulted, raped and robbed by a known dangerous criminal and serial rapist who had escaped from police 
custody through an unlocked gate. 
4 2008 4 SA 458 (CC). This case involved unlawful detention of an awaiting-trial prisoner.  
5 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC). The Minister of Police was held vicariously liable for the damages suffered by a 13-year-
old when she was assaulted and raped by a policeman who was on standby duty.  
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were to obliterate constitutional damages. This means that the question of co-existence of 
remedies becomes relevant only in respect of those rights that overlap and can be remedied 
in both delict and constitutional law.  
Secondly, there is no denying that the Constitution has had a profound impact on the South 
African law of delict. Delict has taken a transformative route, in many ways positioning itself 
as a protector of constitutional rights. This has happened in two ways. Firstly, there are rights 
that the common law has always protected, such as the right to privacy and bodily integrity, 
rights which are now constitutional rights. Secondly, the scope of delictual protection has 
expanded to cover rights that were not solely of common law making, but emerged as 
important largely due to their provision in the Bill of Rights. Notwithstanding, a case has been 
made for the different dimension that constitutional damages bring to the law. Constitutional 
rights having now assumed an elevated importance, the vindication of these rights now 
carries an importance and urgency that need no amplification serve to say that the Bill of 
Rights is a cornerstone to the country’s democracy. The importance of constitutional rights 
was articulated in Kate.6  
Common law falls short in its currency to replace the Constitution. Indeed the liability of public 
authorities under common law remedies has without a doubt expanded in the wake of the 
new constitutional era.7 There are instances when delict does provide appropriate relief to a 
litigant for the violation of their constitutional right. As Moseneke DCJ pointed out in Law 
Society of South Africa and Others v Minister of Transport and Another,8 in an appropriate 
case a private-law delictual remedy may serve to protect and enforce a constitutionally 
entrenched fundamental right. Thus a claimant seeking ‘appropriate relief’ may properly 
resort to a common law remedy in order to vindicate a constitutional right.9 In another case,10 
Moseneke DCJ recognised that there appears to be no sound reason why common law 
remedies which vindicate constitutionally entrenched rights should not pass for appropriate 
relief within the reach of s 38. The Constitution is explicit that subject to its supremacy, it does 
not deny the existence of any other rights recognised and conferred by the common law.  
However, a violation of a constitutional right is markedly different from a violation of a 
common law right. With the former, there is state liability under public law, imposed directly 
by the Constitution. As Currie and De Waal put it, ‘[t]he harm caused by violating 
constitutional rights is not merely a harm to an individual applicant, but a harm to society as 
a whole: the violation impedes the realisation of the constitutional project or creating a just 
 
6 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA) at para 22. 
7 Max Loubser and Rob Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South Africa (2nd ed) (2010) Oxford University Press 
Southern Africa, Cape Town 265. Cases such as Carmichele (note 1), K (note 2), Van Eeden (note 3), F (note 5), 
and Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) were all argued successfully on this 
basis.  
8 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) para 74. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) para 91. 
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and democratic society’.11 For this reason, ‘the object in awarding a remedy is not only to 
grant relief to the litigant before the court, but also to vindicate the Constitution and deter 
future infringements.’12 The necessity of vindication stems from the fact that if harm to 
constitutional rights is not addressed, it will diminish the public’s faith in the Constitution and 
erode the value of the Bill of Rights.13 It is from this premise that constitutional remedies have 
been understood to be community-oriented and forward-looking.14 
 
Swart argues that ‘[t]he notion that remedies such as damages are not ideal constitutional 
remedies because constitutional remedies should be forward-looking and community 
oriented rather than individualistic and corrective is outdated.’15 I align myself with these 
views in toto. This approach is followed in Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, 
and Another16 where it was held that ‘[i]n essaying the determination of appropriate relief, it 
is important to bear in mind that, although constitutional remedies will often be forward-
looking to ensure that the future exercise of public power is in accordance with the principle 
of legality […] they may also be backward-looking.’17 Although constitutional remedies must 
generally be forward-looking, community-oriented and structural as opposed to backward-
looking, individualistic and corrective or retributive,18 it remains a principle of law however 
that justice must be individualised.19 The violated person must receive relief at an individual 
level, and in the pursuit of community-oriented justice the individual must not suffer. The 
correct approach would be to grant relief that speaks to both objectives. Constitutional 
damages speak to both objectives. Thus, where forward-looking remedies do not make sense, 
damages may well be the only appropriate remedy.20  
 
Although seemingly clear and straightforward, the propriety of recognising constitutional 
damages has been an area of disputed judicial authority. The basis of the dispute is primarily 
on the overlap between co-extensive rights at common law and in constitutional law. This is 
where rights can find protection both in delict and in constitutional law. For instance, Loubser 
et al point out that one can reasonably easily find a delictual counterpart for the following 
fundamental rights: human dignity (s 10); life (s 11); freedom and security of the person (s 
12); privacy (s 14); freedom of assembly, demonstration, picket and petition (s 17); freedom 
of trade, occupation and profession (s 22); environment (s 24) and property (s 25).21 In these 
 
11 Iain Currie and Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed) (2013) Juta, Cape Town 181. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Mia Swart ‘Left out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the poorest of the Poor’ (2005) SAJHR 
239-240. 
16 2002 (1) SA 342 (SE). 
17 Page 355-356. 
18 Swart (note 15) 288. 
19 Circumstances exists where backward-looking constitutional remedies are apposite.  
20 Swart (note 15) 298.   
21 Loubser and Midgley (note 7) 32. 
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instances, overlaps are likely and conservative constitutionalists argue against the use of 
constitutional damages in these cases.22 However, there are dissimilarities too: 
 
‘Some fundamental rights simply do not lend themselves to actions in delict. Political rights, such as the 
right to vote (s 19) and the right to citizenship (s 20) do not have private-law counterparts. Similarly, a 
person is unlikely to have an action in delict if, for example, that person’s right to housing (s 26), or 
rights to health care, food, water and social security (s 27), is infringed, unless some other fundamental 
right that has a subjective-right counterpart is also infringed. Other such examples include the rights to 
education (s 29), language and culture (s 30), access to information (s 32), and just administrative action 
(s 33).’23  
 
The pre-requisites for a delictual claim are that: (a) the right for whose infringement the claim 
is made must be recognised as a subjective right, and (b) the infringement of that right or 
breach of that duty must violate a societal norm.24 Not all constitutional rights will pass this 
test. This means one will not have a remedy of a monetary nature at all for those rights that 
do not pass this test should constitutional damages be obliterated. The decisions of the 
Appellate Division in Minister of Law & Order v Kadir25 and Knop v Johannesburg City Council26 
illustrate the problems that claimants for damages against public authorities encountered in 
the absence of a Bill of Rights.27 The general sentiment of conservative constitutionalists 
seems to be that if constitutional damages are to stand, then they must stand only to deal 
with these non-overlapping rights. I contend that this is limiting the scope of constitutional 
damages which must extend even to those rights that can be redressed in delict.  
The question of whether constitutional damages should be preferred over delictual remedies, 
and what difference there is between the two is not an isolated one. It speaks to a bigger 
question of the intersection between public and private law remedies, specifically whether 
private and public law remedies should concurrently be used where applicable, and whether 
that or the inverse would be effective. In Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a 
Metrorail28 it was held that ‘private law damages claims are not always the most appropriate 
method to enforce constitutional rights. Private law remedies tend to be retrospective in 
 
22 See Lourens du Plessis ‘‘Subsidiarity’: What’s in the name for constitutional interpretation and adjudication?’ 
(2006) 17 Stell LR 207-231. 
23 Loubser and Midgley (note 7) 32. 
24 See, inter alia, Amod v MMVA Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA); Carmichele (note 1); Dendy v University of 
Witwatersrand 2007 (5) SA 382 (SCA) and Jooste v Botha 2000 (2) SA 199 (T). 
25 1995 (1) SA 303 (A). ‘Kadir involved the failure of the police to act. The police ofﬁcer investigating an accident 
had failed to take down the particulars of the ﬂeeing driver who had caused the accident even though an 
ofﬁcious bystander had pointed out the driver to him. It was held that, viewed objectively, society would take 
account of the fact that the functions of the police in terms of the Police Act related to criminal matters and 
were not designed for the purpose of assisting civil litigants and that therefore society would baulk at the idea 
of holding policemen personally liable for damages arising from what was a relatively insigniﬁcant dereliction of 
duty. Accordingly, the police owed no legal duty to record the information in question.’ (as summarized by Chuks 
Okpaluba ‘The Law of Bureaucratic Negligence in South Africa: A Comparative Commonwealth Perspective’ 
(2006) Acta Juridica 117, 140.) 
26 1995 (2) SA 1 (A). 
27 Okpaluba (note 25) 140. 
28 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC) para 106. 
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effect, seeking to remedy loss caused rather than to prevent loss in the future’.29 In the same 
vein, in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape,30 the CC stated that the 
purpose of a public law remedy is to pre-empt, correct or reverse improper actions, to 
advance efficient and effective public administration, and at broader level to entrench the 
rule of law. Ideally, a court’s order must not only afford effective relief to a successful litigant 
but also to all similarly situated people.31 Constitutional remedies are located within this 
context. There is ‘a wider public dimension [and the] bell tolls for everyone’.32 As such, this 
requires the interests of all those who might be affected by the order to be considered and 
not merely the interests of the parties to the litigation.33  
Notwithstanding existing debates, the bottom line is that infringement of a constitutional 
right is purely a constitutional issue and it cannot be contended otherwise. It is therefore clear 
that in all its contested formulation, subsidiarity may not be a legal argument to crush 
monetary damages for the violation of constitutional rights. Outside the potential illegality in 
ousting the constitutional damages remedy, it does not seem constitutionally wise to do so. 
 
6.2.2. A remedy of last resort?   
 
Constitutional remedies are not remedies of last resort reserved for use where all else fails. It 
is not disputed that there are indeed cases where it would make judicial and practical sense 
to resort to existing common law remedies. However, this conclusion can only be reached 
after careful consideration of a claim and its intended goal. There is consensus that the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights are fundamental rights,34 and are not to be equated with other 
non-fundamental rights. Such rights are of a higher status and equally the vindication is of 
higher importance.35  
Although Van der Walt holds the view that ‘based on the respect-for-democracy norm the 
subsidiarity approach restricts [direct application of the Bill of Rights] to a last resort solution 
rather than an open option that exists parallel to statutory or common law protection,’36 
there is no principle at law that directs the use of constitutional remedies as a last resort. In 
Kate v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape,37 
 
29 Ibid para 80.  
30 2007 (3) SA 1210 (CC) para 29. 
31 Currie and De Waal (note 11) 182. 
32 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 82; Equity 
Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2009 (1) SA 390 (CC) para 56. 
33 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) paras 42 and 43.  
34 The concept of fundamental rights is used to refer to those rights that are inalienable and central to a person’s 
life that they cannot be legally taken away without just cause. In the South African context, all the rights 
contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution are fundamental rights. See Ian Currie and Johan de Waal (eds) The 
New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1, Constitutional law (2001) 320.   
35 See s 7 of the Constitution, 1996. 
36 André van der Walt ‘Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term’ (2008) 1(1) 
Constitutional Court Rev 77, 119. 
37 [2005] 1 All SA 745 (SE). 
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commenting on the finding in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape38 the High Court stated 
that: 
‘The further comments, that “constitutional damages” may only be awarded where no statutory or 
common-law remedies exist and that back-pay and interest cannot be claimed under PAJA, are also in 
my respectful view not straightforwardly obvious. Sections 8(1) and (2) of PAJA provide that the court 
may grant any order that is just and equitable including, in the case of judicial review under section 
6(1), directing the administrator or any other party to the proceedings to pay compensation in 
exceptional circumstances. On the face of it the wording of PAJA does not preclude judicial review 
under the general rule of law principle of legality, nor does it preclude appropriate constitutional relief 
under such a claim. The remedies available under PAJA too are couched in wide, open-ended and 
permissive terms.’39 
 
In the SCA in MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate,40 Nugent J had the following to say: 
 
‘The question that submission raises is not so much whether the remedy that is now proposed is an 
appropriate one to remedy Kate’s loss but rather whether a constitutional remedy should be granted 
at all. No doubt the infusion of constitutional normative values into delictual principles itself plays a 
role in protecting constitutional rights, albeit indirectly. And no doubt delictual principles are capable 
of being extended to encompass state liability for the breach of constitutional obligations. But the relief 
that is permitted by s 38 of the Constitution is not a remedy of last resort, to be looked to only when 
there is no alternative – and indirect – means of asserting and vindicating constitutional rights. While 
that possibility is a consideration to be borne in mind in determining whether to grant or to withhold a 
direct s 38 remedy it is by no means decisive, for there will be cases in which the direct assertion and 
vindication of constitutional rights is required. Where that is so the further question is what form of 
remedy would be appropriate to remedy the breach. In my view the breach in the present case warrants 
being vindicated directly …’ (my emphasis).  
The existence of delictual remedies neither negates nor renders cosmetic the direct 
application of constitutional remedies. Constitutionalising delict is a constitutional 
imperative, but notwithstanding the evolution of the delictual remedy, constitutional 
remedies cannot be extinguished or devalued on account of the existence of other remedies 
at common law and in statute. Nor does that prescribe an indirect means to enforce 
constitutional rights when the Constitution can be directly enforced and vindicated. Prior to 
the new constitutional dispensation delictual damages and other alterative remedies may 
have applied as surrogates for the protection of constitutional rights. Today the constitutional 
architecture is such that it is now possible for constitutional rights to be vindicated directly, 
without need for recourse to indirect, secondary means of vindication. It is also such that 
while it is open for a litigant to resort to the common law for remedies, it would go against 
the constitutional order of the day for one to be denied use of constitutional remedies directly 
owing to the existence of those common law remedies. Both legal and policy reasons exist to 
support this assertion. Insofar as remedies are concerned, one must look at the breach that 
has occurred, the ‘mischief’ that needs to be corrected, and the impact that such correction 
 
38 2004 (2) SA 611 (SCA). 
39 2005] 1 All SA 745 (SE) para 20 (footnotes omitted). 
40 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA) para 27. 
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is intended to have. This would mean that there are instances where even though there is a 
remedy in common law, constitutional damages would be the most appropriate relief.41  
Woolman correctly highlights the faults of using indirect application to vindicate 
constitutional rights.42 Although Van der Walt contests Woolman’s propositions,43 
Woolman’s contribution directs to the point that resort cannot continue to be had to common 
law as if the Constitution does not allow direct application. Van der Walt challenges Woolman 
as follows: ‘Woolman’s view that indirect application does not tell us whether the right 
requires vindication is based on the narrow assumption that vindication of constitutional 
rights primarily takes place via direct application. In terms of SANDU logic, constitutional 
rights can also be vindicated indirectly, via constitution-compliant interpretation of the 
common law.’44 This Van der Walt does without himself engaging with the value of direct 
application of the Bill of Rights, and how this measures up to indirect application. Neither 
does he give reasons why he believes indirect application vindicates constitutional rights 
more than direct application, which is his own narrow and undeveloped assumption. 
It is correct that in addition to its commendatory utility, delict plays a normative role in 
prescribing a set of ethical rules and principles for social interaction.45 However, such is an 
incidental, secondary and indirect utility which does not replace the need for a direct 
normative authority in the form of the Constitution, and the direct enforcement thereof. 
Locating monetary claims against the state for breach of constitutional rights in delict 
deprives us of this public law function of the Constitution, itself the apex echelon of public 
law. Swart articulates the problem, perhaps with better clarity:  
‘There seems to be a tendency on the part of the Constitutional Court and academics to think in terms 
of a closed category of tried-and-tested remedies. An internet search of “constitutional remedies” 
throws up countless results on homeopathic treatments and medicines. If it is the function of 
constitutional remedies to help “heal the divisions of the past” as the Preamble to the Constitution puts 
it, should the cure not be as individual as the ailment?’46 (my emphasis) 
Whitman’s views are not far-fetched against this background: ‘When it comes to deciding the 
merits of a constitutional claim, torts is a distraction. That is the case whether torts serves as 
a positive model for the constitutional cause of action or as an alternative to be shunned.’47 I 
do not go as far as arguing that they be shunned, but simply that they be an alternative to 
constitutional damages.  
What must be clear is that a move for constitutional damages does not imply undoing the 
power of common law remedies to solve constitutional problems. Judicial remedies, in their 
 
41 As Currie and De Waal (note 34) at 287 advance, there are some situations where a declaration of invalidity 
or an interdict makes little sense and an award of damages is the only form of relief which will ‘vindicate the 
fundamental rights and deter future infringements’.   
42 Stu Woolman ‘The amazing, vanishing bill of rights’ (2007) 124 SALJ 762, 762.  
43 Van der Walt (note 36) 118-119. 
44 Ibid 118. 
45 Loubser and Midgley (eds) (note 7). 
46 Swart (note 15) 240. 
47 Christina Brooks Whitman ‘Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts’ (1997) Chicago-Kent LR 661.  
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multiplicity and variance ultimately converge on the joint and collective purpose of 
vindicating and upholding the rule of law. Klaaren confirms that: ‘A court’s receipt of 
constitutional remedial powers does not oust its remedial powers based upon legislation and 
common law.’48 The only qualification imposed is that these powers must be exercised in line 
with the Constitution. In fact, s 39(3) of the Constitution states that ‘The Bill of Rights does 
not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by 
common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the 
Bill.’ What s 39(3) does not imply, however, is that such other remedies are of first resort 
before refuge is sought in constitutional remedies. Judicial remedies located squarely within 
the four corners of the Constitution do not in any way devalue or detract from the developed 
delictual jurisprudence. Constitutional damages can therefore exist side by side with delictual 
remedies and this way the imperative of legal continuity in a society in transition, as argued 
by Roux,49 is not lost. 
6.2.3. Prevention of double compensation  
When a right finds protection in both delict and constitutional law, where should one turn to 
in order to vindicate such right, and why? In such a case, it seems to me that the pragmatic 
and more constitutionally-compliant approach would be for the plaintiff to have the choice 
to locate their cause of action either in delict or in constitutional damages.  
It is constitutionally problematic when the claimant is denied the option to locate their cause 
of action in constitutional law for the breach of their constitutional right. If it is accepted that 
payment of damages is one of the possible remedies under s 38 of the Constitution, there can 
hardly be justification to exclude this relief. The argument that allowing constitutional 
damages would allow for double recovery does not subsist in a choice approach. The 
argument in itself has fundamental fault lines. Okpaluba correctly points out that two distinct 
propositions arise from the constitutional goal of remedying fundamental rights breaches:  
‘First, a combination of the powers of the courts to grant “appropriate relief” in section 38 and to make 
“just and equitable” orders within the context of section 172(1)(b) suggests that an applicant for breach 
of fundamental rights can recover “constitutional damages”[…] Secondly, it is clear that the mandatory 
provisions of section 39(2) similarly empower the courts to award damages for breach of fundamental 
rights through the South African common law, having regard to the parallel developments of the law 
of governmental liability in other common law jurisdictions.’50  
 
These two propositions are not mutually exclusive.  
 
 
48 Jonathan Klaaren ‘Judicial Remedies’ (1999) Chapter 9 in Woolman et al (ed) Constitutional law of South Africa, 
Revision Service 5, 9-30. 
49 Theunis Roux ‘Continuity and Change in Transforming Legal Order: The Impact of Section 26(3) of the 
Constitution on South African Law’ (2004) SALJ 466. 
50 Ibid 118. 
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Although arguments exist to the effect that one can claim in both constitutional law and in 
delict,51 it is submitted that constitutional damages should not be granted in addition to 
delictual damages. Instead, the litigant should be given a choice between delictual and 
constitutional damages. Although one is a private law remedy and the other is a public law 
remedy, the justification for a choice approach lies in preventing double compensation for 
the claimant and ‘double jeopardy’ on the defendant. This would be different from a situation 
where one can claim compensation in private law (delict) but still proceed to pursue criminal 
charges (public law). There, the question of ‘double compensation’ does not arise.  
An argument that may arise against the choice approach which I suggest would be that it 
promotes ‘forum-shopping’. This is not a convincing argument however. Firstly, where the 
principle of avoidance does not apply and where there is no substantive or procedural bar, 
there is no rule at law preventing situations where one can choose under what law they wish 
to pursue their case. Secondly, ‘forum-shopping’ was found to be problematic in Chirwa v 
Transnet Limited and Others,52 Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and 
Others53 and Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union v Northern Pretoria Metropolitan 
Substructure and Others (IMATU)54 in cases of concurrent jurisdictions as opposed to cases 
where one simply has a choice between two claims – and not necessarily two forums. Thirdly, 
as discussed under the principle of avoidance below, it would be constitutionally defective for 
one not to be allowed to locate their action in constitutional law when the issue is purely 
constitutional. All constitutional rights matters are constitutional issues. It would only be 
when statutes have been enacted to deal with particular constitutional rights in detail that 
one would have to locate their action in statute. Even then, when the statute allows for 
monetary compensation, or allows for any remedy in terms of s 38 of the Constitution, then 
monetary damages can be granted. This is different as one is not resorting to common law, 
but to a statute which in effect is an extension of the particular enabling provision in the 
Constitution. In that sense, the statute does not detract from the constitutional nature of the 
fundamental right, and the issue holds the same weight as if it was being raised directly 
through the Constitution.  
 
6.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY (OR AVOIDANCE)  
 
Critics of constitutional damages argue that it is legal principle that one must resort to an 
already established remedy before resorting to another - a new one. Although not much 
literature exists on this there is an undeveloped attempt to locate this argument in the 
principle of subsidiarity. Seemingly correct at face value, this argument has flaws. 
 
51 These arguments are outlined further below.  
52 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) para 121, per Ngcobo J concurring and para 177 per Langa CJ concurring.  
53 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC) para 97. 
54 1999 (2) SA 234 (T) at 240 B-C. 
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Du Plessis defines ‘subsidiarity’ as a reading strategy whereby a court refrains from taking a 
decision that can be taken by a lower court or avoids a constitutional decision if the matter 
can be decided on a non-constitutional basis.55 The CC confirmed this in National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs.56 In such a case, the Constitution would 
then find indirect application through s 39(2).57 The principle of subsidiarity is sometimes 
referred to as avoidance, and although some have sought to draw distinctions the two words 
refer to the same principle.58 These two words are used interchangeably henceforth.  
In its classical formulation the principle of avoidance means that, whenever possible a case 
should be brought under ordinary legislation as opposed to the Constitution. This traditional 
formulation of the principle of subsidiarity is espoused in South African National Defence 
Union v Minister of Defence (SANDU)59 following on other cases, wherein the CC confirmed 
that once legislation has been enacted to give effect to or to protect a right in the 
Constitution, litigants must rely on the legislation and not directly on the Constitution.60 
Subsequent decisions have articulated and adopted that reasoning.61 The exception is when 
the constitutional validity of legislation is challenged, in which case the constitutional 
provision applies directly.62 The application of the principle is such that where a litigant founds 
a cause of action on such legislation, the court cannot bypass the legislation to then decide 
the matter based on the relevant constitutional provision.63 This is based on the policy that 
legislation enacted by a democratic Parliament to give effect to a constitutional right ought 
not to be ignored.64  
 
55 Du Plessis (note 22) 207-231.  
56 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) para 21. See also the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court case of Majome v ZBC & Others CCZ 
14-2016; AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed) Juta 66; MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v 
Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) paras 39-40 and Chirwa v Transet Ltd 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC) paras 59 and 69. 
57 The section reads: ‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ 
58 See Currie and De Waal (note 11) 24-25 and Van der Walt (note 36) 119. The meaning of these terms however 
remain highly contested. See generally Lourens Du Plessis ‘The South African constitution as memory and 
promise’ (2000) Stell LR 11 385-394 and 388-389; Wessel le Roux ‘War memorials, the architecture of the 
Constitutional Court building and countermonumental constitutionalism’ in Wessel le Roux and Karin van Marle 
(eds) Law, memory and the legacy of apartheid. Ten years after Azapo v President of South Africa (2007) PULP 
65, 87. 
59 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) paras 51-52.  
60 This was originally formulated in NAPTOSA v Minister of Education, Western Cape 2001 (2) SA 112 (C) 123B, I-
J; left open in National Education Health and Allied Workers Union(NEHAWU) v University of Cape Town 2003 
(3) SA 1 (CC) para 17 and in Ingledew v Financial Services Board: In re Financial Services Board v Van der Merwe 
2003 (4) SA 584 (CC) paras 23-24, and discussed in Minister of Health NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 
(2) SA 311 (CC) paras 95-96. This is also discussed in Rautenbach ‘Overview of Constitutional Court decisions on 
the bill of rights - 2007’ (2008) TSAR 330, 330. 
61 Pillay (note 56) paras 39-40; Chirwa (note 56) paras 59 (per Skweyiya J) and 69 (per Ngcobo J); Sidumo (note 
53) para 248; and MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment v HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd 
2008 (2) SA 319 (CC) para 24. 
62 Islamic Unity Convention v Minister of Telecommunications 2008 (3) SA 383 (CC) para 59. 
63 New Clicks (note 60) para 437. 
64 Ibid.  
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This came out strongly in NAPTOSA65 wherein the court found that allowing litigants to rely 
on s 23(1) of the Constitution directly instead of the Labour Relations Act would encourage 
the development of two parallel streams of labour law jurisprudence, one under the Act and 
the other under s 23(1), and such a practice would be ‘singularly inappropriate’.66 This was 
adopted in New Clicks67 by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has also held 
that such an approach would contradict the principle of ‘one system of law grounded in the 
Constitution’.68 From this understanding, there is identifiable legislation that falls into this 
category, and this primarily includes the Labour Relations Act (LRA),69 the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA),70 the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA),71 the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA),72 the 
Employment Equity Act,73 the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act,74 and the 
National Environment Management Act (NEMA).75 Legislation such as Restitution of Land 
Rights Act,76 the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA)77 and the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE)78 may also be considered to fall into 
this category.  
Where the legislation creates a speciality court to hear matters arising under that statute, or 
identifies an existing ordinary court, the principle of avoidance requires that that court be 
used instead of the CC. PEPUDA, for instance, creates the Equality Courts, and the Children’s 
Act79 creates the Children’s Courts. Then there are Acts such as PAJA that set the High Court 
as the court of first instance in matters arising under those statutes.  
According to Van der Walt, in what he considers to be the other side of subsidiarity, once 
legislation has been enacted to give effect to a right in the Constitution, and insofar as the 
legislation was intended to codify the common law, litigants may not rely directly on the 
 
65 Note 60 above para 123B, J. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Note 60 above para 436.   
68 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44 and Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 
2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para 22. 
69 Act 66 of 1995 for s 23, confirmed in NAPTOSA (note 60); NEHAWU (note 60); Sidumo (note 53); Chirwa (note 
56) and SANDU (note 59). 
70 Act 3 of 2000 for s 33, confirmed in Sidumo (note 53); Chirwa (note 56) and New Clicks (note 60). 
71 Act 2 of 2000 for s 32, confirmed in Ingledew (note 60). 
72 Act 4 of 2000 for s 9, confirmed in Pillay (note 56).  
73 Act 55 of 1998.  
74 Act 28 of 2002. Arguably promulgated to give effect to s 24(b)(iii) and s 25(5), read with s 25(4)(a). 
75 Act 107 of 1998 for s 24(b), confirmed in MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment v 
HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 319 (CC) para 24. 
76 Act 22 of 1994. See Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC) 
and similar cases. 
77 Act 62 of 1997. 
78 Act 19 of 1998. Enacted to give effect to s 26(3). See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) 
SA 217 (CC) paras 11-23; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City 
of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 16.  
79 Act 38 of 2005.  
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common law when seeking to protect the concerned right against infringement.80 Currie and 
De Waal take this further, holding that the avoidance principle also applies to disputes 
governed by common law, such that ‘[t]he ordinary principles of common law must first be 
applied, and if necessary developed with reference to the Bill of Rights, before a direct 
application is considered’.81 For this they rely on Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents 
Fund.82 Importantly, they proceed to state that ‘the principle that constitutional issues should 
be avoided is not an absolute rule [and] does not require that litigants may only directly 
invoke the Constitution as a last resort.’83 Van der Walt on the other hand takes a different 
view: ‘[w]hen no legislation applies to the protection of a constitutional right, the logic of the 
SANDU subsidiarity principle would imply that a litigant who wants to protect that right must 
rely on the common law and may not rely directly on the constitutional right, unless she 
challenges the constitutional validity of the common law’.84 He submits that in terms of s 
39(2), the obligation to have first resort to the common law includes development of the 
common law to align it with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.85 Only once it 
is clear that the constitutional right cannot be given effect to by either application or 
development of the common law can a litigant resort directly to the constitutional provision 
either to launch a constitutional attack against a rule of the common law or to craft a special 
constitutional remedy.86 Lewis calls this the principle of ‘exhaustion of alternative 
remedies’,87 meaning that claimants should use procedures for redress that are available 
before making use of the procedure of judicial review.88  
This leads us the conclusion that subsidiarity is about process and forum as opposed to the 
actual relief pronounced. This is the classical way the principle of avoidance works. Lewis 
identifies the rationale for this principle to be twofold. Firstly, ‘where Parliament has provided 
for a statutory appeals procedure, it is not for the courts to usurp the functions of the 
appellate body’.89 Secondly, ‘the public interest dictates that judicial review should be 
exercised speedily, and to that end it is necessary to limit the number of cases in which judicial 
review is used’.90 
The argument that if litigants are allowed to rely on the Constitution when common law 
remedies are there the common law will never be brought into the new constitutional 
 
80 For this proposition he places reliance on Chirwa (note 56) para 23 and Fuel Retailers Association of Southern 
Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Environment, Mpumalanga Province, 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) para 37. These confirmed Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 25 and New Clicks (note 60) para 96. 
81 Currie and De Waal (note 11) 70.  
82 1998 (4) SA 753 (CC) para 26.  
83 Currie and De Waal (note 11) 70.  
84 Van der Walt (note 36) 115-116 (footnotes omitted). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Clive Lewis Judicial Remedies in Public Law (2009) Sweet & Maxwell 426 (11-043). 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid and the English cases cited thereunder.  
90 Ibid. 
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dispensation,91 has to be faulted on the basis that it is misconceived and misrepresents the 
actual legal development that has occurred post-1993. Common law, even in non-
constitutional issues, has been interpreted in line with the Constitution, from delict to 
contract to every other common law action. Many cases have been won because the common 
law was interpreted in light of the Constitution. Allowing direct resort to the Constitution in 
the case of constitutional damages neither stops nor impedes the continued 
‘constitutionalisation’ of delict. When it comes to remedying constitutional rights violations 
using constitutional remedies, development of common law, as Currie and De Waal posit,92 
must be done when looking for ways to cure private constitutional law wrongs in horizontal 
application of Bill of Rights. Public wrongs call for constitutional remedies in the direct and 
pure sense. 
Nonetheless, Van der Walt persists with his arguments:  
‘The goal of ensuring one system of law under the guidance of the Constitution is promoted not only 
by preventing the common law to develop as a parallel system, but also by preventing development of 
a parallel system of unnecessary constitutional remedies. Leaving some aspect of the common law 
intact and crafting a new constitutional remedy should be justifiable only on constitutional grounds’.93  
It is difficult however to see how a constitutional remedy would imply the development of a 
parallel system of law when the country’s law is based on that very Constitution as the 
overriding law. The CC in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers94 unequivocally emphasised that the 
common law precedent continues to inform the law only to the extent that it is consistent 
with the Constitution, and that ‘[t]here is only one system of law. It is shaped by the 
Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its 
force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control’.95 The courts cannot 
simply adopt private law remedies to redress public law violations simply because common 
law civil remedies exist to cover the complaints. This shot-gun approach, while seemingly 
providing the required recompense, falls short of meeting the very purpose of public law 
remedies, being that all public law remedies have a public interest dimension to them. The 
objects of private and public law remedies are different. Kriegler J agrees with this in Fose:  
‘If constitutional rights have complementary remedies, the question is what these remedies should be. 
I would suggest that the nature of a remedy is determined by its object. I agree with the contention 
advanced on behalf of the appellant that the object of remedies under s 7(4)(a) differs from the object 
of a common-law remedy. …’96 
Philpott, speaking of New Zealand said the following: 
 
 
91 Ibid.  
92 Currie and De Waal (note 11) 270. 
93 Van der Walt (note 36) 115-116 (footnotes omitted). 
94 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 
(2) SA 674 (CC). 
95 Ibid para 44.  
96 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 95.  
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‘Whether a remedy for a rights violation is classified as a public law or a private law remedy is an 
important question, not only conceptually, but practically — the "characterisation of the wrong 
involved may have important consequences for the way in which damages under the [HRA and the 
NZBORA] are understood and developed by the courts" and may help to clarify precisely what the 
objective of the remedy is. That is, if the wrong is characterised as a type of constitutional tort, private 
law remedial principles, in which the goal is to return the claimant to the position he or she was in prior 
to the breach, will be relevant. If it is categorised as a public law cause of action, the objectives of the 
remedy may be broader; they may include affirming the importance of the violated right, deterring 
future breaches, and improving the standard of public administration’. 97  
This questions the prudence of utilising a private law remedy to achieve public redress to the 
exclusion of public remedies. There is further no authority to the effect that all public law 
remedies subsist in non-monetary forms and neither is there a good enough reason in 
principle to model the law in that manner.  
In any case, however, the above arguments by Van der Walt proposing the extension of the 
subsidiarity principle to the common law are merely proposals and are not a reflection of 
applicable law. Van der Walt admits that ‘[o]bviously the wider implications of subsidiarity 
have not been worked out by the courts and therefore the analysis above is purely 
speculative’.98 However, notwithstanding that, the argument of Van der Walt puts us in the 
danger of conservatively holding on to common law at the expense of constitutional 
vindication. In the spirit of legislative and constitutional interpretation, it could not have been 
the intention of the crafters of the Constitution to provide for constitutional remedies for the 
breach of rights in the Bill of Rights, yet intending that resort must be had to the common law 
for such breaches. Subject to considerations of justiciability and jurisdiction, the Bill of Rights 
generates its own set of remedies.99 Not only that; the common law can only develop to a 
certain point and cannot under any circumstances assume the same authority and status as 
the country’s Constitution.  
Recently in Life Esidemeni arbitration, a case involving an unconstitutional and irrational 
decision by government officials that resulted in the death of some 144 mental healthcare 
patients, Judge Moseneke as the Arbitrator held that the only way in which to vindicate the 
claimants’ constitutional rights was to grant an order awarding constitutional damages over 
and above the amount already awarded for emotional shock and trauma.100 There was an 
award for the delictual emotional shock and trauma, by that was as far as common law could 
go, and the Arbitrator found that remedy as falling short of vindicating the claimant’s 
constitutional rights – hence constitutional damages over and above the delictual relief. In 
Justice Mosoneke’s words, it was an award necessitated by ‘a harrowing account of the death, 
torture and disappearance of utterly vulnerable mental health care users in the care of an 
 
97 Juliet Philpott ‘Damages Under the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998 and the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990’ (2007) 5(2) NZJPIL 211, 215. 
98 Ibid 125.  
99 Currie and De Waal (note 11) 24. 
100 Families of Mental Health Care Users Affected by the Gauteng Mental Marathon Project Claimants v National 
Minister of Health of the Republic of South Africa; Government of the Province of Gauteng; Premier of the 
Province of Gauteng & Member of the Executive Council of Health: Province of Gauteng 19 March 2019.  
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admittedly delinquent provincial government’.101 This award did not in any way undermine 
the single system of law, nor infringe on the principles of avoidance and subsidiarity. Instead, 
these awards completed each other in achieving fuller protection and vindication of rights. 
Judge Moseneke rejected the State’s argument that all claims in this case should have been 
brought under the common law remedy of general damages. He ruled that claims under the 
Constitution, as the supreme law, could not be denied ‘simply because it could not fit into the 
common law framework’.102 Quite emphatically, Justice Moseneke went on to state as 
follows:  
‘In effect the Government is arguing that the claimants should have converted all their claims to 
common law claims and if not they would be non-suited. Neither the Constitutional Court cases relied 
on nor Mboweni is authority for that proposition. The cases simply state that a remedy under section 
38 of the Constitution may be vindicated by common law mode of pleading and claim. The cases do not 
mean that a party is barred from relying on the Constitution where the breaches defy common law 
formulation. It would be strange if not bizarre if a claim under the supreme law would be denied 
vindication simply because it could not fit into the common law framework. If that were so, the 
constitutional remedies would be granted only subject to the common law. That would be remarkably 
retrogressive understanding of the hierarchy of sources of law. It is important to restate that the 
common law is subservient to the Constitution and not the other way around.’103 
It gets no clearer than Moseneke J’s formulation. In view of the egregious infringement of 
constitutionally protected rights, the arbitrator found that the claims could not fit under the 
umbrella of general damages. Per Toxopeüs’ comment on the case: 
‘While alternative remedies are often suited to fulfil this role, courts cannot shy away from awarding 
constitutional damages directly where circumstances make it appropriate, particularly in cases of 
glaring and continuous state failure to adhere to its constitutional obligations. Essentially, courts should 
look to remedies that enforce and protect these rights. The remedy of constitutional damages does this 
by acting as a rectifying mechanism in circumstances of extreme state failure’.104 
The above is mindful of the fact that recently in Komape and Others v Minister of Basic 
Education105, Muller J in the Polokwane High Court dismissed a claim for constitutional 
damages as ‘nothing short of punitive damages’ and that, if successful, it would result in the 
family being over-compensated without the award serving the interests of society.106 The 
court had dismissed claims for emotional shock as well, with only those claims for which 
liability was admitted being granted by consent. The court was fixated on the common law 
infringement and remedies, despite the court acknowledging that constitutional rights had 
been infringed in a systemic and widespread manner. The structural interdict the court opted 
for, while it attempted to address the systemic nature of the violations, failed to appreciate 
 
101 Ibid para 1.  
102 Life Esidemeni (note 100) para 216. 
103 Ibid.  
104 Michelle Toxopeüs ‘Constitutional damages: Recent decisions in focus’ 24 June 2018 Helen Suzman 
Foundation, https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/constitutional-damages-recent-decisions-in-
focus#_ftn10.  
105 [2018] ZALMPPHC 18.  
106 Ibid paras 67-68. 
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the need for the relief to directly vindicate the rights of the claimants who had lost a son 
through drowning in a faeces-filled pit latrine at a government school. An appeal was lodged 
against this judgment and is pending at the time of writing.  
There is a final question to be addressed: are those rights such as equality, protection from 
illegal eviction, and administrative justice which have specific statutes dealing with them 
precluded from the reach of constitutional damages? The answer has to be no. Interestingly, 
Justice Moseneke also picks this up in the Life Esidemeni arbitration award. He asks:  
‘What is the common law equivalent of a claim based on the State’s breach of the right of access to 
healthcare; right of access to food and water; freedom from torture; protection from cruel degrading 
and inhuman treatment? Similarly what is the common law equivalent of a claim against the State for 
breaching the rule of law, for disregarding protections provided by legislation that is meant to give 
effect to constitutional guarantees or a claim arising from a breach of international obligations on 
Mental Health care? And on the facts here all these breaches together led to agonising devastation for 
families of the deceased, survivors and their families.’107 
Firstly, there are instances such as PAJA108 and the LRA109, where monetary damages are 
expressly allowed for breach of the right to administrative justice and for unfair labour 
practices, respectively. Monetary damages ought to be granted where circumstances obtain 
appropriate. Secondly, there are instances where some statutes are silent on monetary relief. 
In such cases, the courts are entitled to grant any possible remedy as recognised in law, 
provided it is appropriate under the circumstances. This includes constitutional remedies, 
which in turn includes constitutional damages. Subsidiarity simply requires the case to be 
handled in terms of the legislation and before the appropriate court, but does not stop the 
court from granting constitutional remedies for the violation of the right addressed by the 
statute. 
Interestingly, in none of the constitutional damages cases before South African courts have 
subsidiarity been expressly invoked by name, although a few have implied it by speaking of 
remedies of last resort. Swart holds the view that after the CC’s decision in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers, the principle of constitutional avoidance and indirect application of the Bill of 
Rights may no longer be appropriate in this context,110 and that perhaps the time has come 
to resort directly to the Bill of Rights for claims of damages.111 Indirect application is not only 
a problem in itself, but it upsets other constitutional guarantees. For instance, strict 
requirement of indirect application of the Bill of Rights in all cases does violence to the 
generous approach to locus standi guaranteed by the Constitution.112 Some litigants who 
would otherwise have had legal standing to bring a case may not have such legal standing if 
 
107 Life Esidemeni (note 100) para 217.   
108 Section 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb). 
109 Sections 193, 194(4), and 195.  
110 The CC emphasised that the control of public power by the courts through judicial review is and always has 
been a constitutional matter. This is so irrespective of whether the principles are set out in a written Constitution 
or contained in the common law. The common law precedent continues to inform the law only to the extent 
that it is consistent with the Constitution. (See note 94 para 44). 
111 Swart (note 15) 225, citing Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (note 94).  
112 Section 38.  
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the Constitution is applied indirectly via the common law. This is because the locus standi 
requirements at common law differ. It is self-evident that focus on indirect application 
renders the Bill of Rights nugatory.  
 
6.4 POTENTIAL INCONSISTENCY OF A MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE APPROACH BETWEEN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES AND DELICTUAL DAMAGES 
The proposition of the choice approach in this thesis, that once one claims in constitutional 
law then they must not claim in delict to avoid double-compensation, is not without a 
potential legal inconsistency. It is possible that it may be legally tenable for one to be allowed 
to claim both in delict and in constitutional law from the same set of facts, the reason being 
that one is a public law remedy and the other a private law remedy. Public and private law 
remedies can co-exist. At times even two private law remedies can co-exist, the classic 
examples being delictual and contractual remedies. The question of double compensation 
does not arise as each form of compensation will be addressing a specific part of the breach.  
This potential inconsistency has already been picked up in Canada, where a criticism has been 
raised that this exclusionary approach following Vancouver (City) v Ward,113 is potentially 
inconsistent with precedent that allows concurrent actions in tort and contract law. The 
Supreme Court stressed on this potential inconsistency in the court’s explanation of the 
quantum of damages. It remarked that the court must focus on the breach of Charter rights 
as an independent wrong, worthy of compensation in its own right. Simultaneously, damages 
under s 24(1) of the Charter should not duplicate damages awarded under private law causes 
of action where the issue is compensation for personal loss. The common law position in 
Canada is similar to that of South Africa, being that where a given wrong prima facie supports 
an action in contract and tort, the party may sue in either or both, subject to any limit the 
parties themselves have placed on that right by their contract.114 This is because the tort duty 
of care is independent of the specific obligations and duties in a contract between private 
parties. The corollary to this principle is significant: both tort and contract damages can be 
sought, despite the possibility that damages will be awarded for both claims. In the same vein, 
the government’s delictual duty of care is independent of the negative or positive duties of 
the government pursuant to the Bill of Rights.  
The above were merely reservations the court was expressing in its approach. The Canadian 
Supreme Court nevertheless proceeded to decide that Charter damages will be barred where 
a concurrent action in tort or private law would result in double recovery.115 The court 
however was clear in expressing that this must be distinguished from a case where the 
claimant has not instituted a concurrent tort action. As such, the mere existence of a potential 
 
113 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28. 
114 Central Trust Co. v Rafuse [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147. 
115 Ward (note 113) para 36. 
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tort claim would not preclude a claimant from claiming Charter damages, and it is so because 
‘[t]ort law and the Charter are distinct legal avenues’.116  
 
Recent Charter damages cases in Canada seem to have picked up on the Supreme Court’s 
remarks on the potential inconsistency discussed above. In the 2016 British Columbia case of 
Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General),117 the British Columbia Supreme Court awarded 
$7.5 million in Charter damages for wrongful conviction and imprisonment in addition to a 
separate award for compensation for past loss of income and special damages. In the court’s 
words, it sought to deter future violations as ‘the occasions where the Canadian criminal 
justice system sees a wrongful conviction and incarceration must be rare, and the need to 
deter the conduct that might lead to such results is thus limited’.118 Of importance, the court 
concluded that given the compensation that had been determined as appropriate to vindicate 
the breach of the appellants’ Charter rights, a further award to deter future such breaches 
would be unnecessary and would duplicate the compensation assessed for the vindication of 
his rights, and constitute double recovery.119 This is an interesting approach to double-
recovery, as already Charter damages had been awarded in addition to past loss of income 
and special damages. Thus double compensation in this case was only considered in respect 
of different utilities of the remedy, and not on the distinction between constitutional 
damages on the one hand and delictual damages of past loss of income and special damages 
on the other.  
 
6.5 JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND DEFERENCE  
An aspect where courts across all the jurisdictions considered in Chapter 5 are ad idem is that 
constitutional damages are a discretionary remedy. The possible exception is France, owing 
to the debate on the fundamentalisation of compensation for human rights violations. Just 
because a claimant has established a violation does not mean they are entitled to 
constitutional damages as of right. The selection of an appropriate remedial device has been 
held to be driven by underlying substantive goals and, ideally, is tailored to meet interests 
thought worthy of judicial protection.120 The courts have to assess the best remedy under the 
circumstances, having regard to a multiplicity of factors such as the nature of the violation, 
the prevalence of the violation, the violator and the victim, the interest threatened or 
harmed, and the end goal. This is a departure from delictual damages which are claimed as of 
right.121 This is because constitutional damages are not compensatory in the restitutionary 
 
116 Ibid para 35.  
117 2016 BC 1038.  
118 Ibid para 468.  
119 Ibid. 
120 See, for example, the following cases: Carey v Piphus 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978); Carlson v Green 4 46 U.S. 14 
(1980) (awarding damages for failure to provide medical care); and Davis v Passman 4, 42 U.S. 228 (1979) 
(allowing damages in sex discrimination suit).  
121 See Tom Bingham The Rule of Law (2010) Allen Lane, London 51. 
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sense. Thus a judge may refuse damages preferring an injunction if it occurs to him that an 
injunction is better relief in the circumstances.  
 
Kriegler J in Fose drew attention to the fact that ‘while applicants are entitled to relief if their 
fundamental rights have been violated, they have no right to a particular remedy’.122 He wrote 
alone, however, and in no subsequent decision has the court expressly endorsed this 
approach.123 However, in Modderklip,124 the court acknowledged the existence of a 
‘constitutional right to an effective remedy’125 which was said to ﬂow from the right of access 
to courts and the requirements of the rule of law.126 This is unlike the more assertive French 
approach towards ‘fundamentalisation’ of compensation, as discussed in Chapter 5, where 
constitutional damages are beginning to be seen as a right. What one can insist on is an 
effective remedy. This should eliminate the fear of abuse of the constitutional damages 
remedy. The US has also held firm on this principle, and not all seemingly sound constitutional 
damages claims have been granted.127 A variety of constitutional damages claims, even in 
recent times, have been rejected for one reason or another, but not because of the non-
recognition of the action.128 There may well be limited cases, however, where the discretion 
strongly points towards the granting of damages, limiting the scope of that discretion, and 
requiring that that discretion be exercised in only one way – to grant damages.  
Owing to the nature of the remedy, it cannot be denied that budgetary implications should 
be considered at the remedial stage of the analysis.129 This kind of assessment will work as a 
safety net, ensuring that only deserving cases get the benefit of the remedy. It is at this critical 
stage that the courts must also not be blind to the position of government regarding how and 
why the government violated the right(s), what it could have avoided, what it could or should 
have done, and why that was not done. This ensures that while the courts exercise their 
remedial and checks and balances function, they do not make it difficult or impossible for the 
government to operate. This is dictated by practical and pragmatic considerations, and the 
need to strike a balance between those considerations and the exercise of the check and 
balance function as well as the dispensing of justice. This is all part of a functional approach 
to the remedy. As Jafta J pointed out in Mvumvu and Others v Minister of Transport and 
Another,130 ‘in determining a suitable remedy, the courts are obliged to take into account not 
 
122 Fose (note 96) para 100 (Kriegler J). 
123 Hofmeyr ‘A Central-Case Analysis of Constitutional Remedial Power’ (2008) SALJ 537. 
124 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
125 Ibid para 51. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Gene R Nichol ‘Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims’ (1989) 75(6) Virginia LR 1118 also 
recognizes that ‘Not all constitutional violation rive rise to even arguable damage claims.’ 
128 Examples include in the following cases: Chappell v Wallace 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (rejecting a claim for damages 
in a discrimination suit against military superiors); United States v Stanley 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987) (holding that a 
former serviceman could assert no constitutional claim against military officials for being involuntarily subjected 
to LSD testing); Bush v Lucas 462 U.S. 367 (1983); and Schweiker v Chilicky 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988). 
129 Currie and De Waal (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1, Constitutional law (2001) 
289. 
130 2011 (2) SA 473 (CC) para 49. 
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only the interests of parties whose rights are violated, but also the interests of good 
government’. This confirmed what the CC had stated earlier in Minister of Health and Others 
v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2):131 
‘Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have multiple social and 
economic consequences for the community. The Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and 
focused role for the courts, namely, to require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional 
obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. Such determinations of 
reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves directed at 
rearranging budgets. In this way the judicial, legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate 
constitutional balance.’132 
At the same time, in seeking to strike the required balance, the courts must not be 
constrained by these considerations so much so that they are restricted in the execution of 
their constitutional mandate. A key principle emerged from the High Court in Modderklip in 
this regard, to the effect that courts should not be overawed by practical problems, but should 
'attempt to synchronise the real world with the ideal construct of a constitutional world' as 
they have a duty to mould an order that will provide effective relief to those affected by a 
constitutional breach.133 
In Fose, a final rationale in rejecting the damages claim, which was not as prominent as the 
other two, was the desire to leave the field of determining damages for constitutional 
violations to Parliament.134 Klaaren shares the same sentiment:  
‘Finally, it clearly remains open to Parliament to pass national legislation to provide for constitutional 
damages claims. Indeed, in order to facilitate access to remedies for constitutional wrongs, it is to be 
hoped that Parliament will pass a statute laying down general guidelines on this topic. Questions of 
institutional implementation and funding are best addressed by a legislature. For this reason alone 
courts should not be eager, as the Fose court was not eager, to allow constitutional damages claims, 
although in appropriate cases a court may order damages without legislative authorization.’135 
 
I do not share these views, as I have argued elsewhere in this thesis, save to stress that these 
views are indicative of part of the reasons discretion is crucial in the consideration of 
constitutional damages. The principle of deference is not an abstract notion. It is a principle 
reflected in the very structure of government.136 The Western Cape High Court succinctly 
captured the notion in Tlouamma and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and 
Others137: 
‘In Van Rooyen and Others v The State and Others (General Council of the Bar of South Africa 
Intervening) the Court stated that: 
“In a constitutional democracy such as ours, in which the Constitution is the supreme law of 
the Republic, substantial power has been given to the Judiciary to uphold the Constitution. In 
 
131 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
132 Ibid para 38.  
133 Para 43 (footnotes omitted).  
134 Para 85 (Didcott J concurring).  
135 Jonathan Klaaren ‘Judicial Remedies’ (1998) in [REVISION SERVICE 2, 1998] 9-12 and 9-13. 
136 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) para 37. 
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exercising such powers, obedience to the doctrine of the separation of powers requires that 
the Judiciary, in its comments about the other arms of the State, show respect and courtesy, 
in the same way that these other arms are obliged to show respect for and courtesy to the 
Judiciary and one another.”’138  
The court decided that in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers139 and Carmichele140 the CC had 
established that there is no executive, administrative, parliamentary or judicial conduct, and 
no law whatsoever, including amendments to the Constitution, that escape constitutional 
scrutiny.141 Undoubtedly, this includes by extension constitutional relief where it is deemed 
fit and appropriate. The court further cited the CC in Glenister v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others142 where it held that: ‘It is a necessary component of the doctrine of 
separation of powers that courts have a constitutional obligation to ensure that the exercise 
of power by other branches of government occurs within constitutional bounds. But even in 
these circumstances, courts must observe the limits of their powers’.143 Nonetheless, as 
pointed out by the CC in Doctors for Life, ‘Courts must be conscious of the vital limits on 
judicial authority [and] should not interfere in the processes of other branches of government 
unless to do so is mandated by the Constitution.’144  
The granting of constitutional damages must be viewed in this context, and it must be 
assessed whether to grant constitutional damages is ultra vires for the courts. Do the courts 
need to allow Parliament to give a greenlight to damages against the state? Is it intruding on 
the executive and the executive’s allocated resources? I would argue in the negative. Judicial 
authority is vested in the courts, and so is the power to grant appropriate and effective judicial 
remedy. The courts do not need Parliament to tell them what remedies to grant in what 
circumstances. Except in cases of statutorily prescribed fine schedules and sentences, such as 
the Minimum Sentences Act145, the judiciary has full authority to decide its sanctions. With 
constitutional damages, there are no questions of the state issuing orders that may be difficult 
or impossible to implement – the classical cases that call for deference.146  
At times judicial deference will be used as a vehicle for ‘passing the buck’. Brand argues that 
at times deference is ‘the strategy of courts, when faced with difficult technical or contested 
social questions in such cases to leave decision of those issues, in different ways and to varying 
degrees, to the other branches of government.’147 While Brand focuses his work on judicial 
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139 Note 94 above.  
140 Carmichele (note 1). 
141 Note 128 para 68.  
142 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC).  
143 Ibid para 33. 
144 Doctors for Life (note 136) para 37. Also Glenister (note 142) para 44. 
145 Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.  
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deference in socio-economic rights cases, he does so for no deep conceptual reason as 
deference operates generally in administrative and constitutional review as elsewhere in a 
similar manner.148 
 
Pertinently, Brand poses the question of how comfortably judicial deference fits with the 
constitutional imperative that courts should, through their work in socio-economic rights 
cases seek to advance or at least to avoid limiting the kind of ‘thick, or empowered conception 
of democracy’ envisaged in the South African Constitution.149 The answer, according to him, 
is not pleasing:  
 
‘From the point of view of claimants, deference has so far in our courts’ socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence operated as an obstacle to effective enforcement, leading in those cases where claims 
are successful to attenuated forms of relief and explicitly forming the basis for rejection of claims in the 
few cases so far where claimants have been unsuccessful. My focus on deference is intended to address 
this problem – I seek to debunk deference as an obstacle to the effective enforcement of socio-
economic rights.’150 
 
What he proposes is worthwhile to reproduce: 
 
‘[T]he South African Constitution is a transformative document in that it has a certain political 
character; in short that it embodies a certain vision of society and requires positive action on the side 
of all agencies of the state toward the attainment of that vision. This transformative duty – the duty to 
work toward the achievement of the constitutional vision of society – is one that rests also on courts. 
Courts must also, in both the outcomes they generate in their judgments and the manner in which they 
reach their judgments (their reasoning and judicial “method”), to the extent that it “innovate[s] and 
model[s] intellectual and institutional practices” for the rest of society, work toward the achievement 
of the society envisaged in the Constitution. One important aspect of the society envisaged in the 
Constitution is the establishment and maintenance of a particular kind of democracy – a ‘thick’ 
conception of democracy, or what Klare has described as an “empowered” model of democracy’.151 
 
If this description of the constitutional conception of democracy is accepted, Brand proceeds, 
then his critique of judicial deference becomes possible.152 It entails that the strategy of 
deference amounts to a failure in the democracy-related aspect of the transformative duty 
on courts, in that the strategy of judicial deference embodies a conception of democracy 
simply at odds with the constitutional conception of democracy.153 These ‘counter-
majoritarian dilemma’ type of arguments, he argues, promote exactly the kind of democracy 
that the Constitution does not require, or require alone -  an institutional, procedural or 
structural conception of democracy, in terms of which democracy is equated with the formal 
representative institutions that result from it.154 Brand’s arguments find support in Dutton 
who argues that the South African judicial system inherited ‘a reduced conception of the 
judge's role’, a role limited to findings and statements strictly necessitated by the disposition 
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of the particular case.155 It would appear to be this heritage informing those arguing for 
judicial deference on constitutional damages and other constitutional remedies. Deference 
of this nature constricts the kind of transformative vision envisioned by the Constitution.156 
 
Judicial activism also finds itself an applicable concept, within this context. Pertinently, it is 
the kind of approach that may be required to push beyond confining damage claims to delict, 
almost completely avoiding locating damages in the Constitution. Judicial activism has been 
explored almost in exhaustive detail in Chapter 2, but the point to be made here is that judicial 
activism is not at odds with separation of powers and deference. Deference, I would argue, is 
not a legal concept to undercut the courts’ powers. Rather, it is a concept meant to ensure 
that courts do not pronounce on what they do not have practical powers of enforcement, and 
where courts are not better suited to make a pronouncement over the executive or the 
legislature. As long as ruling upon a particular matter is within the remit and province of the 
court, the court can be activist, so long as that activism stays within the confines of what is 
allowable at law, and what wisdom and practical exigencies dictate. This approach, in fact, 
accords with how deference has been argued by various scholars including Plasket who 
argues that deference has no place as a standalone concept.157 Deference itself in embedded 
in the law, that is, administrative-law principles, and separation of powers. Indeed, deference 
must be understood within the context of separation of powers, and what the Constitution 
does or does not authorise the court to do. Plasket concludes thus: ‘The idea of according a 
measure of respect to the decision of another decision-maker is, in the judicial context, 
nothing strange. It is a familiar concept in the courts and an integral part of the judicial 
function that runs throughout the judicial system’.158 For that reason, deference, properly 
understood, is not at odds with judicial activism.   
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Considerations of the powers granted to courts by the Constitution, the vision set by the 
Constitution, and the limits envisaged on how far the courts may go in discharging their 
constitutional mandate, taken together, enable the balanced exercise of judicial discretion in 
the handling of constitutional damages. Such powers as permitted by the Constitution can be 
exercised in a way that does not upset the operations of government, the public purse, the 
rights of the victim, the duties and accountability of the violator, the importance of the 
Constitution and constitutional rights, and the efficacy of the courts as a player in the trias 
politica. At the same time, the Constitution is vindicated through solid and meaningful 
remedies – not just through the delict.  
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Yet notwithstanding the arguments raised that constitutional damages are viable and good at 
law, it is submitted that because of the nature of the remedy, constitutional damages must 
be awarded only in deserving and appropriate cases. Where the matter is simply the 
inadequacy of the common law remedies, the courts are called upon to develop the common 
law in terms of s 8(3) of the Constitution, even at its own volition in terms of s 39(2) of the 
Constitution. The point to be made is that not all constitutional violations necessitate 
damages claims.159 
  
 
159 Nichol ‘Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims’ (1989) 1133. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF A MONETARY REMEDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – SUBSTANTIVE 
ASPECTS AND ADDITIONAL CRITICISMS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As has been made clear in previous Chapters, constitutional damages are not without 
academic and judicial critique. A number of judges and academics have voiced concerns over 
locating monetary damages in constitutional law as opposed to the traditional delict.1 A 
number of these criticisms have already been canvassed, or mentioned in passing in the 
preceding Chapters. This Chapter will deal with a few select criticisms in more detail. While 
numerous criticisms have emerged, I will confine myself to a few selected on the basis of their 
relative importance and their repeated and persistent appearance in both judicial and 
academic critique.  
 
7.2 DEPLETING THE TAX-PAYER’S POCKET 
 
It has been argued that allowing monetary damages for violation of constitutional rights is an 
unwarranted expense to the consolidated revenue fund. This was advanced in Olitzki:  
‘Leaving aside the conceptual and practical difficulties this omission raises, the nub of the matter is that 
the plaintiff in effect claims a windfall, and does so on the premise that its gain has also the public 
dimension of constitutional vindication. Yet, as Ackermann J pointed out in relation to the punitive 
damages sought in Fose, for awards to individuals to have a salutary effect on the conduct of public 
officials they would have to be very substantial, and “the more substantial they are, the greater the 
anomaly that a single plaintiff receives a windfall of such magnitude”’.2  
Here Ackermann J was lamenting the costs that this form of relief would impose on the State. 
He went on to state that there is not only an anomaly in this, but that the grave impact on the 
exchequer raises a critical policy consideration:  
‘In a country where there is a great demand generally on scarce resources, where the government has 
various constitutionally prescribed commitments which have substantial economic implications and 
where there are “multifarious demands on the public purse and the machinery of government that flow 
from the urgent need for economic and social reform”, it seems to me it would be inappropriate to use 
these scarce resources to pay punitive constitutional damages to plaintiffs who are already 
compensated...’3    
These were regarded as powerful reasons of policy pointing away from a constitutional 
entitlement to damages in the terms the plaintiff asserted.4 Specific to the facts of that case, 
however, it must be borne in mind that this statement was made in the context of punitive 
 
1 For this, see the various cases discussed in Chapter 2. See also academic sources quoted below in this Chapter.  
2 Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board & another 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA) para 40. 
3 Ibid para 41 (footnotes omitted).  
4 Ibid para 42. 
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damages. Additionally, the court stated that it was not necessary in the circumstances to 
decide that a lost profit can never be claimed as constitutional damages.5 The rejection of 
punitive damages in Olitzki resonates with Fose. The court in Fose gravitated towards denying 
the remedy as, quoting an English case, the ‘principal objection was to purely punitive 
damages, where the plaintiff was given “a pure and undeserved windfall at the expense of 
the defendant [who] was being subjected to pure punishment”’.6 The court there considered 
punitive damages to be highly anomalous, that they confused the functions of the civil law 
with those of the criminal law, and that they contravened almost every principle which has 
been evolved for the protection of offenders.7 Notwithstanding the specific focus of this 
argument to punitive damages, I will address this argument to the extent that it applies to 
constitutional damages in general and not solely to punitive damages.  
Of all the arguments addressed in this Chapter, this is perhaps the best example of a logical 
fallacy and a non-sequitur. If a litigant claims damages from the State in delict and succeeds, 
that money is paid from government coffers, which is taxpayers’ money. Would it then make 
a difference that the damages have been renamed ‘constitutional damages’? Would 
constitutional damages suddenly become an undesirable expense to the taxpayer, but not 
when the money is paid as ‘delictual damages’? Arguments that an individual claimant would 
receive a windfall at the expense of the taxpayer, while appearing sound at first sight, become 
questionable when we consider that even delictual damages are granted against the State, 
and it is the same pocket that is paying. To then say it is preferable to give the compensation 
as delictual damages and not as constitutional damages because the latter has more cost does 
not seen sound.  
 
A basic premise in a constitutional state is that maintaining that constitutional state costs 
money. Enforcing rights – whatever they may be – has a price tag. The Constitutional Court in 
the First Certification judgment8 made it clear that all rights orders have monetary 
implications.9 Put differently, one cannot avoid expense in enforcing constitutional rights.  
 
In Kate,10 yet another counter-argument to the ‘depletion of taxpayers money’ argument 
against constitutional damages was presented:  
 
‘It is indeed troubling [...] that the public purse, upon which there are many calls, should be depleted 
by claims for damages. If the provincial administration must seek further funds, in addition to those 
that have been appropriated for providing social assistance, in order to meet claims for damages, 
hopefully its accountability to the legislature will contribute to a proper resolution. But the cause for 
 
5 Ibid.  
6 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 45.  
7 Ibid.   
8 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
9 Ibid para 77.  
10 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA).  
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that is the unlawful conduct of the provincial administration and it does not justify withholding a 
remedy.’11 
The need to account for those monies by the concerned departments is itself a check that will 
force the departments to act constitutionally and avoid costly litigation. It is too simplistic and 
inaccurate an argument to claim that the expense of constitutional damages is on the public 
purse, and is a loss to the taxpayer and the departments paying could not care less. More 
expenditure in litigation or payment of damages by a government department or agency is a 
red-flag that would raise questions regarding how that department or agency is operating. In 
turn, the pressure to account would self-correct the department in the medium to long-term, 
and it is this kind of pressure that ought to be imposed on government and its departments 
and functionaries by the constitutional damages remedy, so as to induce increased 
constitutional compliance.  
Although not raised in any court judgment, or academic work, perhaps the fear is that if the 
damages are handled as constitutional damages, then many individuals whose rights are 
violated will approach courts claiming constitutional damages – the so-called ‘opening the 
flood-gates’ legal cliché. As a starting point, if rights are violated then indeed the litigants are 
legitimately entitled to claim against the State, and that right to seek redress cannot be taken 
away from them simply because it is expensive for the State to make good its constitutional 
damage. Even then, there is a check to ensure that the State does not pay that for which it is 
not liable. The courts do not and must not blindly pass claims of money against the State 
without being satisfied as to the State’s liability, and also without being satisfied as to the 
appropriateness of the remedy – which is the whole point in establishing a framework for the 
awarding of constitutional damages.  
On the whole, Corder’s pragmatic and functional approach is to be preferred, that the 
acknowledgment of limited resources must be balanced against the necessity for continued 
efforts to lift the levels of compliance, particularly in the civil-political rights area.12 In fact, 
consistent compliance will prove cheaper in the long-run, as fewer and fewer lawsuits are 
brought against the State. 
 
7.3 THE TRIAS POLITICA AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 
 
Yet another argument is raised against constitutional damages is that the recognition of 
damages claims arising directly from the Constitution's broad commands appears strangely 
at odds with the scheme of the separation of powers.13 Proponents of this argument submit 
that the decision to render government officials monetarily accountable to citizens for redress 
of harm has traditionally been thought to lie within the legislative domain, and entertaining 
 
11 Ibid para 32.  
12 Hugh Corder ‘Securing the rule of law’ (2011) in Carnelly and Shannon (eds) Law, Oder and Liberty: Essays in 
Honour of Tony Mathews 27. 
13 See Nichol ‘Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims’ (1989) 75(6) Virginia LR 1117, 1122. 
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constitutional causes of action involves the judiciary, at least indirectly, in policy choices 
concerning the allocation of limited resources.14 It is important to note that this argument 
mainly emanates from, and is premised in the context of the United States of America. 
Notwithstanding this, local scholars have also raised the subject. For example, Klaaren argues 
that courts should not be eager to allow such claims because Parliament should pass national 
legislation for damages since ‘the question of institutional implementation and funding are 
best addressed by the legislature.’15 O’Regan echoes similar sentiments, opining that ‘an 
express statutory provision providing for damages will put the matter beyond doubt’.16  
 
It is submitted that such a proposition cannot be sustained in the South African context where 
the judiciary is expressly empowered by the Constitution not only to develop the common 
law where it falls short (including common law remedies) in terms of s 8, but also to forge 
new tools or remedies that would allow for ‘appropriate relief’ in terms of s 38. In any case, 
while the doctrine of separation of powers is important, it cannot be used to avoid the 
obligation of a court to prevent a violation of the Constitution.17 The courts not only have the 
power and right to uphold and enforce the Constitution through enablers stated in the 
Constitution itself, but also the duty to do so. It is uncontroverted that the Constitution in s 
172 grants the courts the power to scrutinise the conduct of the other two branches of 
government and declare any law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution invalid. That 
power of judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation 
of powers and the balancing of power among the three branches of government.18  
 
So the courts are expressly empowered to grant a remedy that is within its power without the 
need for authorisation, or to seek such authorisation, from the legislature. In any case, Chief 
Justice Langa notes that it is no longer sufficient for the judiciary to rely on the authority of 
Parliament as justification for judicial decisions, since under a transformative Constitution the 
judiciary bears the fundamental responsibility to justify its decisions ‘not only by reference to 
authority, but by reference to ideas, rights and values’.19 The old order of parliamentary 
sovereignty is no more, where the judiciary saw its role as merely being to interpret and apply 
 
14 Kate O’Regan ‘Fashioning constitutional remedies in South Africa: some reflections’ (2011) April Advocate 44. 
15 Jonathan Klaaren ‘Judicial Remedies’ in Woolman et al (ed) Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed) (2004) 
9-13. 
16 O’Regan (note 14) 44. 
17 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) para 200. The CC said: 
‘Therefore, while the doctrine of separation of powers is an important one in our constitutional democracy, it 
cannot be used to avoid the obligation of a court to prevent the violation of the Constitution. The right and the 
duty of this Court to protect the Constitution are derived from the Constitution, and this Court cannot shirk from 
that duty. As O’Regan J explained in a recent minority judgment, “the legitimacy of an order made by the court 
does not flow from the status of the institution itself, but from the fact that it gives effect to the provisions of 
our Constitution.” In order for the founding values that lie at the heart of our Constitution to be made concrete, 
it is particularly important for this Court to afford a remedy, which is not only effective, but which should also 
be seen to be effective.’ 
18 Tlouamma and Others V Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2016 (1) SA 534 (WCC) para 62. 
19 Pius Langa ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 3 Stell LR 351, 353. 
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the law as enacted by Parliament with no regard to individual rights or the social 
consequences of applying that law.20 In any event, as Lord Steyn in the House of Lords makes 
abundantly clear: ‘Unless there is the clearest provision to the contrary, Parliament must be 
presumed not to legislate contrary to the rule of law. And the rule of law enforces minimum 
standards of fairness, both substantive and procedural.’21 Thus ordering strong affirmative 
remedies such as structural relief and constitutional damages will not mean that courts 
overstep their power but that they fulfil their constitutional mandate.22 
 
7.4 ABSTRACT, NON-COMPENSATORY DAMAGES? 
 
Emanating mainly from American conservative jurists is the proposition that there is simply 
no room for non-compensatory damages as that would be based on a judge’s perception of 
the abstract ‘importance’ of a constitutional right. This proposition has found its way into 
South African jurisprudence. This argument is premised on the misconceived belief that 
constitutional rights are abstract, with varying weight accorded to rights according to the 
judge’s perception.  
Firstly, this argument does violence to accepted international human rights norms, standards, 
and principles which state that human rights are indivisible, interrelated, interconnected and 
are of equal importance.23 There is therefore no task upon the judge to apportion various 
degrees of importance or monetary value to constitutional rights.  
Secondly, the argument commits the offence of selective evidence. The granting of non-
pecuniary damages in nothing novel at law. This is how solatium is granted in private law. 
There need not be a scale that states what value in monetary terms each right is worth, and 
what amount of money is equivalent to what form and level of violation. Instead, with non-
pecuniary damages judges have always been called upon to exercise judicial discretion and 
make value assessments, having close regard to the facts at hand and any other relevant 
considerations. Violations of privacy and dignity, for example, are treated in this manner in 
delict. To then lament this same approach being taken with constitutional damages as if it 
were an introduction of a novel concept of non-pecuniary damages to law amounts to double 
standards. There can be no basis to argue that non-pecuniary damages in public law are 
abstract and hence untenable, but quite the contrary in private law.  
 
 
20 See Dikgang Moseneke ‘The Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture: transformative adjudication’ (2002) 18 
SAJHR 309, 316 and Kirsty McLean Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
(2009) PULP 81.  
21 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Pierson [1998] AC 539, 591. 
22 Mia Swart ‘Left out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the poorest of the Poor’ (2005) SAJHR 
40. 
23 John Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa:  A Legal and Practical Guide (2nd ed) (2013) 
Juta, Cape Town 4.  
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7.5 CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES AND DETERRENCE OF VIOLATIONS 
 
From the analysis of cases done in Chapters 4 and 5 above, the capacity of constitutional 
damages to serve as a deterrent is brought to question. This has been used by some courts 
and scholars to discredit constitutional damages as a tenable remedy. The temptation is to 
summarily dismiss this argument as too broad, general, abstract and too speculative an 
assertion, for there is no evidence that where constitutional damages have been granted, 
they have achieved no deterrent effect. Swart points out that Kriegler J’s statement in Fose 
that punitive damages were inappropriate because the problem of police torture was 
widespread and the damages would therefore not have a deterrent effect can be criticised.24 
Deterrence is only one of the functions of an award of damage,25 and not an end in and of 
itself. For these reasons alone, the argument that constitutional damages are untenable 
because they achieve no deterrence cannot gain traction. Nevertheless, I shall proceed to 
deal with the argument on merits.   
The primary rationale of constitutional damages is always to satisfy the affected and wronged 
individual, not financially, but through vindication of their rights. It is not therefore correct to 
categorise constitutional damages as having the primary utility of deterrence, or punishment, 
and then proceed to deny the remedy on that basis alone. The primary utility is vindication of 
an individual’s fundamental rights, and any secondary rationale does not take precedence. 
The other effects of the remedy can rightly be termed consequential and incidental, and 
unless such effects have such a huge and negative effect on the remedy and its purpose, 
consequential effects cannot be used to deny the soundness of the remedy on its main utility.   
The CC came down heavily against granting constitutional damages as ‘punitive damages’ in 
Fose. Partly, it is this formulation of the constitutional damages claim as ‘punitive damages’ 
that led to the court denying the remedy. The use of constitutional damages for punitive 
purposes is not advanced in this thesis. However, it is of service to unearth double standards 
- some subtle - in the way the courts dismiss remedies they think to be inappropriate. There 
are instances where courts in South Africa have granted and can grant delictual damages 
which are expressly considered ‘punitive’.26 The point to be made here is that there is judicial 
precedent of monetary damages being awarded for punitive purposes for the infringement 
of an interest. I mention this simply to show that either way, there is no wisdom in denying 
monetary damages for constitutional breaches on the wrong premise that the remedy is 
merely punitive, nor on the unproven basis that the remedy achieves no deterrence.  
 
 
 
24 Fose (note 6) para 103 (Kriegler J concurring).  
25 Swart (note 22) 225. 
26 For a detailed analysis of when punitive damages are permissible in South Africa, see Johann Neethling 
‘Punitive Damages in South Africa’ (2009) in Helmut Koziol and Vanessa Wilcox (eds) Punitive Damages: Common 
Law and Civil Law Perspectives 25 Tort and Insurance Law Series, Springer, New York 123-136. 
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7.6 THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES? 
 
Another argument raised against constitutional damages is that the imposition of such 
damages against public bodies or officials would result in unintended negative consequences. 
Public officials, it is argued, may take an ‘unduly defensive and cautious approach’ in carrying 
out their work.27 This would cause, so the argument goes, a chill on government decision-
making.28 The High Court in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, EC29 per Van Zyl J was 
in agreement, noting that the imposition of liability may produce adverse consequences, and 
that considerations of convenience may militate strongly against allowing an action for 
damages as the threat of such an action would unduly hamper the expeditious consideration 
and disposal of applications for the subdivision of land by the public body in question in that 
case.30 Contrary to these obiter remarks, however, Van Zyl J went on to hold that:  
 
‘[T]he argument that the imposition of liability on the Tender Board may cause it to become unduly 
cautious, is not convincing. The imposition of liability may rather lead to a higher standard of care in 
the carrying out of its activities. This would also be in accordance with the concept of accountability 
imposed on all organs of government by the Constitution.’31 
 
These apparently conflicting statements in a single judgment, where in the first instance Van 
Zyl J seems to support the negative consequences argument, only to refute it shortly 
afterwards, are telling. These statements themselves attest to the existing uncertainty as to 
the practical effect and impact of constitutional damages even in the mind of the judiciary. 
Suffice it to state that the claim that constitutional damages may have the effect of developing 
circumspection and over-cautiousness on government officials which then hampers 
functionality is at best speculative and pessimistically far-fetched. This danger is more 
apparent than real because the public officials have substantial protection against the 
imposition of damages for good faith violations of the Constitution.32 Various safeguards exist 
in the law to protect against unwarranted legal actions.  
 
Although not its main purpose, monetary remedies for constitutional breaches do achieve 
deterrence, and in the process, contributing to government efficiency and accountability. To 
augment, De Beer and Vettori submit that ‘[p]ersonal accountability will encourage state 
officials to perform up to standard thus discouraging litigation and the consequent 
unnecessary financial burden on the state.’33 In fact, as was found by Plasket J in Vumazonke 
 
27 See Clive Lewis Judicial Remedies in Public Law (4th ed) (2009) Sweet & Maxwell 545 (14-023). 
28 See Gene R Nichol ‘Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims’ (1989) 75(6) Virginia LR 1122 who 
postulates that: ‘Potential federal liability for every constitutional short-coming visited upon the populace – with 
its attendant chill on government decision making and its economic consequences also poses problems of 
significant dimension.’ 
29 [2006] JOL 16488 (Ck). 
30 Ibid para 35 (footnotes omitted). 
31 Ibid para 63. 
32 Jean C Love ‘Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights’ (1979) 67(6) California LR 1276. 
33 RJ De Beer and S Vettori ‘Enforcing Socio-economic Rights’ (2007) 1 PELJ 27.  
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v MEC,34 such orders as constitutional damages have the effect of cutting costs by ensuring 
efficiency and in the process saving millions of rands in taxpayers’ money that would have 
been wasted in unnecessary legal costs occasioned by indolence and/or incompetence on the 
part of public servants.35 If one can argue that monetary damages would result in unintended 
consequences then one could also argue the same for most of the constitutional remedies, 
as they actually cause government officials to be conscious of the unlawfulness and illegality 
of their actions when they are ultra vires the law.  
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
 
As numerous as criticisms for constitutional damages exist, none of the criticisms emerges 
clean of double standards or unnecessarily and even regrettably undermining the powers of 
the courts to award remedies they deem fit in accordance with the facts before them. The 
result is that there is no substantive constraint to the awarding of constitutional damages at 
law, nor is there necessarily any constraint by reason of expedience. In what follows, I 
conclude by considering the practical considerations and any elements that may be necessary 
to successfully found a claim and prosecute for constitutional damages.  
 
  
 
34 2005 (6) SA 229 (SE) 234. 
35 Ibid para 5. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION - STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
 
‘We who have taken the oath of high office as judges of the republic must effect the promise of the 
Constitution and close the gap between rights and remedies and avoid perpetuating the jurisprudence of 
deficiency as far as effective remedies for constitutional violations may be concerned.’ 
Dingake J, Oatile v Attorney General 2010 (1) BLR 404 (HC) at 422D. 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis has attempted to deconstruct constitutional damages from their perceived mystic 
and nebulous nature, as with the perceived vexed intersection between constitutional and 
delictual damages. In this concluding Chapter, I will tie together my arguments on 
constitutional damages and offer some final thoughts on the framework that I suggest should 
be followed in the context of South Africa and comparable constitutional democracies. The 
process attendant to the public law remedy of constitutional damages and the private law 
delictual action cannot be the same, for in law much is informed by process as by substance. 
Admittedly, one can see from the examination of jurisprudence both in South Africa and 
comparative jurisdictions that private law remedial principles, especially the delictual action, 
exert a lot of influence on the way constitutional damages are approached.1 This should not 
be problematic given the desirability of the principle of consistency and unity in the law. 
Differences in approach should only be drawn to the extent necessary, and to the extent that 
such differences facilitate achievement of the objective of the relief in a functional 
framework. It is with this in mind that I proceed to outline a distinctive functional procedural 
framework that should inform constitutional damages.  
 
8.2 OPTIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
One can accept as a conclusion from the preceding discussions that ‘any problem about using 
damages as a public law remedy resides not in the nature of damages as a remedy. If there is 
such a problem, we should look for it not in the nature of damages as a remedy but rather in 
the grounds on which damages might be awarded in respect of the performance of 
government functions’.2 It is from this premise that options of an approach in awarding 
constitutional damages can begin to be considered.  
 
1 See for example Juliet Philpott ‘Damages Under the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998 and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990’ (2007) 5(2) NZJPIL 211, 216 who in discussing the UK and New Zealand approach 
opines as follows: ‘However, having classified the remedy as a public law remedy, the courts in both jurisdictions 
have adopted an approach to remedies for rights violations that is heavily influenced by private law remedial 
principles’. 
2 Peter Cane ‘Damages in Public Law’ (1999) Otago Law Review 9(3) 489 at 498. 
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From a reading of the preceding Chapters and the literature and judicial decisions surveyed, 
a number of options in approaching constitutional damages are available to South Africa.3 
The first approach would be that of using constitutional damages only where no common law 
or statutory remedies are applicable. This is a very narrow and constrained approach to the 
relief. According to Klaaren, one instance where this might occur is where there is a statutory 
ouster of the court’s common-law jurisdiction,4 and another is where the Constitution 
protects an interest which the common law does not recognise, such as an environmental 
right.5 With such a claim the choice will be between developing the common law and invoking 
the Constitution directly to award damages. While the Fose decision views the South African 
common law as flexible enough to be stretched to provide compensation in most cases, it 
cannot be bent and pulled out of all recognition. As has already been pointed out, this 
approach more than the others seems to be reflective of the cautious and conservative 
approach the judiciary in South Africa is taking. The downside of this approach is that it 
potentially subtracts from the essence and purpose of constitutional damages, relegating 
constitutional damages to a residual remedy.  
A second option is that of using constitutional damages where the existing common law and 
statutory remedies are inadequate to remedy the specific violation. In such a case, there may 
be an impetus to then use constitutional damages as a gap-filler remedy. The main critique 
to this approach is that constitutional remedies in general and constitutional damages in 
particular were never intended to be gap-fillers, but competent remedies in their own right. 
As with the first option, constitutional damages here would occupy an inferior and peripheral 
position. 
A third approach is the pursuit of an award for punitive damages. The courts have not been 
forthcoming with this approach, providing scant support for awards of punitive damages over 
and above those for patrimonial loss, pain and suffering, loss of amenities, contumelia, and 
other general damages. At the core of the courts’ argument against punitive damages has 
been that they would serve no deterrent effect.6 In the courts’ mind therefore, punitive 
damages would be awarded in those circumstances where they would likely have a deterrent 
effect. This approach runs the risk of turning constitutional damages into a punitive remedy 
to the exclusion of its other utilities.  
 
A fourth approach is to award nominal damages. As with punitive damages, the presumption 
against this category of damages is a rebuttable one where no compensation has been 
 
3 See Jonathan Klaaren ‘Judicial Remedies’ (1998) in Stu Woolman et al (ed) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
[Revision Service 2] 11-12 who states that after Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC), there 
are at least three approaches. My position is that the options are more than just three.   
4 Klaaren (note 3) 11-12: ‘The tension here will be whether relief should be confined to remedies of general 
validity (such as invalidity or severance) or should include appropriate individual relief such as damages’. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Fose (note 3) para 71 (Ackermann J); see also para 65 where Ackermann J provides a lengthy list of arguments 
against punitive damages. 
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awarded in the matter.7 Such awards would have little monetary value but would serve to 
vindicate the constitutional rights at issue as for instance in political rights cases. The question 
here is whether nominal damages alone are enough to vindicate rights and ensure public 
accountability.  
 
Merely appropriating any one of these options would not address the numerous questions 
and concerns raised in this thesis regarding the status and utility of constitutional damages in 
South African law. For that reason, a tailor-made hybrid and functional approach is preferred, 
which borrows from all the enumerated options – a fifth option. Such a tailor-made approach 
would be purpose-oriented. It would look at the goal to be achieved, and then consider the 
most appropriate remedy to reach such a goal. In regard to constitutional damages, this 
approach would mean that the existence of a delictual or other alternative remedy to a 
claimant would not necessarily mean that a constitutional damages claim will be met with 
failure. Instead, the onus would rest on the plaintiff to establish why such damages are the 
most appropriate relief, while the State’s role would be to show how there are other more 
appropriate remedies, or any special reason why constitutional damages should not be 
granted. This approach finds support in Canadian jurisprudence.8 Canada follows the same 
approach in awarding non-pecuniary damages in personal injury cases.9 What must be looked 
at is the breach that has occurred, the ‘mischief’ that needs to be corrected, and the impact 
that such correction is intended to have. This would mean there are instances where even 
though there is a remedy in common law, constitutional damages will be appropriate. I now 
proceed to the proposed approach below.  
 
8.3 A TAILOR-MADE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
 
8.3.1 Defining the functional approach 
 
A case has been made in this thesis that local conditions dictate a vigorous, determined and 
sustained offensive against constitutional malfeasance and public disregard for or active 
violation of constitutional rights. The nature of a functional approach that is meaningful in its 
problem-solving capabilities must be premised on the notion that ‘legal norms can be applied 
to novel situations without rigidity or blind conformity to precedent’,10 and that ‘such an 
evolution might require novel and creative features when compared to traditional and 
historical remedial practice because tradition and history cannot be barriers to what reasoned 
and compelling notions of appropriate and just remedies demand’.11 The interplay between 
principles and contingent fact becomes of central importance if remedies granted are to have 
 
7 Ibid para 68. 
8 See the discussion on Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 in Chapter 5. 
9 Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229. 
10 Oscar Schachter ‘Dag Hammarskjold and the Relation of law to Politics’ (1962) 56 AJIL 3. 
11 Ward (note 8) paras 20-21 and also Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) [2003] 3 SCR 3 
paras 55-58. 
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any meaningful effect both to the direct litigants and to similarly situated persons.12 Remedies 
cannot be carved in stone and a ‘mechanical approach to determining the appropriate 
remedy is ultimately impractical because no list can include all harms or take account of the 
variations in circumstance that could make a given remedy appropriate’.13 
 
While suggesting a functional approach to the application of constitutional damages is novel 
in the South African context, propositions of functional approaches to legal questions 
generally are not novel. Jessup has discussed the functional approach in the following terms: 
14 
 
‘The functional approach to law is incapable of concise definition. In general it describes an attempt to 
correlate rules of law with the forces of human activity which they purport to regulate or from which 
they spring. It has been characterised also as an attempt “to see law in terms of activity and effect” 
rather than in terms of isolated and detached rules; it thinks of law in relation to everyday realities 
rather than as a “brooding omnipresence in the skies”. As a pedagogical procedure, the contrast is 
between conceptual and functional groupings of material’. 
 
A functional approach is therefore a means and ends exercise. The premise is that law ought 
to be an effective means to solve people’s problems. To this end the functional approach is 
normative. I take the averments by Currie and De Waal as a premise, that ‘[d]eciding on a 
remedy requires a more pragmatic approach than that adopted in any of the other stages of 
Bill of Rights litigation’.15  
 
8.3.2 Appropriate relief and the ‘choice approach’ 
 
The awarding of constitutional damages should be needs-based. Thus in some cases 
constitutional damages would be awarded for the reason that existing common law remedies 
are insufficient as was the case in Mahambehlala.16 Yet this should not be the definitive 
consideration. There may as well be instances where there are sufficient common law 
remedies but the unique circumstances of the case require much more forceful and 
vindicatory relief, perhaps because of the frequency of violations, reprehensibility of 
violation, extent of violations or any other relevant factor. By so doing, we avoid constricting 
constitutional damages to rigid circumstances – what could also fit the description of the 
austerity of tabulated legalism. Rigidity does not serve constitutional remedies well in 
general. The discretion bestowed upon the courts must allow them to grant relief not out of 
 
12 Ibid.  
13 David I Levine, David J Jung and Tracy A Thomas Remedies: Public and Private (5th ed) (2009) West Publishing 
1-2. 
14 Philip Jessup ‘The Functional Approach as Applied to International Law’ (1928) Third Conference of Teachers 
of International Law 1.  
15 Iain Currie and Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) (6th ed) Juta, Cape Town 179. 
16 Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another 2002 (1) SA 342 (SE) 354I-J and 355A-B: ‘In my 
opinion, in the light of these considerations, the applicant's common-law remedies are insufficient to be 
regarded as appropriate relief as envisaged by s 38 of the Constitution. […] I am of the view that it is incumbent 
upon this Court to attempt to fashion what may loosely be referred to as “constitutional relief” …’.  
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mere procedure but of the need to effectively remedy a violation. For that reason, the 
Constitution itself did not prescribe what form of constitutional relief is permissible under 
what circumstances, choosing rather to leave such considerations in the capable and trusted 
hands of the courts.  
 
The utility and effectiveness of constitutional damages is the key determinant to whether or 
not the remedy ought to be granted.17 It is submitted that this should be the guiding principle 
in modelling a case for constitutional damages. Modderklip18 and Kate19 provide excellent 
examples of where constitutional damages are granted as of necessity and for pragmatic 
purposes in vindicating rights. Levine et al20 argue that there are four critical trans-substantive 
choices in identifying the appropriate remedy. Firstly, the choice is to identify the remedy’s 
goal.21 The second choice is the choice between a specific and a substitutionary remedy.22 A 
Specific remedy achieves the remedy’s goal in kind, by giving the plaintiff the exact thing to 
which he or she is entitled.23 Then substitutionary remedies operate by giving the plaintiff a 
substitute – typically, an award of money – equal to the value of the plaintiff’s entitlement.24 
The third choice has to do with how to implement the first two choices in crafting the 
remedy.25 Then the fourth choice is how to enforce the remedy.26 These four choices demand 
consideration  when constitutional damages are sought.  
 
The functional approach is meritorious for one more reason: not every breach of a right will 
call for constitutional damages. Not all constitutional violations give rise to a damages claim.27 
In this regard a functional approach prevents the acceptance and use of constitutional 
damages from having far-reaching and unintended consequences. Such an approach would 
inform us that where the goal is single, for example, compensation, then existing delictual 
remedies will be sufficient. Similarly, in some situations a mere declarator would be sufficient. 
A functional approach would mean that constitutional damages are only granted in deserving 
cases, while at the same time meaning that the existence of a delictual or other alternative 
remedy does not necessarily mean that a claimant cannot succeed in a constitutional 
damages claim. The question of the co-existence of constitutional damages and the private 
 
17 This approach has been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Canada. The court states in Ward (supra) para 24, 
that: ‘A functional approach to damages finds damages to be appropriate and just to the extent that they serve 
a useful function or purpose. This approach has been adopted in awarding non-pecuniary damages in personal 
injury cases (Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229), and, in my view, a similar approach is 
appropriate in determining when damages are ‘appropriate and just’ under s 24(1) of the Charter’. 
18 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
19 MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA). 
20 Levine et al (note 13). 
21 Ibid 3. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Gene R Nichol ‘Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims’ (1989) 75(6) Virginia LR 1117, 1133. 
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delictual remedy is thus not one without an answer. It should lie upon the litigant to pick and 
pursue a cause of action, in what can be termed a choice approach. The nature of the violation 
is a key consideration. For instance, systematic violations of fundamental rights as opposed 
to isolated violations call for structural remedies.28 Ngcobo J noted in Hoffman v South African 
Airways29 that invariably, the nature of the right infringed and the nature of the infringement 
will provide guidance as to the appropriate relief in a particular case.  
A choice approach would work in a manner in which Bishop articulated as follows:  ‘a litigant 
should not have to fail at claiming indirect damages or prove that they will be ineffective to 
qualify for direct relief. Whether a court should award direct or indirect damages should 
depend on all the facts of the matter. The fact that a person framed a claim in terms of direct 
relief rather than indirect relief should not be used to deny them any relief at all. For what is 
ultimately at stake is the vindication of a constitutional right.’30  
Concerns regarding preventing the creation of a parallel system of law are allayed by the 
courts determining appropriateness of a remedy on the facts of the case. Facts are the 
ultimate decider. The onus rests on the plaintiff who is claiming constitutional damages to 
establish why they are the most appropriate relief, with the State showing why constitutional 
damages should not be granted. A claim should be supported on the facts, and it is those facts 
that would determine whether a constitutional damages claim is meritorious, or a delictual 
claim would have been more appropriate. As Bishop has noted, ‘No formula or algorithm 
exists for courts charged with determining which remedy is appropriate. Indeed, the chosen 
remedy most often turns on the facts and the relief pursued by the person asserting a 
constitutional claim’.31 In their evaluation the courts must have regard to the consequences 
of imposing liability in each case, bearing in mind that the imposition of this species of liability 
is intended to lead to a higher standard of care in the way public officials and bodies carry out 
their work.32 Other factors include the impact of the violation on the victim,33 and violations 
which result in the imprisonment of the victim, for instance, should not be tolerated, even 
temporarily.34 Yet another vital consideration is the comparative balancing of the interests of 
the parties concerned.35 This achieves fairness as a principle. In an attempt to give substance 
to the term ‘appropriate relief’ the SCA has stated that the word ‘appropriate’ means 
‘specially suitable’ or ‘proper’.36 The appeal court referred to the CC’s decision in Hoffmann37 
 
28 Currie and De Waal (note 15) 182.  
29 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 45.  
30 Michael Bishop ‘Constitutional Remedies’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed 
(Original Service 06-08) 9-157. 
31 Michael Bishop ‘Constitutional Remedies’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed 
(Original Service 06-08) 9-151. 
32 Clive Lewis Judicial Remedies in Public Law (4th ed) (2009) Sweet & Maxwell 545 (14-023). 
33 Currie and De Waal (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1, Constitutional law (1st ed) 
(2001) 289. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Abram Chayes ‘The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’ (1976) 89 Harv LR 1281. 
36 Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshababala-Msimang 2005 (3) SA 238 (SCA) para 76. 
37 Note 30 paras 42-43 cited in Pharmaceutical Society (note 34). 
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in which it was stated that in the context of the Constitution appropriateness imports the 
elements of justice and fairness. According to the CC, fairness ‘requires a consideration of the 
interests of all those who might be affected by the order'.38 
While constitutional damages may appear to be relief aimed at satisfying the individual 
litigant concerned, the vindicatory nature of the relief sends a message beyond the plaintiff. 
Thus, it is not correct to say that constitutional damages do not meet the characteristics of 
structural relief. It must also be borne in mind that constitutional vindication is not a goal to 
be attained by one super remedy. Rather, it is a cocktail of several constitutional remedies 
that collectively achieve this goal, including constitutional damages. 
 
Ultimately a shift in judicial attitude is required. Judicial remedies are primarily a domain for 
the courts, and the judiciary cannot wait upon the legislature to prescribe remedies. If 
nothing, then a measure of judicial activism in required. This is not to say the courts should 
be blind to practical considerations, but rather that they should have the willingness to realise 
the full potential of constitutional damages, and the open-mindedness to accept its viability 
as a remedy.  
 
8.3.3 Special factors?  
 
The ‘special factors’ or special remedy approach to constitutional damages should be 
rejected. Not only is it inconsistent with progressive public law litigation but it takes the 
remedies regime backwards to where equitable remedies were only granted as a matter of 
‘extraordinary’ circumstances. It must no longer be accepted that breaching fundamental 
rights in itself is ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ such that constitutional damages are not appropriate 
for lack of ‘special’ factors and ‘extraordinary’ circumstances. There is nothing normal about 
breaching the Constitution. Chayes argues that surely the old sense of equitable remedies as 
‘extraordinary’ has faded.39 Where constitutional damages would constitute equitable just 
and appropriate relief, the courts should grant them and not hold on till they establish some 
‘special factors’.  
 
Allowing constitutional damages only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ where ‘special factors’ 
are present is predominantly an American approach, and should not be an option for South 
Africa. At its most ambitious this discretionary rationale would cast a considerable shadow 
over the practice of constitutional review.40 This is true given that special factors analysis is, 
by definition, or even by intention, unprincipled.41 The reality is that ‘a court creates distinct, 
standardless exceptions when it is worried that, in the future, it will be unable to live with the 
principle it announces. The special factors exception provides the court an escape hatch if 
 
38 Hoffmann (note 29) para 43. 
39 Chayes (note 35) 1281. 
40 Nichol (note 27) 1124. 
41 Ibid 1126. 
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circumstances, to the judicial mind, warrant.’42 It is for this reason that, in as much as the 
courts exercise their discretion to grant the most appropriate remedy, the special factors 
approach must be rejected.43 Following a special factors approach in South Africa will result 
in predictable outcomes: the perpetual underdevelopment of the constitutional damages 
remedy.  
 
8.3.4 The four-stage test 
 
As to process, the four-stage test formulated by the Canadian Supreme Court in Ward and 
reproduced in various forms in New Zealand and Trinidad and Tobago jurisprudence is a 
concept that would work for South Africa, as detailed and discussed in Chapter 5. First, the 
claimant must establish that a constitutional right has been violated. Second, the claimant 
must show why damages are an appropriate and just remedy to the extent that they serve a 
useful function or purpose. In the third stage there is a shift in onus, with the State rebutting 
the damages claim through presenting countervailing factors that defeat the functionality of 
damages or render them inappropriate or unjust. Should the government fail to rebut the 
damages claim the court moves on to the fourth and final step, which is the assessment of 
quantum. Once more, the guiding principle is that the amount awarded should be just and 
appropriate, and the approach to assessment of quantum should be goal-oriented and 
functional, with the test to determine whether constitutional damages are the appropriate 
remedy applying mutatis mutandis to the assessment of quantum. Here the court must focus 
on the breach of constitutional rights as an independent wrong worthy of compensation in 
its own right.  
 
Structuring a constitutional damages remedy in this way helps address the concern of 
whether in a constitutional society the remedies available augment or facilitate what the 
substantive law promises.44 There is thus a gap-bridging utility in this endeavour. In what 
follows, I address key procedural and structural aspects relevant to the functional approach 
that I propose.  
 
8.4 THE STATE AS DEFENDANT 
 
An action for public law damages lies against the State and not against individual actors or 
non-state juristic persons. Distinctively, actions against individual actors should be pursued in 
 
42 Ibid. 
43 Similarly, Nichol (note 27) 1153 makes a case for the abolition of this approach in the US in the following 
terms: ‘In my view, the special factors exception should be abolished. The recognition of damages claims under 
the Constitution is an acceptable, even essential, aspect of constitutional interpretation. Values that serve to 
defeat such claims should, at a minimum, be similarly constitutional in pedigree. The special factors concept has 
strayed very far from that central determination.’ 
44 See Vicky Jackson and Mark Tushnet Comparative Constitutional Law (3rd ed) (2014) Foundation Press 155, 
who discuss the dichotomy in substance and procedure in attaining constitutional rights.  
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accordance with existing causes of action, that is, at common law and in statute, although the 
underlying policy considerations that are engaged when awarding private law damages 
against State actors may be relevant when awarding public law damages, and ‘such 
considerations may be appropriately kept in mind’.45 This is by no means to suggest that the 
law should not develop in the direction of public remedies for private violations of 
constitutional rights.  
The immediate question is, why are constitutional damages claimable only against the State 
and not private violators of constitutional rights? There is a difference between a private 
citizen and the State violating a constitutional right of an individual. Foundationally, 
constitutional damages represent attempts to render governments and their officials and 
employees accountable for the constitutional harm they cause.46 The nature of the remedy is 
to require the State on behalf of society at large to compensate an individual for breaches of 
the individual’s constitutional rights. This is an aspect the Canadian Supreme Court addressed 
in Ward, emphasising that an action for public law damages lies against the State and not 
against individual actors.   
 
Where the State is concerned with the violation of constitutional rights, it is using power in 
the public sphere (public power) and there is an asymmetrical power relationship between 
the private citizen and the State. Whitman correctly points out that in constitutional cases, 
the person who is said to have wronged another is by definition someone who has a special 
power to do harm because of his government position.47 Not only are the rights in the Bill of 
Rights meant to protect citizens from bureaucratic overreach and abuse of power by the State 
and its functionaries, but the State itself is supposed to be the main protector of people’s 
rights. It therefore becomes more reprehensible when the State violates the rights of the 
private citizens who entrust public power into its hands to exercise it for the greater good of 
society.  
None of the comparative jurisdictions surveyed in Chapter 5, or any that I am aware of, allows 
for constitutional damages for horizontal violations of constitutional rights. The rationale is 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court per Brennan J writing for the majority in 
Bivens: ‘An agent acting—albeit unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States 
possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority 
other than his own’.48 
There are fundamental differences in the philosophies underlying the violation of 
constitutional rights on the one hand and a delict on the other. In delict, when a state 
functionary acts in the course and scope of their employment, their conduct is attributed to 
 
45 Ibid.  
46 Sheldon Nahmod, Michael Wells and Thomas Eaton Constitutional Torts (1995) Anderson Publishing Company, 
Cincinnati 1. 
47 Christina B Whitman ‘Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts’ (1997) 72 Chicago-Kent LR 675. 
48 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics 40 3 U.S. 388 (1971) 392. 
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the State, leaving the State vicariously liable. However, the trajectory that constitutional law 
cases - constitutional damages cases included, have followed is that the State is not liable 
through vicarious liability but is directly liable for violating the Constitution through its 
representative functionary, entrusted in his own capacity with public power. This is important 
as the State will not be allowed to escape liability by disassociating itself from the conduct of 
its functionary when such a functionary has been placed in a position to violate the 
Constitution because of the public power he or she is vested with.  
The liability of the State in the case of constitutional damages is thus, strictly speaking, not 
based on the theory of vicarious liability for a tort committed by its servants, but rather 
primary liability for a wrong committed by the State in its own name. In Maharaj v Attorney 
General of Trinidad and Tobago 2,49 the court spoke as follows: 
 
‘Lord Diplock put it succinctly when he said in relation to redress under the constitution of Trinidad and 
Tobago – “The claim for redress under 6 (1) for what has been done by a judge is a claim against the 
State for what has been done in the exercise of the judicial power of the State. This is not vicarious 
liability; it is liability of the State itself. It is not a liability in tort at all: it is a liability in the public law of 
the State not of the judge himself, which has been newly created by Section 6 (I) and (2) of the 
constitution"’. 
 
Nonetheless, this is an aspect of disputed positions as some jurisdictions prefer to 
characterise the State liability as vicarious. Notwithstanding, whether the liability is 
characterised as vicarious or direct makes no practical difference to the claimant.  
 
8.5 THE ELEMENTS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES CLAIM 
 
An action for damages in delict consists of six elements- conduct, wrongfulness, unlawfulness, 
causation, fault and harm.50 More often than not, delictual cases turn primarily on 
wrongfulness, causation and fault. The question then is whether these elements are a pre-
requisite for a constitutional damages claim. This is critical not only to the extent that it 
establishes the requisites of a model constitutional damages case, but also to the extent that 
it delineates differences between delictual and under constitutional damages. 
Generally, there is consensus that delictual elements are not applicable in toto and mutatis 
mutandis to constitutional damages claims. Rather, it is sufficient for a claimant to prove the 
violation of a right, and to establish that constitutional damages are an appropriate remedy 
in the circumstances. Judicial discretion in the granting of constitutional damages is thus not 
a check-list exercise of satisfying certain fixed elements. Satisfying the requirements of 
violation of a specified right – of which each right may require proof of violation in different 
ways and degrees, is enough to establish that a constitutional wrong has been done. That, of 
course, must be a violation that is not saved by the general limitations clause (s 36) or any 
 
49 1979 A.C. 399.  
50 Max Loubser and Rob Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) Oxford University Press Southern 
Africa, Cape Town 7 and 21-22. 
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internal savings provision within the clause that provides for the right, or any other 
constitutional clause that may have the effect of removing or limiting liability for the State.  
The violation of constitutional rights is said to have occurred when an individual is denied 
access to his or her right, when the enjoyment of that right is unduly limited, or when an 
individual is persecuted for having exercised his or her rights. Practically and functionally the 
burden of proof will not be the same in delict and in the violation of constitutional rights. 
Whereas delict is proven on an established test that takes the litigant through the six 
elements, violation of constitutional rights is defined differently depending on the rights in 
question. This may involve different elements in each case. The import of this is that the 
constitutional damages case is not as structured as a delictual case, and need not follow an 
element by element enquiry as in delict. What needs to be determined is the violation of a 
constitutional right, including the manner in which it occurs, and the effects thereof on the 
victim and on society. Next, the court will then determine whether monetary damages are 
the appropriate remedy in the circumstances. This is because in constitutional law the remedy 
varies depending on facts and circumstances while in delict the remedy is default.  
Nevertheless, the elements of delict may find relevance and application in some of the 
enquiries into whether a constitutional rights violation has occurred, and should therefore 
not be disregarded completely. In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Von Abo,51 
the court held that fault and causation are particularly important factors when considering 
constitutional remedies.52 This suggests that a party should show that his or her harm was 
causally connected to the breach of a constitutional right, before an award of damages can 
be considered.53 This can only be logical given that while the nature of constitutional damages 
does not follow the delictual enquiry, it is recognised that there cannot be damage without 
causation and fault. The State must have acted, or omitted to act in a way that causes a 
violation of the fundamental right(s) of the claimant. It must be made clear however that 
insofar as constitutional rights are concerned, the fault element would almost always be 
inherent in the finding of a violation. If there is no fault a finding of violation would rarely be 
made – unless strict liability applies. Alternatively, there would be a violation complete with 
fault, but then the violation is allowable through the limitations clause or some other savings 
clause.  
An important element to consider is harm. Harm is a pre-requisite in delict and would differ 
in nature depending on whether the action is brought under the actio legis aquiliae, the actio 
iniuriarum or the Germanic action for pain and suffering.54 The actio legis aquiliae requires 
out-of-pocket financial loss. The actio iniuriarum deals with injury to personality interests and 
 
51 2011 (5) SA 262 (SCA)  
52 Para 33: ‘In order to decide on an appropriate remedy, the nature of the breach must also be considered. This 
brings the issue of causation into focus’. 
53 Maharaj (2) (note 49) para 33.  
54 Johann Neethling, JM Potgieter and PJ Visser Law of Delict (6th ed) (2010) Lexis Nexis, Durban 5; Loubser and 
Midgley (note 50) 27-28. 
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requires contumelia or injuria, being hurt feelings or hurt reputation. The action for pain and 
suffering deals with non-patrimonial harm, the loss of enjoyment of the amenities of life, 
and/or actual physical pain and suffering. With constitutional damages the harm could be any 
of these. There could be out of pocket financial loss when one’s property is violated by the 
State, or there could be contumelia when one’s dignity is impaired, and there could be loss of 
enjoyment of amenities of life and actual pain and suffering when one is tortured and 
physically disabled in the process. All these harms are acceptable under the constitutional 
damages claim. The fundamental question is whether there has been violation of a 
constitutional right, and since constitutional damages are awarded for the purposes of 
declaring and vindicating legal rights, proof of the harm itself is not required, unlike in delict.55 
Whenever there is a proven violation of a constitutional right there is harm in one form or 
another, keeping in mind that the harm is always beyond the individual but also to society’s 
interests in the protection of the Bill of Rights.  
Both in Modderklip56 and Kate57 the awards were based on quantifiable financial harm. But 
would this mean that constitutional damages may only be awarded where financial harm can 
be proven? This cannot be so. The violation of constitutional rights involves loss on many 
fronts. Some of the loss is not financial but costing the affected more than a mere loss of 
money. Constitutional rights are beyond issues of financial protection or security, and cannot 
be reduced to such. The financial loss compensated for in Modderklip and Kate happened to 
simply direct the court in the quantification of the damages, not that the quantifiability was 
the determinant factor for the granting of the relief in the first place. Rather, the court in both 
cases directed payments to be made in terms of existing calculations for ease of 
quantification, and because it simply made sense to do so.  
Currie and De Waal provide a useful list of ten considerations that come into play in 
determining appropriateness of the constitutional damages remedy.58 These are: (1) the need 
for effective remedies;59 (2) a court order must not only afford effective relief to a successful 
litigant, but also to all similarly situated people;60 (3) good governance;61 (4) separation of 
powers and deference to legislative powers; (5) identity of the violator; (6) the nature of the 
violation; (7) consequences or impact of the violation on the victim; (8) fault and causation;62 
 
55 Loubser and Midgley (note 50); Jean C Love ‘Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights’ 
(1979) 67(6) California LR 1246-7.  
56 Modderklip (note 18). 
57 Kate (note 19). 
58 Currie and De Waal (note 15) 181-183. 
59 Citing National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 65.  
60 Ibid para 82; Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2009 (1) SA 390 (CC) para 56 and Hoffman (note 29) 
paras 42-43.  
61 For instance, the CC has refused to grant relief that would lead to ‘serious inconsistencies’ in the legislative 
framework in Geldenhuys v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 (2) SA 310 (CC) para 42.  
62 Von Abo (note 51) para 33. 
170 
 
(9) victim responsibility;63 and (10) prospects of successful implementation of the court’s 
order.64  
 
With all public law actions and remedies, the end goal is the protection and welfare of society. 
When a crime occurs, for instance, the harm assumes a public character and affects society 
at large. To illustrate how far this goes, there is a recognised category of victimless crimes and 
offences at law.65 Here there is no specific human being who can be identified as a victim, but 
the victim is society as a whole through endangering or violating public safety, peace, order, 
morality or health. Thus, when a criminal is imprisoned, or is made to pay a fine, this is not 
done to satisfy the victim or complainant but to do justice to society, yet in that process the 
victim is not forgotten. It is for this reason that in sentencing the court will look at the triad of 
the crime, the victim and society.66 Where a victim has suffered damage or loss of property 
due to crime, the court may order the accused to compensate the victim in terms of s 300 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act.67 This compensation is not the core of the trial or the justice 
sought, but is a means by which both individual and public justice is attained, in addition to 
imprisonment or a fine. Similarly, a violation of the Constitution by the State, while not 
causing actual financial loss and actual physical harm, has harmful effects to society and the 
constitutional order. In the same way, in awarding constitutional damages the court would 
look at the constitutional violation, the victim (both the individual and society), and the 
offender (how the offender has taken advantage of his public powers to violate rights, or how 
s/he has misused, abused or neglected such powers). With both criminal sanction and 
constitutional damages as public remedies, the court cannot be confined to looking at the 
parties only.  
 
Finally, the arguments advanced above draw support from the French position, as articulated 
by Quézel-Ambrunaz in discussing of the elements of a damages case. Relying on a case 
before the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), Quézel-Ambrunaz argues that mere proof 
of violation of privacy entitles the victim to obtain compensation.68 Whereas in an action for 
civil liability the plaintiff must prove fault or other basis for liability, the damage caused and 
the causation, according to this ruling he cites, the proof of the fault alone is sufficient in a 
constitutional damages case and damage and causation are presumed because of the nature 
 
63 Such as the victim being responsible for the delay in the discharge of duties, or exercise of own rights. See 
Sanders v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) para 33-34 and Billiton Aluminium SA Ltd t/a 
Hillside Aluminuim v Khanyile 2010 (5) BCLR 422 (CC). 
64 See Hoffman (note 29) para 45; Von Abo (note 51) paras 26-27; and Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2001 (2) SA 609 (E) 633A.  
65 These are crimes and offences which do not involve any harm to the person, property or personality of 
another, but nonetheless are illegal and criminal. Examples would include drug use, driving without a licence, 
public drinking, and illegal gambling. 
66 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A); S v Rabie 1975 SA 855 (A).  
67 Act 51 of 1977 ‘CHAPTER 29: COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION’.  
68 Citing Cass. Civ. 1, November 5, 1996, Bull. I,378. 
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of the right infringed. The Cour de cassation broke it down as follows in a case of privacy:69 
since violation of privacy had been established, there was necessarily damage requiring 
compensation.70 Thus violation of a right is itself damage.  
 
8.6 RIGHTS FOR WHICH CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES ARE CLAIMABLE 
 
Firstly, should constitutional damages be available only for rights contained in the Bill or 
Rights? This question is posed in the context of s 39(3) of the Constitution which provides that 
‘The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they 
are consistent with the Bill’. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,71 with added reference to the 
Interim Constitution, the CC explained as follows:  
 
‘What section 35(3) and section 33(3) of the interim Constitution make clear is that the Constitution 
was not intended to be an exhaustive code of all rights that exist under our law. The reference in section 
33(3) of the interim Constitution and section 39(3) of the 1996 Constitution is to “other rights”, and not 
to rights enshrined in the respective Constitutions themselves. That there are rights beyond those 
expressly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that there are two systems of law. […] There is, 
however, only one system of law and within that system the Constitution is the supreme law with which 
all other law must comply.’72 
 
The meaning of this provision is that there are rights beyond those enumerated in the 
Constitution. However, that does not necessarily mean that every constitutional remedy is 
available to these other rights that are not in the Constitution. For this assertion, I am fortified 
by the case of Modderklip,73 in which the SCA defined constitutional damages as ‘damages 
due to the breach of a constitutionally entrenched right’. (My emphasis). The meaning of this 
is that what defines ‘constitutional’ damages is the fact that the right sought to be remedied 
is in the Constitution itself. This, of course, does not necessarily extend to every constitutional 
remedy. Some remedies do lend themselves to rights that are not constitutionally 
entrenched.  
Secondly, the question remains whether constitutional damages are claimable for the breach 
of every constitutional right, or the cause of action does not subsist for some rights. In Fose 
the following statement was made by Ackermann J in his majority opinion:  
 
‘Notwithstanding these differences it seems to me that there is no reason in principle why “appropriate 
relief” should not include an award of damages, where such an award is necessary to protect and 
 
69 Cass. Civ. 3, February, 25 2004, Bull. III, 41. 
70 See Christophe Quézel-Ambrunaz ‘Compensation and Human Rights (From A French Perspective)’ (2011) 4 
NUJSLR 189, 194. 
71 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC). 
72 Ibid para 49.  
73 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal 
Resources Centre, amici curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, amici curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) para 43. 
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enforce Chapter 3 rights. Such awards are made to compensate persons who have suffered loss as a 
result of the breach of a statutory right if, on a proper construction of the statute in question, it was 
the legislature’s intention that such damages should be payable, and it would be strange if damages 
could not be claimed for, at least, loss occasioned by the breach of a right vested in the claimant by the 
Supreme law. When it would be appropriate to do so, and what the measure of damages should be, will 
depend on the circumstances of each case and the particular right which has been infringed.’74 (My 
emphasis).  
What Ackermann J suggests is that whether constitutional damages are to be awarded, and 
to what measure, will depend on the circumstances of each case and the nature of the 
particular right for which a claim is made. Does this suggest that certain rights may attract 
constitutional damages and not others?  
As has already been stated, constitutional damages are simply a remedy that is considered 
after liability has been determined. A violation would have already been proven. The 
determinant considerations remain the effectiveness and appropriateness of the remedy. A 
hypothetical application of this test to different kinds of violations would reveal that not all 
breaches open up to claims for constitutional damages. This principle was laid down by Wallis 
JA in Mboweni,75 holding that even if it is found that a constitutional right has been infringed, 
that does not necessarily establish the right to claim damages, for ‘[n]ot every breach of 
constitutional duty is equivalent to unlawfulness in the delictual sense and therefore not 
every breach of a constitutional obligation constitutes unlawful conduct in relation to 
everyone affected by it.’76 Further, even if infringement could be found there remains the 
issue of whether constitutional damages are the appropriate constitutional remedy for that 
breach.77 Although Wallis JA’s attempt to measure a constitutional damages claim by resort 
to delictual elements should be faulted, it is clear from his statement that there is no question 
of ranking rights and selecting those for which constitutional damages are appropriate, but 
simply a consideration of appropriateness at the remedial stage after breach and liability have 
already been established. It is therefore inappropriate and undesirable to list rights which 
lend themselves to constitutional damages as this can be fluid depending on facts and 
circumstances.  
The utility of constitutional damages, together with other considerations, would dismiss an 
assertion that such a remedy would be applicable to certain rights in the Bill of Rights and not 
others. Firstly, a constitutional damages claim has more to do with vindication of the 
constitutional right as opposed to the nature of the constitutional right itself. Secondly, the 
notions of indivisibility, interrelatedness and interdependence inform us that one cannot 
arbitrarily pick and choose which rights are to be regarded as worthy of constitutional 
damages over others. This would not only violate the fundamental and basic universal 
principles of human rights, but also the architecture of the Constitution which sets the rights 
 
74 Fose (note 3) para 60.  
75 Minister of Police v Mboweni and Another 2014 (6) SA 256 (SCA). 
76 Ibid para 18. 
77 Ibid para 20. 
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at par, without any preferential order expressed or implied.78 Finally, I would borrow the 
French expression of legal principle that there is no hierarchy in the protection of lawful 
interests.79  
 
8.7 ASSESSING QUANTUM 
 
Having established a case for constitutional damages, it remains for the court to determine 
quantum. This is one of the perceived areas of difficulty with constitutional damages, with 
some arguing the impossibility of apportioning an amount to a violation of a constitutional 
right. The argument is that there is no price tag to a right, such that it would not be possible 
to apportion money based on the ‘abstract’ value of a right infringed. Granted, there is no 
monetary value fixed to constitutional rights. What the argument conveniently overlooks, 
however, is that there is also no price tag when the right is dealt with under the delictual actio 
iniuriarum. Yet courts do not exactly struggle to calculate an amount to be paid for 
contumelia, or invasion of privacy, or defamation of character. As with the determination of 
the appropriateness of the remedy itself, a functional approach would, with relative ease, 
lend to the assessment of quantum. It is not hard to see why quantum assessment in 
constitutional damages is and must be distinct from the manner of quantifying damages in 
delict, especially under the aquilian action.80  
There are cases in which the courts have granted constitutional damages which in delict 
would be classified as ‘special damages’ because these are amounts determined or fixed by a 
certain specific criterion. For example, we have seen how in Kate and Modderklip the 
damages awarded were essentially ‘special damages’ in the sense that in the former case 
damages were quantified by calculating interest at the prescribed rate of 15.5% per annum, 
and in the latter an amount was calculated in terms of s 12(1) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 
1975.81 Here there was no need for ‘thumb suck’ figures to be assessed by the courts as is the 
case with what would be general damages in delict.  
In dealing with quantum in Kate,82 the court made the following remarks:  
‘It has not been shown that Kate suffered direct financial loss and it is most unlikely that she did, for 
the grant was destined to be consumed and not invested, but the loss was just as real. To be held in 
poverty is a cursed condition. Quite apart from the physical discomfort of deprivation it reduces a 
human in his or her dignity. The inevitable result of being unlawfully deprived of a grant that is required 
for daily sustenance is the unnecessary further endurance of that condition for so long as the 
unlawfulness continues. That is the true nature of the loss that Kate suffered. There is no empirical 
monetary standard against which to measure a loss of that kind. Counsel for Kate submitted that in the 
absence of such a measure she should be awarded an amount equivalent to the interest that is 
 
78 The only ‘grading’ of rights in the Constitution, and remotely so, is to be found in s 37(5), where non-derogable 
rights and the specific subsections are listed.    
79 Quézel-Ambrunaz (note 70) 200-202. 
80 This difference in assessing constitutional and delictual damages was mentioned in Maharaj v Attorney 
General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2) [1979] AC 385 (PC) 400. 
81 Note 73 above para 52(b) and (c). This was confirmed by the CC.  
82 Kate (note 19). 
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recognised in law to be payable when money is unlawfully withheld […] and I think we ought to adopt 
it. Counsel were agreed that the damages ought not to accumulate such as to exceed the capital 
amount.’83 
Here the circumstances of the case allowed for a practical way of calculating damages using 
the prescribed rate of interest of 15.5% per annum, and a similar approach was followed in 
Mahambehlala.84  
What we see in these cases is but an example of approaching quantification, and not a 
definitive approach. Contrary to what cases like Minister of Defence v Dunn85 and Darson 
Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town86 suggested that proof of pecuniary loss is required 
for constitutional damages to be awarded (albeit in respect of PAJA damages – which I 
demonstrated to be constitutional damages in Chapter 4), this is in fact not a requirement for 
constitutional damages. That is a preserve for delictual damages where the primary agenda 
is to make good a loss.  
 
So where it is possible for a figure to be calculated and precisely determined based on a 
formula applicable to the case, then that should be followed for reasons of expediency. 
Where applicable and necessary the damages here would serve to place the plaintiff in the 
position they would have been had the breach not occurred. In no way however would this 
imply that such damages become compensatory. Rather, it is simply a practical and 
convenient way to calculate quantum. There is no doubt however that such cases will be 
exceptions as at most times the courts will be seized with violations that do not involve 
formulas through which determinable damages could be calculated. 
What must be clear is that constitutional damages cannot be negated for the sole reason that 
there is no objective criterion for determining quantum. Arguments to the contrary are 
disingenuous and dabble in double standards. As demonstrated above, it has always been a 
practice in delict in general damages matters for the court to assess and come up with a figure 
that it believes would do justice to the case and cause. There is absolutely no reason in 
principle, in substance or both that can then seek to deny this approach when it comes to 
constitutional damages. While admittedly, quantification would continue to be contested, 
quantification alone should not be reason for the courts to shy away from awarding 
constitutional damages. As the French have argued, it is politically indecent for a State to be 
found liable for violation of human rights, and to this end the ruling itself, without regard to 
 
83 Ibid para 33.  
84 Mahambehlala (note 16) page 355-356: 
‘Bearing in mind the observation of Kriegler J in Fose's case … para [97] … it seems to me that it would 
be just and equitable for an aggrieved person in the position of the applicant to be placed in the same 
position in which she would have been had her fundamental right to lawful and reasonable 
administrative action not been unreasonably delayed, and that relief placing her in such a position 
would be “appropriate” as envisaged by the Constitution.’ 
85 2007 (6) SA 52 (SCA). 
86 2007 (4) SA 488 (C). 
175 
 
the amount of damages, may help in the enforcement of human rights.87 There is thus a 
strong political and legal statement to be made when a court pronounces that the State has 
violated constitutional rights and must pay damages. Such a statement is made stronger in a 
pronouncement of constitutional damages as opposed to delictual damages for the reasons 
advanced throughout this thesis.  
 
Where precise calculation is not practically possible, then there is nothing irregular, unlawful, 
or inappropriate to grant damages as ‘reparations’ or ‘satisfaction’/solatium, just in the same 
way damages are awarded under the actio iniuriarum. This is done with due regard to fairness 
under the circumstances.88 For non-pecuniary harm and other intangible interests such as 
reputation, voting rights, liberty, and privacy, general damages are presumed although the 
scope of the presumption varies.89 This is how the courts have always made delictual awards 
for personality rights without any specific amount being proved as harm or loss.90 These 
damages cannot therefore be dismissed as ‘abstract’. As with ‘nominal damages’, these 
typically consist of an allocation awarded upon proof that the defendant has violated the 
plaintiff's legal rights.91 The purpose of this award is to provide some relief for the 
infringement in the form of monetary satisfaction and to attempt to assuage the feelings of 
injustice that the plaintiff may feel.92 In all instances courts make the award ex aequo et bono, 
which means that the award reflects what a court considers to be fair and just under the 
circumstances.93  
The above discussion demonstrates that there may be instances where damages in 
constitutional law would fall into the classifications of special and general damages if an 
analogy is to be drawn with delict. Although no such formal classification is necessary or 
motivated for here, the courts may simply use this distinction to help them reach a decision 
on quantum. To that extent I would give credence and weight to the assertion in Merson v 
Cartwright94 (Bahamas) that: ‘The comparable common law measure of damages will often 
be a useful guide in assessing the amount of compensation. But this measure is no more than 
a guide because the award of compensation […] is discretionary, and moreover, the violation 
of the constitutional right will not always be co-terminous with the cause of action of law’. 
 
Some scholars have suggested further means of ascertaining quantum. Funnah and Sibanda 
have argued for ‘case-specific amount ceilings’.95 The two propose that some standard should 
 
87 Quézel-Ambrunaz (note 70) 193. 
88 Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers Ltd 1941 AD 194, 199. 
89 Love (note 55) 1245. 
90 See Loubser and Midgley (note 48) 400-402. 
91 Ibid 427. 
92 Ibid; Love (note 55) 1246-7.  
93 Ibid.  
94 [2005] UKPC 38.  
95 Abdul Karim Funnah and Omphemetse Sibanda ‘Towards a Selective Awarding of Punitive Damages Awards 
in South Africa? A Comment on Fose v The Minister of Safety and Security’ (2008) 48(2) Codicillus 36, 39. 
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be introduced to set a limit on the amount of damages in certain cases, a model which they 
argue ‘has become an important feature of punitive damages reforms in the United States’.96 
In Alabama, they argue, the limitation of the amount of damages depends on the nature of 
the harm - whether the harm is physical or non-physical, and on the type of the defendant 
and the defendant’s business’ net worth.97 Similarly, they proceed, the State of Alaska limits 
the amount of damages to be awarded in terms of the nature of the wrong and of the 
defendant.98 As pragmatic as the suggestion may sound, this is a potential minefield as it 
essentially amounts to putting price tags on rights. On what basis do we determine which 
right is more important than the other, and what objective criteria do we use to assign value 
to rights, if any? In addition, this method would mean little attention is paid to the specific 
circumstances of the case before the court, yet it is the violation and the circumstances that 
have always guided the court in determining quantum even in delict.  
 
Another option, suggested by French scholar Quézel-Ambrunaz, is to rank rights.99 This 
suggestion is quite close to that of Funnah and Sibanda above as it amounts to making 
decisions as to what rights are more important than others. Quézel-Ambrunaz does admits 
that French tort law does not apply a hierarchy among the protected rights, and full 
compensation of any legal injury is the rule and the defences are the same whichever interest 
is violated.100 Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the character of human rights 
attached to the violated interest leads the judges to modify their approach towards proof of 
 
96 Ibid para 48-49.  
97 Ibid. They cite as follows: ‘See Punitive Damages Reform: SB 137 (1999): Ala. Code § 6-11-21. The law limits 
the award of punitive damages in most non-physical injury cases to the greater of three times the award of 
compensatory damages or $500,000. Limits the award of punitive damages in non-physical injury cases against 
businesses with a net worth of less than $2 million to the greater of $50,000 or 10% of the business’s net worth 
up to $200,000. Limits the award of punitive damages in physical injury cases to the greater of three times the 
award of compensatory damages or $1.5 million. Prohibits application of the rule of joint and several liability in 
actions for punitive damages, except for wrongful death actions, actions for intentional infliction of physical 
injury, and class actions. Provides that the limit on punitive damages will be adjusted on January 1, 2003 and 
increased at three-year intervals in accordance with the Consumer Price Index. See further Gold ‘Trial by Jury 
and Statutory Caps on Punitive Damages: Lessons for Alabama from Ohio’s Constitutional History’ (2001) Cumb 
LR 287’. 
98 Funnah and Sibanda (note 95) 48-49, citing as follows: ‘Punitive Damages Reform: HB 58 (1997). Limits the 
award of punitive damages in most cases to the greater of three times the award of compensatory damages or 
$500,000. Limits the award of punitive damages to the greater of four times compensatory damages, four times 
the aggregate amount of financial gain, or $7,000,000, when the defendant’s action is motivated by financial 
gain. Limits punitive damages in unlawful employment practices lawsuits to: $200,000, when the employer has 
less than 100 employees in the state; $300,000, when the employer has more than 100, but less than 200 
employees in the state; $400,000, when the employer has more than 200, but less than 500 employees in the 
state; and $500,000, when the employer has more than 500 employees in the state. Requires a plaintiff to show 
by “clear and convincing” evidence that a defendant acted with “reckless indifference” or was engaged in 
“outrageous” conduct. Requires the determination of awards for punitive damages to be made in a separate 
proceeding. Requires that 50% of punitive damages awards be paid to the state treasury. …’  
99 Quézel-Ambrunaz (note 70) 193-4. 
100 Ibid citing The Principles of European Tort Law (2005) European Group on Tort Law and E von Bar, E Clive and 
H Schulte-Nolke (eds) Draft Common Frame of Reference (2009). 
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damage, he says.101 Again, ranking of rights is not agreeable for the same reasons as with 
Funnah and Sibanda’s suggestion which raises more problems than solutions.  
 
Amounts awarded ought to be such that it does not cost litigants more to seek to vindicate 
their rights than they will receive in the end if successful. Anything less would inevitably 
invoke the question whether such a remedy is effective at all.102 One could, of course, argue 
the need to discourage litigants from approaching the courts seeking damages but to seek 
alternative dispute resolution, but that is not an enviable goal when it comes to vindication 
of rights. Quite the contrary, litigants should be encouraged to enforce their rights using legal 
process, including the courts. In any event, one can see the double standards in this argument 
given that the argument is never raised in respect of delictual claims.  
 
As for punitive damages, the court need not award a separate amount under the head of 
punitive damages. Rather a global award should be made. A court can make a punitive order 
without necessarily saying so, but rather through a global award without complicating the 
compensation with further categorisation. On the whole, compensation should be adjusted 
to reflect the intrinsic value of the breach. The New Zealand courts’ approach that awards 
should not be extravagant but such awards need not be nominal is agreeable. It is important 
to adopt this reasoning of the French: ‘[T]he economic analysis of law furnishes an ambiguous 
answer that the State will be incentivised to prevent the violation of human rights only if the 
cost of compensation for any violation is higher than the cost of prevention of such violations. 
By this approach, the higher the damages are, the better the enforcement of human rights 
is.’103 While pronouncing a violation of rights by the State is in itself a strong legal and political 
statement made upon which voters and citizens can act to hold the State accountable in other 
ways, the judiciary still needs to enforce that accountability as per the law, and this is achieved 
through a meaningful award that would force government to act and prevent future 
violations – if not for a moral or legal reason, then for an economic reason.  
 
8.8 RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
A point that has been frequently made in this research is that constitutional damages are a 
novel device in the context of South Africa. It has been indicated in Chapter 1 that there is 
minimal research in South Africa in this area. It is therefore pertinent that given what this 
research has covered, I end by suggesting ways that the research can be taken a step further. 
Constitutional damages are granted when the State violates the rights of an individual. It is a 
vertical approach. As Devenish outlines, traditionally a Bill of Rights was conceived and 
designed to protect individuals against abuse of State power.104 This was because the 
 
101 Quézel-Ambrunaz (note 70) 193-4. 
102 See Philpott (note 1) 234-35. 
103 Ibid 193. 
104 George E Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) Butterworths, Durban 24. 
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relationship between the individual and the State is not one of equality: the State obviously 
is more powerful and has far more resources than the individual.105 This has now changed by 
virtue of ss 8(1) and (2) of the Constitution, which stipulates that the Bill of Rights operates 
both horizontally and vertically.106 
 
The Constitution thus recognises that private individuals and non-state juristic persons can 
also violate the constitutional rights of individuals. Section 7 expressly provides for the 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, that is, it requires everyone to respect, promote 
and protect fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights, and equally places a duty on private 
individuals and non-state juristic entities. Depending on the circumstances, this means that a 
provision of the Bill of Rights may bind a natural or a juristic person.107 The clear difference in 
the application of the Bill of Rights in the interim era and in the post 1997 era in South Africa 
is made manifest by the 1996 CC decision in Du Plessis v De Klerk,108 where it ruled that 
Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution did not directly apply horizontally. This position in the 
Interim constitution changed in the Final Constitution. Devenish also points out that the 
phrasing of many specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as those dealing with children 
(s 28) and labour relations (s 23) indicates with clarity that they have a horizontal 
application.109 The issue of individual liability for constitutional damages when they violate 
fundamental constitutional rights is becoming important to ventilate. It must therefore be 
investigated in further research whether constitutional damages can and should be expanded 
to cover horizontal relationships, and if so, what approach should be taken.  The High Court 
in Snyman v Van Tonder110 passed an opportunity to pronounce on this question, where a 
private citizen was seeking constitutional damages from another citizen. However, damages 
were simply dismissed for non-exhaustion of other remedies, with the court stating that the 
Applicant claim could be met in delict – not necessarily because a private citizen cannot claim 
constitutional damages from another.  
 
Further, it remains an open question whether the French approach of ‘fundamentalisation of 
compensation’ should be adopted, that is, making constitutional damages a right.   
 
 
 
105 Ibid.  
106 These issue is discussed extensively is a long list of literature e.g. Karthy Govender ‘Horizontality revisited in 
the Light of Du Plessis v De Klerk and clause 8 of the Republic of south Africa Constitution Bill 1996’ (1996) 1(3) 
Human Rights and Constitutional Law Journal of SA 20; Van der Walk ‘Justice Kriegler’s Disconcerting Judgment 
in Du Plessis v De Klerk: Much ado about Direct Horizontal application (read Nothing)’ 1996 TSAR 732; Cheadle 
and Davis ‘The application of the 1996 Constitution in the Private Sphere’ (1997) SAJHR 45, 54; Smidt ‘Horizontal 
Rights: Fundamental Rights in the Private Sphere’ (1996) 4 Juta’s Business Law 153; and Pringle ‘Broadening Your 
Horizons: The Constitutional court decides on Retrospectivity and Horizontality’ (1996) 4 Juta’s Business Law 
167. 
107 Devenish (note 104) 24. 
108 (1996) 5 BCLR 658 (CC). 
109 Devenish (note 104) 25. 
110 [2017] ZAWCHC 60.  
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8.9 CONCLUSION 
 
South Africa is grappling with an action that gained momentum after 1993, not because that 
is when constitutional damages began to be considered worldwide, but because that is when 
a new constitutional culture emerged in South Africa. The test for constitutional damages 
must reflect a reasoned balance between remedying constitutional violations and public 
policy considerations, but the latter should never be used overly to frustrate the achievement 
of the former. This is an issue of competing interests, but in handling those, constitutional 
vindication should not give way, given the elevated legal status of the Bill of Rights.  
In all circumstances, the approach to follow in awarding relief directly under the Constitution 
is the need to give the Constitution and the Bill of Rights a generous and expansive 
interpretation rather than a narrow, technical or legalistic one. This will inevitably involve 
doing away with the undeniably archaic approach to remedies, to think in terms of a closed 
category of ‘tried-and-tested’ remedies.111 A healthy measure of judicial activism is 
appropriate,112 and of necessity, the obligation in a constitutional state of the courts to make 
the Constitution’s demands meaningful carries ramifications well beyond the glories of 
constitutional theory.113 As a legal document the Constitution carries the force of ultimate 
authority as opposed to mere political suggestion.114 This makes it susceptible to adjudication, 
an essential attribute of which is the application of a remedy.115 Thus ordering strong 
affirmative remedies such as constitutional damages will not mean that courts overstep their 
power but that they fulfil their constitutional mandate. Arguments of state immunity do not 
belong in a constitutional state, and boldness by the courts is not misplaced to hold 
government accountable.116 
To this end, the approach in Fose,117 a case which Swart describes as ‘unnecessarily 
conservative’,118 must promptly be revisited and corrected. The broadly conservative 
approach to damages that the South African judiciary has adopted, which sees damages ‘in 
the narrow and dated strictures of the common law only’,119 does not serve the new 
constitutional order well. Whatever little merit there is in ensuring that damages awards for 
human rights violations remain the exception rather than the norm, preferring an overly 
conservative approach would at times leave deserving plaintiffs without an effective 
 
111 Mia Swart ‘Left out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the Poorest of the Poor’ (2005) 21(2) 
SAJHR 215, 240. 
112 Judicial activism in the area of constitutional damages is required. This is discussed in full in Chapter 6.  
113 Nichol (note 27) 1117. 
114 Ibid 1137. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Swart (note 111) 240. 
117 Fose (note 3). 
118 Swart (note 111) 225. 
119 This is how Justice Moseneke described the invitation by the State to reject constitutional damages as good 
at law, where there are common law remedies, in the Life Esidemeni arbitration award at para 219. 
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remedy.120 Should one feel the need to treat constitutional damages as exceptional relief, 
then that relief may as well become the order of the day for constitutional breaches, for 
breaching the constitution in itself is exceptional behaviour. There is nothing normal about 
that. If that were accepted as a premise, then exceptional behaviour may as well be met with 
an exceptional remedy. Either way, constitutional damages cannot be suppressed with 
decency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 Philpott (note 1) 242. 
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